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The photo at the front page was taken by Nathan Went, August 2009. It shows the Praça 
dos Combatentes during the reconstruction. Behind the observers in the foreground, one 
may glimpse the roadwork for the prolongation of the Avenida das FPLM. The crowd in 
the background are Xikhelene vendors who remained at the place after the demolition of  
their market stalls.
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Abbreviations 
ASSOTSI Associação dos Operadores e Trabalhadores do Sector Informal / 
Association of Operators and Workers of the Informal Sector 
CBO Community Based Organization
CLEP Commission of Legal Empowerment of the Poor
CMI Christian Michelsens Institute
CMM Conselho Municipal de Maputo / Maputo Municipal Council
COMUTRA Comição da Mulher Trabalhadora / Committee of Female Workers
CSO Civil Society Organization
DMMF Direcção Municipal de Mercados e Feiras / Municipal Department for Markets 
and Fairs (of Maputo) 
FPLM Forças Populares da Libertação de Moçambique / Mozambican Popular Liberation 
Forces
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
Frelimo Frente de Libertação de Moçambique / Mozambican Liberation Front
IESE Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos / The Institute of Social and Economic 
Studies
GDEI Gabinete de Desenvolvimento Estratégico e Institutional / Institutional and Strategic 
Development Office
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HD Human Development
HDI Human Development Index
ILD Instituto Liberdad y Democracia / (Peruvian) Institute for Liberty and Democracy
ILO  International Labour Organization
IMF  International Monetary Fund
LEP  Legal Empowerment of the Poor
MZM  Mozambican Meticais
MZN  New Mozambican Meticais (1MZN = 0,17NOK/0,02EUR, 26.04.10)
NGO Non Governmental Organization
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OTM Organisação dos Trabalhadores de Moçambique / Organization of Mozambican 
Workers
PARPA Programma de Acção a Redução de Pobreza Absoluta / Action Plan for 
the Reduction of Absolute Poverty
PDMM Maputo Municipal Development Program
PEUMM Plano de Estrutura Urbana do Município de Maputo / The Municipality of Maputo 
Urban Structure Plan
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
PRE Programa de Reabilitação Económica / Economic Recovery Program 
PREALC Programa Regional de Empleo para América Latina y el Caribe / Regional 
Employment Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean 
RAP Resettlement Action Plan
Renamo Resistência Nacional Moçambicana / Mozambican National Resistance
RPF Resettlement Policy Framework
SAPs Structural Adjustment Programs
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises
TDM Telecommunicações De Moçambique / Mozambican Telecommunications
UEM Universidade Eduardo Mondlane / Eduardo Mondlane University (The public 
university in Maputo) 
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
WTO World Trade Organization
Non-English words frequently used in the thesis
banca  Removable market-stall made of wood
bairro Part of a city
barraca Fixed market-stall made of bricks and concrete
capulana Cloth with different patterns and colours. Used by women
chapa Here: Minibus used for collective transport
chefe de quarteirão Head of a quarter
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1    Introduction and  research   questions 
Informality and formalization
The discussion on informality has earned an increasing attention among academics, like for 
example Hernando de Soto (1989), Portes & Schauffler (1993), Chen (2002) and among policy 
making institutions such as International labour Organization (ILO) or the Commission on Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP). Informal economy is a concept which has had many working 
definitions. The one used here, will be the same as the one used by the CLEP (2006, p1), as: “all 
economic activities by workers and economic units that are, in law or in practice, not covered or 
insufficiently covered by formal arrangements”.  It  must be added to this  notion,  that  there is a 
continuum, a continuous succession from the formal to the informal, with activities that are partly 
informal  or  partly  formal  (Chen  2002).  Furthermore,  informal  systems  are  characterized  by 
processes  that  occur  outside of  formal  arrangements,  for  example «people engaged in  informal 
activities have their  own “political economy” – their own informal or group rules, arrangements, 
institutions  and  structures  for  mutual  help  and  trust,  providing  loans,  organizing  training, 
transferring technology and skills,  trading  and market  access,  enforcing obligations,  etc.»  (ILO 
2002,  p7). Hence,  the  dynamics  of  informality  are  governed  by  something  else,  or  partly  by 
something else than formal arrangements.
This  thesis  examines  a  policy  issue  related  to  formalization  of  the  informal.  Here, 
formalization will be understood as: imposing legal framework that include the informal activities, 
thus turning them into formal activities. There has been some discussion over how to formalize and 
for what purpose. One suggestion is advanced by de Soto (2003): to impose property rights on poor 
people's assets. Another has been pursued by the ILO, which is a strategy of formalizing the work 
relations  aiming  to  ameliorate  worker's  environment  or  rights  which  tend  to  be  weak  among 
informal workers (ILO 2006). The aim is to solve the common problem of vulnerability among both 
the  self  employed,  informal  entrepreneurs  and  the  wage  workers  who  are  unprotected,  or 
insufficiently protected under legal and regulatory frameworks (ILO 2002). More relevant for this 
thesis is the notion of the Legal Empowerment of the Poor (LEP), which seeks a broader pro-poor 
policy,  through  development  of  accessible  institutions  and  legislations,  in  a  process  of  local 
participation (CLEP 2008). 
A group of informals  that  has  been seen as  particularly vulnerable  and targeted by this 
strategy, is the third world, urban slum dwellers. It is a well known problem for cities of “the South” 
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that most people do not enjoy legal security for their houses nor for the access to their sources of 
income. Being politically and economically marginalized, they become vulnerable when their areas 
are  to  be  used  for  private  sector  investments  or  become  a  part  of  the  renewal  of  urban 
infrastructures (Durand-Lasserve 2007). This group has been growing, particularly in the cities of 
Sub-Saharan  Africa.  Drawing  on  ILO  policies,  it  has  been  created  a  paradigm  in  which 
governments acknowledge their need for informal arrangements and thus seek to create an enabling 
environment for it rather than to prevent it (Lyons & Snoxell 2004).
Mozambique is an East-African country that stretches from the borders of South Africa and 
all the way up north to Tanzania, along the shores of the Indian sea. The buildings and streets of its 
bustling  capital,  Maputo,  still  bear  the  scars  of  two decades  of  civil  war  and the  corners  and 
growing suburbs are crowded with people looking for an opportunity to earn their daily bread. They 
are coming to the city in the hope for opportunities. At the same time, Maputo is the centre for the 
country's current economic growth and foreign direct investments. Changes are brought to the city 
as new high-rises grow up and as fresh, black asphalt and pavement cover the holes of the erosion 
and mud of a yet not too distant past. Like in many other Sub-Saharan, African cities, the access to 
urban space is getting scarcer and the access to it is contested (PEUMM 2008a). 
As in any African city, the informality in Maputo is widespread. Writers have claimed that 
informality occurs within all social levels of society, ranging from the large scale corruption within 
the corridors of power, to the squats on occupied urban land (Lindell 2008, Francisco & Paulo 2006, 
Jenkins 2000). Furthermore, Jenkins (2000) holds that it is the poor who are most likely to be the 
losers of informality, as they are the less able to claim their interests, when assets are subjected to 
networks  of  power  rather  than  formalized  rights.  Poor  people's  dependence  on  informal 
arrangements  is  recognized  by  the  Maputo  Municipal  Council  (CMM)  and  policies  are  being 
conducted to solve problems of legal exclusion of the urban poor. At the same time, the CMM seeks 
to  gain  control  over  the  development  of  the  city.  Hence,  formalization  may apparently  pose  a 
situation of common interest between the CMM and the informal actor. In collaboration with civil 
actors, various policies for formalizing the informal are carried out, ranging from imposing new 
rules  for  the widespread housing  (PEUMM 2008b) to  imposing  rules  on street  vending or  the 
formalization of Maputo's many marketplaces (FAO/CMM 2008b). 
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The research questions
The objective of this thesis is to shed light on how processes of formalization affect vendors 
at an informal market in Maputo, which bears the popular name Xikhelene. This market is located in 
the suburb, north of the Maputo city centre at the square of Praça dos Combatentes. The Praça dos 
Combatentes is a state reserve, planned for some future use by the authorities and it was never 
meant to host a market. Nevertheless, the municipality of Maputo did not have the means to control 
this occupation, in the same way as it generally could not control the influx of people to the city and 
the way they, informally, used urban space in order to live and to survive. Today, the Xikhelene is 
bustling with vending activities and its existence has been debated. 
The CMM's attitude and policies on marketplaces have been changing, implying a gradual 
and partly formalization of the Xikhelene, which implies a tax policy, an agreement on the use of 
space,  collaboration  with  its  market  committee  and  the  vendor's  association:  Association  of 
Operators  and  Workers  of  the  Informal  Sector  (ASSOTSI).  In  turn,  this  affects  the  way  the 
marketplace operates. However, even though some formal procedures have been imposed on the 
functions of the Xikhelene, dynamics still remain outside of formal arrangements. The aim of the 
first part of the research questions is to find out how a range of formal and informal arrangements 
affect the dynamics at the Xikhelene. This is formulated in the first question. Some of the dynamics 
at  the Xikhelene may also be understood by looking at  the very reasons of its  growth.  This is 
formulated in the second question. Both these questions will be discussed later, in chapter 5:
How does the Xikhelene operate?
What are the reasons for the growth of the Xikhelene?
In 2009, most of the Xikhelene was demolished as a part of a reconstruction to give space to 
new a collective transport terminal. The project  was a part of the rehabilitation of the highway 
Avenida  Julius  Nyerere  which  was  destroyed  by  erosions  during  the  great  flooding  of  2000. 
According  to  the  ASSOTSI,  the  Xikhelene  normally hosts  more  than  7000 registered  vendors. 
About two thirds of them now lost their market stalls and their daily income without receiving any 
compensation nor being successfully resettled to an alternative place to vend. During the fieldwork 
for this thesis, conducted about two months later, most of them were still sitting on the ground on 
the nearby streets and on the building site, refusing to move. The next research question for this 
thesis is twofold. The first question will explore how the decision making occurred when resettling 
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the  vendors.  The  second  questions  will  explore  the  vendor's  response  to  their  removal  and 
demolition of their market stalls. These two questions will be discussed in chapter 6:
What characterizes the decision making process of resettling the Xikhelene vendors?
What explains the way in which the vendors responded to the resettlement?
It is important to note that the first two research questions are mainly meant to serve as an 
auxiliary  for  answering  these  two  questions:  Some  dynamics  at  the  market  were  important, 
particularly for understanding the vendors' response to the resettlement. Furthermore, the formal 
legal framework became important, both for the decisions that were made and for the the role of the 
participating actors and their room for action. 
Finally, exploring these questions poses an opportunity to look at the outcome of the CMM 
formalization policies for the Xikhelene, which is discussed in an overall conclusion in chapter 7.
The theory
This thesis applies two bodies of social science, namely the discussion on informality and 
the  discussion  on  urban  governance.  Theory  on  informality  is  expected  to  shed  light  on  the 
dynamics of informal activities, of which the Xikhelene is an example. This theory will serve to 
answer the first two research questions. The second two research questions examines a process of 
decision  making  in  an  urban  setting.  Theory  on  urban  governance  is  thus  expected  to  pose 
explanations. Finally, theory on informality will also shed light on the subject of formalization. As 
formalization is a process governed by relations of power, theory on urban governance will also 
provide explanatory power on the outcome of formalization. Thus, an interaction between these two 
bodies of social theory becomes necessary.
The case 
A case is  defined by Thagaard (2002) as an  empirically defined/limited unit, or by Stake 
(2005)  as  a  bounded  system,  with  working  parts  and  purposes. My case  in  this  study is  the 
Xikhelene and the vendors who use it. It was easy to define and isolate this as a specific case, since 
it is a place with a name, a history and with specific people being involved. Though, people in 
Maputo often seem to talk about the Xikhelene as the entire area or the neighbourhood in which the 
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market is located. Since there is a spatial continuity of commercial activity between the Xikhelene 
and  the  smaller  market-places  nearby,  namely  the  1.  de  Junho,  the  Mucoriane  and  even  the 
Compone, some people do not bother to distinguish between them. Commercial activity can be 
encountered all  the way along the roads  and in  the surrounding neighbourhoods,  so it  may be 
difficult to define the limits of the marketplace. My definition of the Xikhelene as a case in this 
thesis is: 
The activity of vendors who are, or should have been1 paying tax to the Xikhelene market-
committee. 
This excludes other markets nearby and it excludes as well commercial activities nearby, 
that pay tax directly to the municipality, even though these also might be affected by the Praça dos 
Combatentes reconstruction. To not confuse the Xikhelene with the surrounding neighbourhoods, I 
will not refer to the Xikhelene as a place, but as a market activity of vendors and to the Praça dos 
Combatentes or the surrounding  bairros, as the place in which the Xikhelene market activity is 
being located. Stake (2005) also stresses upon that a case has outside features significant as context 
for the event  or parts  of the case that  is  being studied.  In my analysis  this  context or  outside 
features have been the political,  economic and social context described in chapter 4. The other 
factors are  the roles  of  the civil  organizations:  the ASSOTSI,  the market  committee and some 
initiatives  conducted  by  the  vendors  themselves.  The  role  of  the  World  Bank  has  also  been 
considered. However, the most important actor is the CMM and its officials working under various 
departments.  As  this  thesis  treats  the  issue  of  formalization,  considering  the  role  of  relevant 
guidelines  and  legal  frameworks  have  been  important.  The  most  important  is  the  CMM 
formalization  strategy  on  formalizing  retail  markets.  Furthermore,  The  Maputo  Municipal 
Development Program (PDMM) has been an influence along with the role of the ProMaputo, which 
is an urban reform. The ProMaputo also adopted the World Bank Resettlement Policy Framework 
(RPF),  which  is  a  World  Bank  attempt  to  embed  rights  for  the  displaced  into  guidelines  for 
resettlement processes during development projects.
1 Supposing that some, mainly ambulant vendors, do not pay tax even though they are supposed to, but still use the 
advantages of doing commercial activity at the Praça dos Combatentes.  
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The research method 
In this study I have chosen to do a qualitative single case-study. For the first two research 
questions the aim was to find out how the market operates and reason for it growth. I solved this by 
searching for explanations for what dynamics that governs the market. I have tried to answer this 
question by finding out how and why the market was being used by the different operators, within a 
context  of  existing  regulations,  social  conditions  and  the  history of  Maputo.  Talking  to  CMM 
officials  and  organization  leaders  and  generally  people  with  knowledge  proved  valuable,  but 
interviewing the Xikhelene vendors became the most important source. I wanted the vendors to 
explain to what degree the market was necessary to sustain their households, what problems they 
face, how they use it, how they could use the market to prosper and make their activities grow, what 
factors led to the development of the market even though it was not allowed by the state and why 
people specifically chose the Xikhelene. All these will constitute explanations and histories which 
will shed light on the functions of the market, and a qualitative approach is suitable. 
For  the  second two research  questions,  I  was  searching  for  information about  the legal 
context and the political  process concerning the demolition of the Xikhelene and the following 
transference  of  vendors  and  the  reactions  to  it.  I  found  that  this  cold  also  be  solved  with  a 
qualitative approach,  by conducting interviews with vendors,  officials,  organization leaders  and 
reading official documents. 
The structure of the thesis
This thesis consists of seven chapters. This chapter is an introduction which explains the 
research objective, formulates research questions in order to meet this objective and describes how 
the use of empirical findings are expected to answer the research questions. Chapter 2 is a 
description of the research method conducted for gaining empirical findings for the thesis and the 
research process. The aim is to give the reader an opportunity to evaluate the quality of the research. 
Chapter 3 is a theoretical framework for the thesis which aims to bring together theory on 
informality with theory on urban governance and ideals of good governance. The first part discusses 
the development of the topic of informality and will explain briefly the strategy of formalization. 
The theory on urban governance and democratic ideals will shed light upon the second part of the 
research questions, which is aimed at analysing a decision making process with various actors 
involved and the responses to it. Chapter 4 explains some of the social and political background of 
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Maputo, Mozambique, which uses other empirical data to present the context for the development 
of the Xikhelene market and the milieu in which the decision making concerning the resettlement of 
its vendors took place. Chapter 5 concerns the empirical findings for the first two research 
questions. Chapter 6 concerns empirical findings on the second two research questions. Both 
chapter 5 and 6 contain conclusions that brings theory and data together to answer the research 
questions. Chapter 7 contains an overall conclusion and policy recommendation.
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Map of Maputo
Places and streets that are significant for thesis are highlighted.
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Map of Mozambique
Map of Praça dos Combatentes during reconstruction 2009
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2    Research-  design   and process 
Thagaard  (2002)  uses  the  concepts  of  reliability,  analytic  generalization  and validity  as 
guidelines to improve the quality of a qualitative research2. In this chapter, these terms have been 
used as a  point of reference.
Reliability3 refers to the degree on may have confidence in the research data that has been 
gathered. In order to make the reader to have this confidence, it is important to explain how the data 
has been collected and used, what problems the researcher has faced during the process and what 
ethical considerations have been taken, so that the reader may judge the quality of the data. The aim 
of this chapter is to consider these questions (Thagaard 2002). 
Analytic generalization4 implies that the research contains a contribution to the development 
of  theory.  I  have  chosen  a  broader  approach,  namely  what  Thagaard  (2002)  defines  as 
transferability: that it  may be useful for later research of other, similar cases or generally pose 
valuable insights for other occasions. Sub-chapter 7.1 considers some policy recommendations.
Validity5 here implies that the researcher maintains a critical view on his/hers own analysis 
and to what degree the results may be confirmed by other research. Along with the introduction, an 
aim of this chapter is to give the reader an opportunity to judge whether the analysis of the thesis is 
supported by the data. As explained in sub-chapter 2.2, a method of triangulation has been used to 
include other empirical data to support or contradict my findings.
Moreover I will explain, in sub-chapter 2.2, how data has been collected, later analysed and 
for what purpose. I will also give an account of how the process itself developed and what problems 
I encountered along the way. Sub-chapter 2.3 discusses the quality of the data, while sub-chapter 
2.4 explains the method of analysis.
2.1 Implications of a normative approach
According to Ragin (1994), an aim for social sciences is to give a voice to specific groups. 
Not only to study the group itself, but to contribute to its voice in society, making it visible in a 
political debate. This could often refer to marginal groups, like poor people, minority-groups and so 
2 These terms are translated from Thagaard's (2002) Norwegian contribution. They are applied somewhat differently 
than the normal, English use.
3 Thagaard's (2002) Norwegian term: «troverdighet»
4 Thagaard's (2002) Norwegian term: «overførbarhet»
5 Thagaard's (2002) Norwegian term: «bekreftbarhet»
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on. The vendors at the Xikhelene-market can be described as such, being a group of mainly poor 
people  dependent  on  informal,  small-scale  commercial  activities,  based  on  assets  without 
ownership-rights on an occupied space, which is not officially recognized by the Mozambican state. 
Interviewing the  vendors  with  the  purpose  to  let  them  express  their  opinions  about  a  political 
process, I am giving a voice to this group. This aim is important for the second part of my problem 
which concerns a political process. Before I went to Maputo, I was planning to find a specific event 
in which the market-committee played a specific role, in order to shed light on how this committee 
defended the vendor's interests. When I came to the Xikhelene the 15th of July 2009, more or less 
two thirds of the established part of the market  had been removed but, despite the fact that the 
vendors had lost their stalls, they still remained at the place. So I found it convenient to study the 
political process leading to this reconstruction and removal of vendors and to find out about the 
vendor's opinion regarding this, and to what degree their voice had been taken into account.
Ragin (1994) state that research that advocates the interests of a certain group may, from a 
naturalist point of view, be criticized for not being objective. Therefore, one has to take precautions 
to  remain as objective as possible,  for example:  express several  points  of view concerning the 
matter or be wary of how people rationalize what they do. In my analysis I am trying to express the 
opinions of both the vendors, the municipal officials and the organization leaders. Still my analysis 
arguments in favour of the market vendors, emphasizing their social vulnerability. 
Giving  a  voice  to  marginal  groups  could  pose  a  methodological  advantage:  Given  that 
knowledge  about  society  is  socially  constructed,  as  argued  by  social  constructionists,  the 
construction of knowledge is a result of a discursive struggle, which according to Vivien Burr (1995 
in Jørgensen & Philips 1999) is created and maintained by social processes and power-struggles. 
Then, one may argue that a part of our knowledge about society will drown and so knowledge will 
be less «neutral»,  if  not putting emphasis on the weaker voices. This is relevant for this thesis 
because the vendor's interpretation of the Xikhelene-market's role in society may differ from the 
«official version” of the knowledge about the market which can be found in newspapers, documents 
or among officials. It may also be relevant because a part of the analysis in this thesis is dealing 
with a specific political process: the decision of reconstructing the Xikhelene-market and what logic 
and who's voices seemed to be dominant in making these decisions. What «truth» seemed to lead to 
the decision of the political process and what «truth» did not, is a question that will be treated as 
data. Still,  neutrality is not the objective for this thesis. From a post-modern point of view, the 
researcher's analysis cannot be neutral, but it can just be another representation of the study-object. 
And this representation is motivated by the wish that the vendors at the Xikhelene-market should 
have had a greater power of decision in the political process leading to reconstruction and transfer 
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of  people.  Considering  Mozambique's  present  high  economic  growth,  an  even  higher  urban 
development will take place in the future and it is vital to find solutions for the large part of the 
urban population relying on informal activities. To strengthen the political rights of these people 
may be one solution. This corresponds to what Ryen (2002) defines as a normative approach, and it 
was certainly a main motivation both for the second part of my research questions and for the focus 
on potential problems concerning issue of formalization. 
2.2 Searching for information about the Xikhelene
For the first part of my problem, I decided to collect and compare explanations and narrations of the 
use of the Xikhelene-market,  told by vendors at  the market,  people living nearby,  municipality 
officials and leaders of relevant civil organizations. Reading various historical sources about the 
social situation in Maputo and documents that explained state legislation and projects for market-
places did also turn out to be useful. Moreover I observed the market in order to see how it was 
used on a daily basis. The approach for the research regarding the second part of the problem was 
slightly different. I had to hear opinions about the political process involved and how this process 
actually  had  occurred.  This  was  characterized  as  being  an  inquiry  where  looking  for  written 
material and continuously asking for new possible contacts and material in what Thagaard (2002) 
calls a snowballing-method, became particularly important actions. For this problem it also became 
more important to do comparisons of statements of different the different stakeholders, and how 
this  corresponded  with  official  documents.  While  studying  how the  vendors  responded  to  the 
reconstruction, observations also became useful for this problem . 
Interviews,  observations  and  documents  have  been  used  as  sources  and  combined  in  a 
triangulation.  The term triangulation may be strictly defined, as for example by Thagaard (2002) 
who explains it as a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. I am applying a wider 
definition suggested by Stake (2005) as employing various procedures to avoid the likelihood of 
misinterpretation of data or: a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying 
the repeatability of an observation or interpretation. I have used a combination of approaches in a 
method-triangulation:  interviews, observations and  reading of related documents, trying to see if 
different perspectives will  confirm each other.  This turned out to be especially important when 
asking for information from vendors at the Xikhelene-market where knowledge seemed to be based 
on rumours, quickly misinterpreted and distorted. With several occasions I followed a track which, 
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after a while became weakened or rejected  by other informants. Therefore, I have been trying to 
use only information that has been confirmed by more than a couple of informants, or observations 
that have been confirmed by interviewees, especially when it  comes to information about what 
happened  during  a  particular  event  or  when  trying  to  obtain  concrete  facts  about  the  market. 
Informant-triangulation as described by Denscombe (2007), has thus been important. Furthermore, 
in cases where claims in the analysis have not been confirmed by more than one informant or in 
some way considered as weak, this will be explained in the analysis and the strength of the claim 
considered thereafter.
In order to answer the second problem, I used triangulation in a different way: According to Stake 
(2005) triangulation may also be useful for a researcher who has an interest for diversity concerning 
the perception of the case or for identifying different realities presented by relevant actors. In other 
words, the different way people talk about a certain event or express a certain opinion may be 
treated, not as an obstacle for analysis due to an unfulfilled picture, but as data. This has been 
important for finding different realities, plausible alternatives or opinions regarding the status of the 
market and the vendor's legal rights during the transfer of vendors. For example, municipal officials 
had  a  totally  different  perspective  on  the  transfer  of  vendors  than  the  vendors  who had  been 
afflicted  by  the  reconstruction.  Vendors  who  had  not  been  afflicted  by the  reconstruction  had 
different  explanations  from those who had been  directly confronted  to  it  and so on.  Then the 
concept of triangulation is not only used as variation in methods, like a combination of quantitative, 
qualitative and observation, but for getting an image of  the opinions of various actors who play 
different parts and have different perspectives on the case, to explain why and whose voices were 
realized and thus dominating and what realities they reflected. 
2.2.1 The interview-process
The  main  source  of  information  comes  from  interviews.  Altogether  I  conducted  forty  three 
interviews6 and conversations. Twenty two of these interviews have been recorded and transcribed, 
the rest  summarized. Thirteen of the transcripts and fourteen of the summaries were made by my 
research-assistant  and  the  rest  by  me. Almost  all  the  summaries  were  made  quickly  after  the 
interviews,  but  a  few  also  during  interviewing.  The  interviews  were  all  made  with  strategic 
samples, people that were chosen because I assumed they could offer information about my subject. 
6 See Appendix for list of interviews conducted.
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I tried to vary the age and gender of my informants as much as possible.
It must be mentioned that before I could even start the interview-process, I was rejected by the 
Xikhelene market-committee because I had not obtained a locally approved research-credential. 
This had to be applied at the DMMF, a process that took about a month because the application had 
to be sent to the Municipal Council, since the municipality did not have any standard procedure 
dealing  with  foreign  students.  It  also  turned  out  to  be  a  problem that  my credential  from the 
University of Oslo was written in English, since the officials of the department did not understand 
it. I solved this by asking a professor at the UEM that remembered me from my exchange-period, 
who spoke English and where certified to write research-credential. This credential was approved of 
and stamped by the DMMF and thus, accepted by the Xikhelene-market committee. Two weeks 
later, I got the municipal research-credential. From then on, I was operating with two credentials7. 
Ryen (2002) writes about the nature of relations between the informants and the researcher doing 
fieldwork in a distant culture. First, this relation will be characterized by history. According to Ryen 
a  Norwegian  will  usually,  in  Africa,  be  categorized  as  a  white  European.  The  relation  is  then 
marked by colonial past and large social differences. To be able to understand communication, one 
has to be aware of the historical  and social  relation.  Ryen also emphasizes that  this relation is 
constantly changing and she exemplifies how it may be modified consciously by the researcher. 
Secondly,  she  stresses  upon  the  importance  of  establishing  a  relationship  of  trust  with  the 
informants, which is crucial for making good interviews with reliable data. The cultural difference 
between the researcher and the informants may then be an obstacle, but it may be also be used 
dynamically to establish good relationships by making use of one's own positionality. This requires 
that the researcher to be  reflexive,  as Mohammad (2002) explains it:  being aware of one's own 
position with the researched subject  in the field. Here, I will explain how I have been trying to 
consider my positionality in the various surroundings where I gathered information. And, I will 
explain how I believe that this positionality had an impact on my interview-process.
During my period as an exchange-student in Maputo in 2006, I  experienced different situations 
being a young, white man in Maputo, so I had some ideas about how to deal with it. There is for 
example a more acute social difference in Mozambique and especially in Maputo than what I am 
used to. I had the impression that people of a high class are shown more respect in Maputo, but at 
the same time people of lower classes contribute to the creation and perpetuation of this difference 
7 See Appendix for research-credentials.
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by characterizing rich people as snobbish and arrogant. At the same time, it seems to be important 
for upper class people to secure their social position by keeping a certain distance from people 
belonging to the lower class, an attitude they are expected to adopt. As a white person from a rich 
country, I had the feeling that people often expected me to act even more like a Maputo high-class 
person. A lot of Mozambicans travel to South Africa and they are familiar with the social separation 
and and image of racial separation which is still typical for the South African culture. This may 
explain  my  perception  of  distance between  me  and  my study-objects.  Another  reason  for  the 
atmosphere of  distance,  was  simply the language-problem. First,  my Portuguese is  not  perfect. 
Usually it is no problem when talking face to face with a single person, but when talking to a group 
of people it becomes difficult to follow the conversation. Sometimes it may also be difficult to 
create a personal relationship, since I am not aware of how to use slang or other socio-cultural 
factors embedded in the language. Second, many vendors at the Xikhelene seemed to feel more 
comfortable and personal when speaking Shangaan or Ronga, which are languages that I do not 
speak.  
Since  I  was  already aware  that  I  was  going  to  face  these  problems,  I  tried  to  counteract  the 
atmosphere of distance by living with a family in the Bairro Ferroviário, close to the market during 
the fieldwork period. I got in contact with this family through a friend from my exchange-period in 
2006.  This  family had  a  lot  of  acquaintances  in  the  area,  which  gave  me  an  easy  access  to 
informants which again would serve as door-openers for more informants. Interviews conducted 
with these people became some of my best interviews. I had a lot of informal conversations with 
these people not mentioned in the list of interviews and I was showed around at the market and 
introduced to  different  people.  I  also  tried  to  solve  the  distance-problem by using  a  research-
assistant. He was a male, last-year bachelor-student at the UEM and a very clever person, whom I 
also got in contact with through my student-friend who was working as a teacher at the university 
during the period. Cooperating with the research-assistant gave me several advantages during the 
interviews. First, he took part in the cultural identity of my informants, which in some instances 
made it easier to get in touch with people, both to participate in interviews and to increase the 
quality  of  the  interviews.  Though,  I  suspected  that  it  might  have  been  some class-differences 
between him and my informants, but I was not able to notice how and if this really made any 
difference. Second, grown up in Xai-Xai, Gaza, he spoke perfect Shangaan and Portuguese, which 
also counteracted my language-problem in some of the interviews. He was also making summaries 
during some interviews. But in the end, I actually found it preferable to do interviews on my own. 
This is simply because it was easier to follow the conversation and control it when operating alone. 
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Doing interviews alone also made it clear that I was the one that the informants were supposed to 
talk to, which made it easier to make conversation without any confusion.
Thirty of the interviews have been conducted with vendors at the market. I hoped that these people 
would explain how they used the Xikhelene-market, what importance it had in their everyday life, 
how they had developed their  commercial  activity,  why the Xikhelene-market was a preferable 
place for their activities and also that they would narrate the history of the market. I also asked a lot 
of  questions  about  how  the  current  reconstruction  affected  them,  how  the  reconstruction  had 
occurred,  how  they  had  been  informed  about  it  and  their  opinions  about  it.  Many  of  these 
informants were, as mentioned, people that I got in contact with through the family I lived with. I 
realized that this implied a couple of problems for the quality of data. First, most of these people 
also knew each other, so my interviewing quickly created rumours and conversations about the 
topic of my interviews. A couple of times I could notice that informants had already made up their 
minds  and decided what they were going to say even before the interview started, which made it 
difficult  to  control  the  conversation.  Usually  they  exaggerated the  aspects  regarding  the 
reconstruction which  was  a  typical  topic  of  conversation  during  my  fieldwork-period  at  the 
marketplace, but which I left for the last part of my interview-guide. So, when I tried to make them 
talk about the development of their own activity and the general use of the Xikhelene, they showed 
less interest in talking about this. For example: I started the interview asking them to tell me about 
the  development  of  their  activity,  but  they responded by talking  about  the  reconstruction.  The 
second problem was that I chose to start picking random vendors at the market as soon as I had 
interviewed all the people I knew. In other words, I had to use two different strategies for making 
contact  with  informants,  which  caused  a  mix  of  what  Stake  (2005)  calls  convenience-samples 
strategic samples. At least the interviews differ in content and size, which made it a bit difficult to 
compare. The way I experimented different ways of presenting myself in an attempt to find the best 
way to create a good interview-situation, may also have created some variation of content. 
In order to get in contact with random vendors at the market, it would have been a good 
situation if  I  had been able  to  use the market-committee as a  gate-opener,  being introduced to 
different people at the market. This would have demanded that I somehow should have found a way 
to  create  a  better  relationship  with  them.  Unfortunately  I  was  not  able  to  do  this,  as  the 
representatives of the market-committee were rather suspicious and not willing to help me out or let 
me participate in what they were doing. Still, it might have been possible if I have had the time to 
make a screening-process to get in contact people related to them. 
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Walking around at the market, trying to pick random people to create a good situation for 
interviews turned out to be very difficult. People often seemed to be afraid to attract attention. I was 
told  that  there  used  to  be  civil  police  patrolling  the  market  to  stop  possible  riots.  Indeed,  the 
presence  of  municipal  police  was  often  noticeable,  trying  to  make  way for  the  reconstruction 
activities and the vendors seemed to be afraid of them. I found out after a while that using the word 
«interview» made people think that my project had something to do with radio or TV and they 
either did not want that kind of attention, or they were afraid they might say something that could 
harm them. When I realized this, I stopped using the word «interview» and rather presented my 
request as a school-project. Other people, especially young people were very shy and found my 
attempts to interact with them extremely embarrassing. Sometimes I could notice that information 
was distorted because the informant was not willing to talk and was giving short answers just to get 
the interview over with. It was in these circumstances that I sometimes benefited  from the help 
from my research-assistant. Some of the vendors were also sceptical about what kind of information 
was being spread about the market, for whom and to what interest. I had the impression that people 
spreading information about the Xikhelene-market, for example for newspaper articles and such, 
rarely presented the market in favour of the vendors. 
People also seemed to be sceptic or bitter towards those who had a higher social status than 
them or a more prosperous economic position. This latter category was usually associated to white 
people who very often were assumed to be rich. As a white person, I was always distinguished from 
other  people  there,  no  matter  what  significance  they put  into  the  white  skin-colour. With  one 
occasion I asked a woman about her opinion regarding the reconstruction, and she responded: «We 
don't know! You are the ones who decide!». Some people also assumed that I had some kind of 
power within the marketplace, that I was there to earn money or that I would use the information 
against them in one way or another. After a while I realized that it was important to present myself 
in the right way. I started to avoid the word «university» to reduce my own status. The best way 
was to present myself like this: «Hi! How are you? I am doing a school-work about the Xikhelene-
market.  I  am going to  write  a  book about  it.  And the  best  way to  get  information  about  this 
marketplace is to talk with you, the vendors, to see your point of view. Would you like to help me 
out with some information?». Not explaining correctly how information obtained in interviews will 
be used, may be considered an ethical problem. The vendors knew I was making a written work 
about the Xikhelene, but did not know perfectly what an university-thesis implies.
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It was also often a question of money in the air. It is normal to offer something in return for 
a favour. It even seemed impolite not to offer money or at least to buy something in return for an 
interview. Sometimes I tried to solve this by buying some small article to gain sympathy, but, for 
ethical reasons, I decided that this should never appear to be a payment for the interview itself. The 
reason is that I rather wanted to find the informants who were really willing to cooperate, to express 
a point of view and to talk. Moreover I did not want to create a rumour of me paying money to 
people, which could have led to a situation of vendors «standing in a line» to be interviewed for 
money and saying whatever they thought I wanted to hear, which would have conducted to data 
distortion. Another problem was that some informants believed that I earned money for my project 
and, for this reason, they found it unfair that I was not paying them for their contribution. A few of 
times I tried to convince them that I was not earning anything and that I did it for the purpose of my 
education, but I quickly decided that coming up with such arguments was not worth the effort and 
that it was easier and quicker to pick someone else. Still, more than once an argument like this led 
to a more informal conversation that took place in a friendlier atmosphere, making possible the 
gathering of data. 
Another dimension of the problem was that the normal way of interaction at the marketplace 
did not fit very well with the formal interview-situation. I noticed that people at the market were not 
comfortable  in  a  strict  formal  situation.  Therefore,  the  typical  interview-situation  was  not 
necessarily the best way of getting information. To sit down and talk to the people for half an hour 
as agreed, to take them an «interview» did not seem to be a natural setting for people to express 
their opinion about something or talk about more personal matters. The answers where often short, 
«the official answer» or a mechanical answer coming from someone who obviously did not enjoy 
the setting or the situation they found themselves into. I had the feeling that these were “political 
correct” answers, not the kind of answers they would have given if chatting with a friend and really 
expressed their opinions. Usually I got better and deeper explanations when chatting at dinner time 
or after we had slightly got to know each other. Then, not even necessarily with informants in the 
list of interviews, but with people who showed up for a conversation at the place where I lived. To 
create a situation like this with random people at the market was far from easy. Very often simply 
because they could not just leave their market-stalls, or because they did not know me well enough. 
After a while I found out that it was certainly worth the effort to spend some time talking to people 
about  other  things.  Most  people  seemed  to  be  quite  curious  about  me  and  enjoyed  a  good 
conversation.  Sometimes  these  conversations  resulted  into  data,  but  these  data  did  not  strictly 
followed my interview-guide. With other occasions, I was presented to someone else that was more 
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willing to talk about my topic as a result of establishing a certain atmosphere. Generally it seemed 
that talking to people at the market on daily topics often resulted in important conversations and 
data in the end. Since people preferred a relaxed, informal conversation to a strict interview, it also 
turned out to be difficult to use a sound-recorder. This is the reason why only eight of the interviews 
with vendors were recorded and transcribed. The necessity to establish an informal, unpretentious 
atmosphere made it difficult to follow ethical guidelines. When strictly following ethical guidelines 
during an interview, like informing about the aim of my thesis, the rights and anonymity of the 
informants, it usually resulted in the informant feeling so alienated that he or she lost the will to 
continue. Of the same reason, I did not make them fill in any forms that guaranteed their rights as 
participants. Still, during all the interviews, the informants knew that the information was to be 
used for a university-thesis, often explained as «school-work». I explained before, or during the 
conversation that I wanted to know about how they were using the market, the importance of the 
market and their opinions about the reconstruction. People where also scared away when I was 
asking if they wanted  to be anonymous. They were too suspicious to participate in a project, where 
it, by some reason they did not comprehend, was necessary to be anonymous. I have made all the 
vendors anonymous, but the reader only has my word for it.  
The  interview-process  with  vendors  resulted  in  seventeen  summaries  and  thirteen 
transcripts. The ideal situation would have been to take thirty interviews, all semi-structured and 
transcribed,  in  which   vendors  would  have  explained  carefully  how they  had  developed  their 
activities and what  the Xikhelene-market meant for them. It became a mix of convenience samples 
and a strategic samples.  It  is also a mix of a semi-structured interview-form and a more loose 
conversation. This material has a certain variation in content and a large variation in quality and 
size. 
Since the transcription and a part of the analysis were done during fieldwork I became aware 
of the problem with this group of informants early in my research. That is why I did some general 
changes in  interview strategies  and decided to conduct  some additional  interviews with people 
living close to the market.  I  conducted four interviews with this group. I was hoping that they 
would give some additional details about how customers used the market, that they would have 
more knowledge about the development of the market, and maybe some other points of view on the 
reconstruction. It was easy to make these interviews, because these were people that I knew from 
living almost three months in the Bairro Ferroviário, so they were all happy to talk with me.  I 
became  pleased  with  them because  they  contained  deeper  additional  explanations  on  how the 
market was developed and used, by both customers and vendors. It also turned out that two of the 
29
informants had experience themselves as vendors at  the Xikhelene,  which gave me some more 
detailed stories about how small-scale activities was developed. These interviews resulted in three 
transcripts and one summary, since the last of these informants did not want the interview to be 
recorded. The variation makes the interviews difficult to compare, which again created difficulties 
for answering the first part of the problem for this thesis. Ideally, the analysis for the first part of the 
problem, as being done in chapter 5,  should have consisted of narratives where vendors would 
explain their everyday work and posed some thoughts on the dynamics of the marketplace. Only 
two,  maybe  three  of  these  interviews  went  according  to  these  expectations,  while  most  of  the 
interviews with vendors were quite superficial. As a result, to be able to make a text that could be 
presented  in  the  analysis  for  this  thesis,  I  had  to  combine  various  claims  and explanations  to 
complete the picture. It was also became completely necessary to combine these interviews with 
observations and analysis of documents. Furthermore, as the interviews were both quite different in 
character and many of them somewhat superficial, I have a feeling that there is a missing saturation 
of  meaning:  that  the  factors  explained  about  the  everyday  functions  of  the  marketplace  are 
somewhat  casual,  that  the  information  has  been  obtained  by  chance  and  that  there  might  be 
important information that did not make its way into the thesis. However, combining these findings 
with  background  information,  other  interviews  and  observations,  it  was  possible  to  create  a 
narrative. I am also pleased with the way this information serves as an auxiliary for making account 
for the second two research questions.   
I  knew  that  Professor  Theresa  Cruz  e  Silva  at  the  UEM  had  been  writing  about  the 
ASSOTSI,  so I  made contact  with her  hoping  that  she would be  able  to  tell  something  about 
informality in Maputo and the Xikhelene-market (Cruz e Silva 2003). She advised me to rather talk 
to António Franscisco, who is a professor of economy at the IESE in Maputo. Shortly afterwards, I 
conducted an interview with him. This interview was not so important data for the case itself, but 
rather for secondary information. The aim was to get advice and insight on the degree to which the 
debate on the informal sector was present in the literature about Mozambique's development and on 
the socio-political situation in Maputo. This interview was very important to get an understanding 
of informality, particularly in Maputo and how the theory used in this thesis could be connected to 
the Mozambican context. Then especially the legalist-approach that Professor Francisco has been 
using in his writings about informality in Mozambique. In addition, the interview with him gave me 
some understanding of the development of street-vending in Maputo and policy-issues connected 
with this.
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Finally I conducted nine interviews with different actors with political influence, namely 
two interviews with the spokesman of the Xikhelene market-committee, two interviews with the 
leader  of  the  ASSOTSI,  one  interview  with  the  spokesman  of  the  1.  de  Junho,  with  a 
neighbourhood-secretary, a district-secretary, and with two municipality officials. I also attempted 
to conduct an interview with a representative of the World Bank, but this was not successful. This 
last  series  of  interviews was important  for  the  second part  of  the  problem and it  was  used to 
compare different explanations for the decisions related to the reconstruction and as a means for 
gathering more information and written material. All interviews with vendors and people living in 
the market's neighbourhood was semi-structured, to benefit from the opportunity to compare the 
interviews and to ask specific follow-up-questions and go deeper into specific subjects. Interview-
guides  for  the  academic  and  for  the  last  group  of  political  actors  have  been  created  for  each 
interview separately. Even though they are anonymous,  it  may be easy to identify some of the 
informants of this group. But I do not see how the information might harm any of them. 
 
To get  in  contact  with  this  category of  informants  I  either  used  a  snowballing-method, 
asking to be introduced, or asking if the informant knew someone else that had knowledge about 
my topic. Usually I just went to their office and knocked on their doors, and I was almost never 
rejected. But, it demanded some patience, since the appointments often were postponed over and 
over again. It was also easier to make good interviews with these informants. Most of them where 
professionals, therefore used to a more formal setting. Thus it was possible to make appointments 
and to follow the interview-guides more exactly as planned from A to Z. The atmosphere of the 
social setting was strikingly different from with the vendors. Compared to what I am used to from 
Norway, people of high positions have to be treated more respectfully than other people. And by the 
way I was addressed in these settings, I understood that these interviews conducted in a formal and 
polite way, using the words like “você”, “o senhor” or “a senhora”8 which, on the contrary, would 
have  seemed  ridiculous  in  the  interviews  with  vendors.  In  one  occurrence  an  informant  got 
offended when I asked if he wanted to be anonymous, as if I assumed that could not make a stand 
for  what  he  was  saying.  Regarding  the  dressing  code,  this  had  to  be  more  formal  for  these 
interviews than for the ones at the market. Actually, I had the feeling that being a foreigner, and thus 
a person who these people could not easily place, seemed to give me sometimes an upper hand. 
Being an outsider,  not taking part in nor having any idea about local relations and traditions of 
power made me a person that could not be judged. In other words it seemed like I could be more 
easily forgiven for not following codes and unwritten rules, which made it possible for me to ask 
8 «Você», «O senhor» or «A senhora»: Polite forms of «you» in Portuguese
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more direct questions. Sometimes officials and secretaries were also more benevolent towards me 
since I was a foreigner, helping me with whatever I needed: documents, phone-numbers, contacts 
and so on. Since the municipal officials I interviewed had seldom much time at their disposal, none 
of these interviews lasted for more than forty five minutes. It was quite difficult to get a good 
interview with the Xikhelene market-committee.  They always had a line of consulting vendors 
waiting outside to get an audience every time I came there. They turned down my interview request 
several times and I had to insist a lot before I obtaining a second follow-up interview which was 
necessary to gather information about how they were included in the political process connected to 
the  market  reconstruction.  It  was  only the head  of  the committee  who was willing to  give  an 
interview, and he was very busy doing many activities at the same time. The other committee-
members  reacted  somehow  similarly  to  many  of  the  other  vendors  at  the  Xikhelene,  being 
suspicious to my presence there. This reaction was disappointing, since I originally wanted to make 
the market-committee a central part of my study. Realizing that the ProMaputo is to a large part 
financed by the World Bank, I attempted to conduct an interview with the Ali Alwahti at the World 
Bank office Maputo. I was soon redirected to Uri Raich who is the World Bank team leader for the 
ProMaputo. I had an e-mail correspondence with him until December 2009, until my request was 
rejected,  as  the  reconstruction  of  the  Praça  dos  Combatentes  was  not  formally  a  part  of  the 
ProMaputo.  It  could  have  been  useful  to  know  how  the  RPF  was  developed,  monitored, 
communicated to donor recipients and how it got adopted by the CMM. However, it was through 
the World Bank I got to know about the ProMaputo, the RPF and that the GDEI was the responsible 
municipal department for conducting urban development projects.
During the last week of my fieldwork, I got a conversation with the GDEI, which is the municipal 
department  responsible  for  the  ProMaputo,  and  thus  the  reconstruction  of  the  Praça  dos 
Combatentes.  When  I  came  there  it  was  just  to  obtain  some  documents  that  the  World  Bank 
representative demanded me to read before an eventual interview with the World Bank, but the 
GDEI had prepared themselves to make a one and a half an hour conversation with me about their 
work. In other words, I showed up unprepared for this conversation which made it very confusing. 
It also seemed improper or impolite to start recording, so I did not get very much data out of, which 
otherwise would have been one of my most important interviews. They presented the aims of the 
ProMaputo which was very useful. But I was mostly interested in discussing implementation of the 
World Bank resettlement-policy, which it seemed like they were not willing to discuss. It might 
have  become  too  confronting  when  I  was  asking  about  the  unsuccessful  resettlement  of  the 
Xikhelene vendors. 
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2.2.2 Other sources: Observation and document-analysis 
Living with a family in the bairro Ferroviário gave me some advantages, especially the possibility 
to do observations at the market. It was not to actively do a participating observation, which would 
demand a much longer research-period and participating in activities at the market. It was rather to 
force myself into going to the market everyday since the family I lived with used it all the time. 
Getting information from the friends of this family was probably the closest I could get to being an 
insider, which according to Mohammad (2002) for a researcher would imply crossing the boundary 
that circumscribes identity, social position, belonging and similar markers. I was accepted by them 
since I was an acquaintance of somebody they know and since I was living in the house of someone 
they could relate to.  This does not mean however that  I was taking part  in their life and daily 
problems. 
The use of observations has not been my most important source for data. According to Thagaard 
(2002), observation is a useful method to study relations between people or people's actions. As for 
me, I have not done this actively and consciously. Still, observation has been important to get a 
personal experience of the case and to confirm information provided by informants. Necessity of a 
personal experience, or to «get into the situation» is also stressed by Thagaard (2002). Doing my 
shopping at the market, shopping together with the family I lived with and making friends with 
people at the market gave me a better opportunity to observe how people related to the market on 
an everyday basis.  Even though this  was not used systematically as data,  it  has certainly been 
important. Still, the most important data that stemmed from observations were those that confirmed 
information  from  interviews.  Doing  interviews  at  the  market  brought  a  lot  of  contradictory 
information, so the best way to find out the «real story» was often to go and see for my self. For 
example, one informant told me that all the vendors who were transferred to the street that went 
parallel  with  the  Av.  das  FPLM  left  this  place  and  went  back  to  the  market.  To  see  if  this 
information was true, I went there, saw all empty bancas and asked a person where all the vendors 
had  gone,  and  thus  had  the  information  confirmed.  There  were  a  couple  of  observation 
opportunities that I missed, but that could have been very relevant. For example, there were several 
meetings taking place before the reconstruction, involving the market-committee, the municipality 
and various organizations. Being present and observing those meetings would have strengthened 
this thesis, but unfortunately they had all taken place before I arrived Maputo. The GDEI asked why 
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I had not cooperated more with them in my fieldwork, observing their work. Unfortunately I missed 
this opportunity as well, since I had not been informed of the role of the GDEI until the end of my 
fieldwork and did not get in contact with them until the last week of my stay in Maputo.
The third source of data consists in the analysis of documents. Some of the municipal documents 
describe the use of Maputo marketplaces and are therefore relevant as data for the first problem. 
Historical texts and other academical articles concerning Mozambican society and Maputo describe 
the social situation which indirectly leads us to reasons for the use of marketplaces, general petty-
trade in Maputo and political traditions in Mozambique. These are also used as data, putting other 
empirical findings into a context and thus supposed to create a deeper understanding. Moreover I 
see the use of academical articles in this thesis as a «bridge» between  theory and analysis, bringing 
the theory down to a local context which is also useful for answering the first problem. Still, the 
document-analysis is mostly relevant for the second problem. Documents obtained at the CMM, for 
example describe the legal status of Maputo markets, the Praça dos Combatentes reconstruction and 
the  CMM  resettlement  policy  leading  to  civilians  being  afflicted  by  development  of  urban 
infrastructure. These documents serve as a supplement for the interviews conducted with the last 
group of informants, and especially, municipal officials and the ASSOTSI. Reading documents was 
also necessary for doing some of the interviews. For example, doing the follow-up-interview with 
the ASSOTSI became more useful after reading CMM legislations for markets, and the World Bank 
representative  whom I  were  in  contact  with  demanded that  I  obtained  the  CMM resettlement-
documents before the interview9. There are some documents that I have not been able to get, but 
that would have been important if I had them. For example, old newspaper-articles or minutes from 
meetings that have been defining for the Xikhelene markets status or the involvement of social 
organizations could have been of great importance. These kinds of sources proved to be difficult 
and  time-consuming  to  get  in  Maputo.  As  a  result,  the  information  obtained  about  how  the 
marketplace came into being and how the market committee worked, stems from interviews that 
feels a bit incomplete or difficult to rely on. However, the greatest annoyance was that I never got 
my hands on the RAP for the reconstruction of the Praça dos Combatentes. The GDEI sent me 
several  documents  a  few days  after  our  meeting,  as  agreed  upon,  except  from the  RAP.  This 
document would most likely have proved crucial for getting exact information and officially stated 
plans  about  the  resettlement  of  vendors  and  information  about  operators  involved  in  the 
reconstruction and their  specific roles. The GDEI claimed that the reasons for not handing this 
document over, was that they did not possess a digital version, even though they were showing me 
9 This interview did not take place.
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this document on a laptop during our meeting. I was continuously sending mails asking for this 
document until January 2010 before finally giving up. All the statements in the thesis about the 
resettlement of vendors are therefore based on interviews.
2.3 Usefulness of the data
As  explained,  the  information  gathered  during  interviews  with  vendors  seem  somewhat 
circumstantial, which poses difficulties for the first part of the problem. I have found moments that 
has been enough to build a text that answers the problem. It works well when supplemented with 
background  information,  but  it  might  have  been  important  information  about  the  use  of  the 
marketplace that I was unable to find. I was unable to get any good, written work about the history 
of the Xikhelene market, so this information is solely based on oral sources. The history of the 
market poses some explanations for the functions of the market, but it is not given first priority. As 
it was easier to get good interviews with officials and get documents more directly related to the 
second part of the problem, these findings appear stronger and more convincing. The second part of 
the problem is also more sharply defined in relation to theory, which made it easier to categorize the 
findings and create arguments. Still,  findings for the first part of the problems serves well as a 
supplement for second part, which was intended. 
2.4 Method of analysis
The transcripts and  summaries  of interviews have been analysed by categorizing the content that 
seemed relevant for the problem. The text were put into a table, then the relevant content was 
underlined, numbered and used for further notes. Documents or historical texts have been used 
either as supplement or for contextualizing the content of the interviews. Then I compared this 
content and looked how content of different interviews or written material could supplement or 
contradict each other, to find a saturation of meaning and build a text. Thus, I have adopted what 
Thagaard  explains  as  a  issue-based  interpretation,  identifying  aspects  about  the  ways  the 
Xikhelene-market  is  being  used  and  how the  process  of  decision  related  to  its  reconstruction 
occurred. Looking at how different operators narrate the same situation, for example regarding the 
Xikhelene's legal situation or the transference of vendors has revealed a lot about power and how 
the different operators were involved. Some of the content of the material also demanded what 
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Thagaard  (2002)  describes  as  a  person-based analysis,  using  narrations  about  how  individual 
vendors  had  developed  their  activity,  how  the  marketplace  is  important  for  them or  how  the 
reconstruction affected their activities . 
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3    Theoretical Framework  
This  part  consists,  first,  of  theory  on  informality  and  then  relevant  theory  on  urban 
governance. Theory on informality  was chosen because it will pose understanding for the growth 
and  dynamics  of  the  Xikhelene  and  the  discussion  on  formalization.  The  discussion  on 
formalization is given some attention in   sub-chapter 3.1.3. Furthermore, as formalization occurs 
through processes of decision making and as this thesis examines a particular process of decision 
making,  this  chapter  will  also discuss  theory on governance,  in sub-chapter  3.2.  The particular 
urban setting will be prioritized. As policy makers regard principles of participatory governance and 
substantial democracy as particularly important during formalization processes, this will also be 
examined. A suggestion on how these two bodies of theory may be combined; informality and 
governance will also be considered in the concluding sub-chapter 3.3.  
3.1 Perspectives on informality
This chapter consists of three theoretical approaches on informality, first  early approaches 
and then the current, dominating approaches: the legalist approach which is a Neoliberal approach 
and the informalization approach, which is a Marxist approach.
3.1.1 Early approaches 
Informal work is often defined as the activities that take place outside formal wage-labour 
market, such as self-employment as well as illegal and clandestine work (Munck 2002). The earliest 
models on informality were developed during the 1960s and 1970s and stem from concepts put 
forward by the modernization theory like,  for example Rostow's (1960) distinction between the 
traditional and the modern sector. These approaches explained informality as the traditional sector 
or simply as  marginality.  Already at this  stage, the discourse had a  dualist view on informality 
versus formality, and informality was regarded as a temporary state caused by underemployment, 
due to the urbanization that occurred faster than industrialization. This early theory predicted that 
this sector would be absorbed as growth of industrialization and modernization of society created 
jobs. Marxist writers from this earlier period argued that there was no incentive for capitalism to 
upgrade  urban,  marginal  masses  because  they served  as  an  «excess  reserve  army of  workers» 
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(Portes & Schauffler 1993). 
Later it became clear that the informal sector was by no means a transitional phenomenon. 
An ILO research in Kenya 1972, «Employment,  income and equality,  a strategy for increasing 
productive employment in Kenya» proved that the informal sector was rather expanding because 
extralegal  activities  became  necessary,  as  wages  provided  by  the  formal  sector  jobs  were  not 
sufficient to sustain households and because not enough new jobs were created.  Then the term 
«informal sector» was applied internationally for the first time. Both the 1972 ILO research and a 
contemporary article by Hart, published in 1973 present an optimistic image of informal labour, 
emphasizing that the informal sector may work as a safety net for the unemployed and that it may 
open possibilities for entrepreneurship and economic growth (Chen et al. 2004). Hart's article is 
described as a breakthrough because it yields an explanation on why and how the Third World's 
growing shanty towns function. ILO adopted a definition that seems important for the later legalist 
approach  which  brings  an  even  stronger  emphasis  on  informal  workers  as  entrepreneurs, 
underlining that  the informal  sector  has a «low entry barrier  to  entrepreneurship».  This can be 
explained by the fact that self-employment was not necessarily connected to poverty,  but could 
sometimes bring more profit than formal employment (Chen 2007). 
However, with the dualist approach, the “informal sector” was still associated with poverty 
and as a safety net for the poor and unemployed. It was normally defined through a bundle of 
typical  characteristics,  which  contrary  to  the  “formal  sector”  are  recognized  as:  small  scale 
activities,  traditional,  family/individual  ownership,  labour-intensive,  subsistence  oriented, 
indigenous technology/inputs, unregulated/competitive markets, ease of entry, informally acquired 
skills, minority of workers protected by labour legislation and covered by social security (Chant 
2002).    
3.1.2 Current approaches: the legalist approach and the informalization approach 
More  recently,  two contemporary interpretations  may be  used  to  explain  the  expanding 
informality in the third world. One of these two is connected to a neoliberal stance and points out 
state  regulations  as  the root  of  informalization,  as  entrepreneurs  seek to  escape inefficient  and 
unrealistic state regulations (Lindell 2002). Hence, it may also be referred to as a legalist approach 
(Chen et.al 2004). The Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto has provided the main contributions 
to this approach. The work The other path from 1989, based on empirical findings from Peru and 
conducted by his institute shows that operators are driven into informality by the legal obstacles 
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they meet  when trying to start  a factory or other  business.  De Soto's  contribution shares some 
features with Hart's approach. For example, informality is characterized mainly as a consequence of 
urbanization and poverty in third world countries (Portes & Schauffler 1993). The informality has 
roots in the poverty and overpopulation of the cities due to migration, which leads to the existence 
of a population that the established formal system cannot absorb. However, the problem does not lie 
in the poor population,  but in the system which is too rigid. Furthermore, the earlier «safety-net» 
definition is abandoned: informality is preferred, it will out-compete regulated activities and even 
though the phenomenon is connected to poverty, the operators are not necessarily poor (de Soto 
1989). 
The legalist approach is an optimistic view because it characterizes the informal operator as 
an active entrepreneur. To make the most of this resource, de Soto encourages the knock-down of 
state regulations. Hence, the legalist approach has been embraced by the policy makers of the time, 
during the shift from Keynesianism to Neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s. Another reason for its 
popularity may be that the hardening international economic competition escapes criticism, as the 
mercantile state becomes rather the oppressor (Portes & Schauffler 1993). For neoliberals, de Soto 
in his later work: The Mystery of Capital also offers a favourable explanation on why informality 
increased  during  SAPs  and  opening  of  economies.  Poor  people  are  excluded  from  economic 
participation because of high entry barriers  to formal  institutions so that  their  assets  cannot be 
turned into capital. 
In The Other Path various empirical studies by the Peruvian ILD are used to prove how and 
why  informality  has  been  getting  hold. The  examples  are  mainly  historical  and  show  the 
development of informal transport, housing and trading among the poor, urban population in Lima. 
The empirical work within these sectors shows that theory works well to explain a great variety of 
informal activities. The excluded people act like entrepreneurs, they screen the different accessible 
possibilities to find a place to live, to earn an income and overcome the eventual obstacles.  This 
activity  taking  place  outside  of  formal  regulations  becomes  a reason  for  a  great  variety  of 
organization, cooperation and competition. Thus, a strength of the legalist approach is that it has 
explanatory power for informal governance, informal institutions and informality as a socio-cultural 
feature. For example, people without access to formal institutions will have to develop new or make 
use  of  use  traditional  institutions,  such  as  organizations,  arrangements  and  unwritten  rules,  as 
exemplified by Lindell  (2001).  Hence,  it  may serve to  explain informal  governance as  well  as 
informal economic activity. 
But the legalist approach also has its shortcomings. For example, the choice of empirical 
examples  shows  that  it  mainly  regards  informality  as  a  trait  among  the  poor  and  the  small 
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enterprises in the third world, which is problematic for various reasons. First, it does not clarify why 
the regularized economies of many industrialized countries, for instance in Scandinavia, have not 
created an extensive informal economy. Second, it does not explain generally informalization in 
industrialized economies.  Third,  for  authors  of  the  informalization-approach,  the  manufacturing 
sector has been used empirically in order to document links between the formal and the informal. 
Since  the  empirical  examples  in  «The  other  path»  exclude  manufacturing,  it  has  not  been 
sufficiently considered how the informal economy can be connected to the formal. For instance, 
how many large companies hire workers «off the books», an action that proves the existence of such 
a connection. This will suggest that informality takes place in other settings as well. Hence, the 
legalist approach may be criticised for dealing only with the visible informality, the one that can be 
seen  on  the  streets  of  the  third  world  cities.  The  consequence  may be  that  people  talk  about 
informality exclusively as something that happens on the street,  among people lacking financial 
means, who violate regulations, public space and so on (Portes and Schauffler 1993). 
Since the informal operators are optimistically portrayed as «actors» and not as «victims» 
one may ask the question: do they choose informality, or are they driven into informality? When for 
instance Chen (2004) refers to the legalist view, she describes it as, «plucky entrepreneurs» who 
choose to operate informally. But the way De Soto explains it, it does not necessarily appear like a 
free  choice,  for  legality  is  a  privilege  available  only for  those  in  possession  of  economic  and 
political power. De Soto conducted a fieldwork, exploring the opportunities to open a street kiosk or 
to sell from a pushcart within the limits of the legal framework and found that the tax policies and 
the bureaucracy were abysmal. He concluded that it was nearly impossible for poor people in Lima 
to not break the law when conducting necessary, economic activities. Hence, the poor are excluded 
and they have no alternative but illegality (de Soto 1989). It seems then an ambiguity to blame the 
system for the informality and at the same time optimistically portray poor people as entrepreneurial 
actors who choose informality. This apparently remains unsolved and I think it is important because 
the legalist view is influential and its definition may influence the way policy makers talk about 
informality. Portraying informality as a voluntary state will, for instance, make small scale traders 
more  responsible  for  their  own  situation.  Thus,  the  transgression  of  the  law  will  seem  less 
legitimate, which will lead to less questions asked and less opportunities for resistance,  when the 
state or other operators impose changes in their environment that negatively affect their activities. 
This may be further exacerbated by, as Castells & Portes (1989) criticize, the lack of a conceptual 
difference between informal work and crime. As opposed to crime, informal work results in a legal 
product, but the activity itself may, depending on local legislations, be defined as extralegal and 
criminal. However, since it is important for de Soto to portray the informal actors in a positive way 
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and  as  a  source  for  economic  growth,  this  criticism  may  be  a  lot  more  relevant  for 
conceptualizations that draw on the earlier approaches. 
Another theoretical approach to informal economy is a Marxist structural approach, or neo-
structural approach, referred to as the informalization approach. This approach is the most system-
critical.  It  claims  that  informal  economy  is  not  a  transitional  phase,  but  that  increasing 
informalization is rather a feature of late capitalism and globalization.  It draws on earlier  Neo-
Marxist concepts which provide explanations on why it may be preferable for an operator within the 
formal economy to have a connection to the informal (Lindell 2002). Writers of the informalization 
approach, like Castells & Portes (1989), claim that informal work is a result of exploitation of non-
institutionalized labour in order to profit from undefined relations of production. Hence, the formal 
and the informal are interconnected: informality is not a strategy, but a manifestation of specific 
relations of production. Informal labour may be described as waged labour in the same manner as 
any labour, except that work relationships are disguised so that workers do not enjoy the rights 
given by a formalized employment relation. As already pointed out, the earlier approaches describe 
informality as a transitional feature of third world economies on their development path towards 
capitalism.  On  the  contrary,  the  informalization  approach  explains  it  as  an  increasing,  global 
tendency due  to  the  sharpening  competition  created  by globalization  and  knock-down of  state 
regulations, all this stemming from the crisis that occurred in the Fordist model for development 
(Munck 2002). Knutsen (2006) applies Harvey's «The new imperialism» from 2003, to explain the 
informalization processes as a feature of late capitalism, as capitalism is in need to create an outside 
of  the  formal by  «throwing  workers  out  of  the  system»  to  circumvent  the  pressure  of  over-
accumulation.  Moreover,  the  workers  are  dispossessed  of  the  rights  that  come  with  a  formal 
proletarian status.  In  addition  to  this,  informalization  will  also facilitate  a  greater  flexibility of 
access to labour and suppliers, which has been increasingly important for Post-Fordist competition. 
The informalization approach is supported by the fact that informality is proved to be increasing, 
not decreasing and that it is not solely a feature of the third world, but also an expanding tendency 
in more institutionalized economies (Castells & Portes 1989).  
Since  formal  and  informal  systems  are  interconnected,  it  becomes  misleading  to  treat 
informality as an isolated  sector because this definition closes the boundaries between the formal 
and the informal.  Consequently, informal  economy,  becomes a better  term than informal  sector. 
Economic activities operate within a continuum of degrees of informality, with total informality at 
one extreme and total regulation at the other (Chen 2007). As proved by Roberts (1989), a firm 
operating  within  the  formal  system  may  be  partly  dependent  on  informal  labour,  informal 
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subcontractors or more stable suppliers. The degree of formality and informality of an economic 
activity may be permanently changing,  so it  becomes more fruitful  to explain informality as a 
process  and not  as  an object  or  condition.  For  example, a  company can  change subcontracted 
projects, agreements or other actions passing from formal to informal.  This is why informality is 
referred to as a movement or characterized as increasing, an idea properly rendered by the term 
informalization: as a present participle that refers to a process or something that is evolving.
Moreover, this approach yields an all-encompassing definition on informality that breaks 
away  from  the  arbitrariness  of  the  typical  characteristics of  the  early  approaches.  Formal 
arrangements, institutions, laws or rights are assets that may be traded, lost, dispossessed. It does 
not necessarily have anything to do with poverty,  as these processes may take place within the 
corridors  of  power  as  well  as  among  the  poor.  Another  advantage  is  that the  informalization 
approach establishes a sharper separation between informal economy and crime. Castells & Portes 
(1989)  describe  crime  and  informal  economy as  structurally  linked  to  the  formal  economy in 
fundamental different ways. Another merit is that a conception of informal economy as connected 
to the formal one, opens the possibility to create a model for the segmentation of different informal 
activities and it explains their diversity by placing them along a continuum that describes degrees of 
informality, from total formality to total informality (Chen 2007).     
3.1.3 Some approaches on formalization
For  most  policy  makers,  informality  has  been  seen  as  undesirable.  However,  de  Soto's 
(1989) contribution, The Other Path cherishes the self-employed, informal entrepreneurs, but still, 
in his work from 2003, he claims that capitalism cannot function with total informality:  with  a 
missing common language for economic transactions, people's assets cannot be turned into capital, 
but be a subject for sporadic, informal and unpredictable arrangements. In turn, informality hampers 
economic growth. In his volume of 2003, de Soto introduces property rights on poor peoples' assets 
as a solution. The CLEP stresses that informality excludes people from the rule of law, causes social 
exclusion and vulnerability. They also claim that it  undermines a functional democracy, as poor 
people's claims on their informal ownership, even though crucial for their everyday survival, do not 
become subject  for  fair  political  processes.  They become helpless  when  for  example  powerful 
actors claim ownership to their residents or assets (CLEP 2008). ILO and the CLEP share many 
aspects. However, ILO's concern is more directed towards that labour rights and labour standards 
are weakened as a result of informalization. 
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At the same time, a total formalization through enhanced regulations may be neither realistic 
nor desirable. De Soto's (1989) solution is thus important in this respect, because it calls for down 
building of regulations in order to encourage informal entrepreneurship rather than preventing it. 
Being able to operate informally is a necessity for the activities of many third world people, as it 
poses an opportunity for entrepreneurship. Portes & Scauffler (1993), as well as ILO (2006) agree 
with de Soto and argue that small enterprises should be given an upper hand by being able to “go 
informal” and break the rules, as it gives them an competitive upper hand. They also claim that too 
strong state regulations and international labour standards is a very reason for informality, as it will 
conduct the companies to appeal to a greater deal of informal employment, leading therefore to a 
«race to the bottom». Hence, policy recommendations of the ILO and the CLEP are quite similar in 
the way they seek a balance between the dynamics of regulations and informality. A main difference 
however, is that ILO primarily maintains a focus on informal work relations, whilst the CLEP to a 
larger extent concerns itself with the informal self employed. Hence, the LEP becomes very relevant 
for this thesis, as it examines a retail market with vendors who are, for the most part, self employed. 
ILO  suggests  that  labour  standards  have  to  be  adapted  to  the  financial  opportunities  of  each 
particular country (ILO 2006). The LEP seeks to impose a pro-poor policy by creating institutions 
and rules that are accessible and understandable particularly for the poor. The LEP also seek to 
repeal laws and institutions that marginalizes the poor. In sum, it is important for the analysis of this 
thesis to maintain that the rules, that are imposed as a part of the formalization strategy, have to be 
enforceable and they have to be realistically abided if the formalization is to be successful.  
For  both  ILO  and  the  CLEP  it  is  crucial  to  facilitate  the  creation  of  representative 
organizations and open an opportunity for participation in the implementation of policies (CLEP 
2008, ILO 2006). This is marked by a general aim of conducting democratic practices. However, if 
the aim is to empower poor, informal entrepreneurs and workers and to avoid social exclusion and 
vulnerability, local participation can be a valuable tool for a successful formalization. One relevant 
example may be taken from the findings of an article by Lyons & Snoxell (2004), of a study of 
informal, urban retail markets in Accra and Dakar. They claim that such traders often rely on the 
social capital of family and friends which is often based on the proximity embedded in the system 
of the marketplace. Thus, during relocation of marketplaces as a part of the formalization process, a 
throughout local consultation is necessary in order to avoid breaking the systems that the traders 
rely on. 
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3.1.4 Summary
The previous sub-chapters present three perspectives on informality. The first, earlier views 
see  informality  as  an  isolated  sector  of  activities  performed  by  the  unemployed,  ready  to  be 
integrated into  the formal  sector  as  the economy grows.  It  came into existence  due to  a  rapid 
urbanization and population growth that was not followed by economic growth. Hence, informality 
often takes place where there is poverty. With less regulations and tax, the informal sector also has a 
low entry barrier. This element is taken further by de Soto (1989). 
The second is a legalist view that has similarities to the earlier view in the way it primarily 
regards informality as a trait among poor people. However, the reason for informality is not first 
and foremost the missing economic growth, but rather that entrepreneurs avoid the formal sector, as 
the legal barriers for entering are too high. The legalist view has had great influence on policy 
makers, like ILO, but particularly the CLEP in which de Soto himself is a member. However, the 
CLEP  poses  an  extended  notion,  which  describes  the  general  inaccessible  or  insufficient 
institutional framework as a reason for informality. Hence, informality is not just a result of poverty, 
but also of the legal context. In this thesis, informality in Maputo will be explained in relation to the 
legal framework. It will also be explained how formalization occurs as an attempt to adapt a new 
legal framework. The legal framework thus becomes important to understand the functions of the 
Xikhelene market..
The third view is an informalization view that explains formality as formalized relations of 
production. Informalization occurs when these are being built down due to the structural changes in 
the processes of capitalist competition. Important for this thesis is then to note that the formal and 
the informal are intertwined, as this view introduces a continuum from activities being formal and 
regulated to informal and totally unregulated. For this thesis, it is also important to stress that a 
formal status is seen as a political capital as there are rights that come with it. 
Some approaches to formalization have also been discussed. For this thesis, it is important to 
note that formalization is necessary because informality causes exclusion from the rule of law and 
thus undermines a functional democracy. However, a total formalization may be disadvantageous, 
particularly  for  poor  people,  because  informality  poses  an  important  opportunity  for 
entrepreneurship. Informal actors may also be dependent on complex informal systems for their 
income generation, which should be considered during formalization.   
It must also be maintained that formalization has to be balanced and realistically enforced 
and abided. ILO stresses that  imposing regulations has to occur within the limits of a financial 
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frame and that some informality thus has to be tolerated. The LEP strategy seeks to formalize by 
lowering the legal barrier and adapting the law to make it accessible for poor people, which also 
may be seen as a balanced formalization. 
Both ILO and the CLEP stress that a democratic governance and local participation with 
representative organizations is crucial, both to secure the rights of the subjects and to make sure that 
all  aspects  of  informal  activities  are  considered in  the strategy.  How formalization  occurs  in  a 
process of decision making is examined in this thesis. 
3.2 Urban governance and new democratic ideals
Changes driven by the processes of globalization have created a need for both academics 
and policy makers to broaden concepts of democracy and the discourses of citizen participation in 
urban governance. The concept of globalization is often referred to as a process by which capital 
flows,  labour-markets,  commodity  markets  and  organizations  are  increasingly  interdependent 
throughout the world (Castells 1998, in: Beall et al. 2002). The new division of labour resulted in 
crisis  as  tax-revenues  fell  due  to  the  relocation  and  the  following  unemployment  and as  state 
expenditure  increased  due  to  unemployment  and  short-time  working  (Fröbel  et  al.  1980).  In 
addition to this, the democratic institutions of the Fordist state did also prove ineffective to handle 
the  increasing  complexity of  state  tasks  (Fung & Wright  2001).  The  crisis  of  the  Fordist  state 
challenged the state power and marked a shift towards a decentralizing Post-Fordist «hollowing 
out» of the state, where the state was loosing many of its functions to sub national and supranational 
levels  (Goodwin  &  Painter  1996).  This  shift  was  also  pushed  forward  by  a  new  neo-liberal 
hegemony (Leitner et al. 2007). The dispersion of power created a need for rethinking perspectives 
of political power which resulted in a scalar shift from seeing the state as the main decision maker, 
to moving focus towards the local scale, for example towards the significance of civil society, and 
towards the global scale, for example towards the international institutions like the World Bank, the 
IMF or the UN. The process of power-dispersion and the new interrelatedness between the global 
and the local scale  have been referred to  as  glocalization.  Dispersion of power to networks of 
participants did also create a shift in the concept on how society is governed, from the role of the 
state, towards on how power is shared in networks of actors, thus introducing the term governance 
(Swyngedouw 1997 in: Millstein 2007).
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3.2.1 “The local” as the new space for development discourse and policy making 
For development discussions, the discourse of  glocalization was a part of a post modern 
turn. It created a focus on diversity, the particular characteristics, the interests and the culture of the 
local instead of the earlier, holistic development-theory and all-encompassing development-policies. 
Holistic modernization-theory based on for example classical economics or dependency theory was 
criticized for being irrelevant and for not having effects on the problems it is supposed to address. 
With a focus on characteristics of the local, the policies of development-agencies have increasingly 
been encouraged to base its insights from below through local participation. Development theory 
should be advanced the same way, from below and with inductive methods. It was now put less 
emphasis on what the state could do or what development-agencies could do to create development, 
and more emphasis on how local communities could contribute to knowledge and what they could 
do themselves to promote their own agendas and change. Hence,  the local gets a new power of 
discourse in the development of theory. This perspective «from below» was a starting point for new 
«alternative»  development-agendas  of  empowerment and  participation of  local  actors  (Edwards 
1994). 
For  example,  Dudley  (1993)  criticizes  how  development  programs  destroyed  local 
communities or how they eventually fall apart as local people were not taking part in them. He calls 
for a development-strategy where local people should set  their  own agendas,  and participate in 
development-projects.  Participation is  supposed to bee seen as a goal  itself,  as  this  was a way 
people could be  empowered to  make changes.  Friedman (1992)  divides  empowerment  in  three 
«powers». First, the  social power  is an access to the bases of household-production through the 
knowledge, information, and participation in social movement that is needed. Political power in this 
context, refers to as an access and influence in the political processes that affects ones own life. 
Alias, a definition that is extended from just a power to vote. Psychological power, he describes as 
being confident  of  ones  ability to  create  changes.  This is  taken further  by Rakodi  (2002) who 
applies  a  figure  of  livelihood  assets.  Strengthening  livelihood  assets  is  a  “bottom-up”  way of 
combating poverty, which may be achieved by empowering the household's10 powers, which is here 
understood  as  capital.  This  capital  is  divided  in  five  categories:  human,  social  and  political, 
physical, financial and natural capital. Relevant for analysing a political process of decision, may be 
the household's social and political capital, which corresponds well with Friedman's (1992) political 
power: 
10 The household is often used as the common local geographical unit.
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Political power concerns the access of individual household members to the process by which 
decisions, particularly those that affect their own future are made (Friedman 1992, p33). 
3.2.2 The local as the space for democratic practice and resistance
As importance is being put in the local as a political actor and as a participator in processes 
of decision, participation of the local also becomes a question of democracy. As well, through the 
shift of power from the state towards the local, it became necessary both for academics and policy 
makers to look for alternatives to the democratic ideal-model, and to broaden the understanding of 
democratic  ideals.  Traditionally the concept  of democracy has  been understood as an  electoral  
democracy, a functioning democratic ideal model with democratically elected institutions governing 
society on behalf of the population (Rhodes 1997). With the decentralisation of state functions and 
as decisions are being made on new arenas, it has also been necessary to broaden the scope of the 
democratic model to include these new arenas. Consequently, the democracy has to be an inclusive 
one, or a  substantial democracy: where the different voices of interests are heard and are able to 
negotiate  in  processes  of  decision.  A strong  substantial  democracy  has  to  imply  policies  that 
facilitate participation of the myriad of new spaces (Törnquist 2004). 
Within this scope, it has first and foremost been shed an optimistic light on the civil society  
as the arena where citizens should be given a better opportunity to organize, and to participate in 
governance, in shaping discourses and practises, to exercise control over decisions that affect their 
own lives and to hold the state accountable (Fung & Wright 2001). Furthermore,  civil society is a 
buzzword that has extensively been an object for academic discussions. Tostensen et al.  (2001) 
presents a quick overview of different strands. Most of these have had a normative, optimistic view 
and presents it as if everything that goes on in civil society is within public interest. Civil society 
has, for example, been presented as a carrier of cultural norms and values. It promotes solidarity 
and communitarianism through thrust and co-operation. It is based on moral principles and it is 
synonymous with a good society. Furthermore, the civil society has been presented as a sum of 
different  organizations  and activities  that  contributes  to  civil  life.  It  is  assumed  that  the  sheer 
multitude and variation will create a vibrant, democratic society. It has also been normal, especially 
for neo-liberal policy makers or the donor-community to place civil society in opposition to an 
autocratic or centralized state as a countervailing power representing public interests (Tostensen et 
al. 2001). 
The Post-Marxist view on civil society share the same optimistic view on civil society as the 
neo-liberal view. The civil society represents a political space that can bring a more diverse, auto 
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centric and socially relevant development, than the politics of the state. But for Post-Marxists, the 
politics  of  civil  society,  as  conceptualized  by  Mittelman  &  Chin  (2000),  is  an  expression  of 
resistance against the both the centralized state and the hegemony of global economic liberalization. 
Among the literature on resistance, Friedman (1992) created a model that may be connected to 
definitions on informal economy. According to him urban, civil resistance in the third world is even 
a direct  result  of structural  conditions, created by the entry of transnational corporations in the 
economy squeezing people out of their original habitation. A large part of the marginalized people 
migrates  to  cities,  where  a  huge  subsistence  sector11 is  created  and  where  they  create  protest 
movements against a top-down distribution of power and demanding enhanced civil services. These 
movements  may in  turn  develop  into  informal  institutions  of  self-management  within  the  civil 
society.  He concludes  that  third  world development  demands a  participating  democracy,  where 
institutions of this kind are included in the governance of society,  as a civil  society domain of 
organization. More specifically about techniques of civil resistance, these Post-Marxist works draw 
on  Gramsci  (1971,  in:  Mittelman  &  Chin  2000):  power  is  expressed  through  a  hegemony 
established in  existing laws,  institutions and ideology serving the dominant  classes.  Hegemony 
implies that the suppressed are co-opted into the logics of these structures and adapt through “self-
government”. Somehow, the construction of a “counter-hegemonic consciousness” in milieus that 
may  have  an  interest  in  exercising  opposition,  such  as  civil  society  or  within  the  very  state 
institutions, must first be created. Resistance then takes place by “wars of movement”: assaults such 
as strikes or military action, or “wars of position”: non-violent action such as boycott that impedes 
the everyday state functions. Polyanis (1957, in: Mittelman & Chin 2000) notion of resistance is a 
“counter movement” against a development, or “movement” in society that has a negative impact 
on  the  social  relations  or  institutions  of  its  participants.  In  this  sense,  the  understanding  of  a 
“movement” refers  to  the  liberalization of  markets,  which  in  turn  has  a  devastating  impact  on 
various groups. Scott (1990, in Mittelman & Chin 2000) introduced the idea of “infrapolitics”. This 
is  an  everyday  form  of  counter-hegemonic  resistance  through  “hidden  transcripts”  which  are 
invisible to those in power: creation of identities, language, behaviour and lifestyle that contests the 
way dominant classes have created and narrates society in their favour, which here are referred to as 
“public transcripts”. 
An over-emphasis or an exaggerated optimism on the civil society has been criticized. These 
criticisms may serve to weaken, or at least complicate the assumption that an emphasis on civil 
society in governance,  easily will  lead to a stronger  democracy.  First,  the local  has often been 
11 Friedman's (1992) version of the term informal economy  
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viewed in isolation and taken out of its context of broader economical and political structures which 
determines  how  politics  of  the  local  are  played  out  (Mohan  &  Stokke  2000).  Second,  the 
complexity  within  civil  society  may  remain  unexplored,  due  to  the  already  explained  sheer 
optimism, the common normative approach and the shallow assumptions of the dominant ideologies 
(Mercer 2002). These assumptions have often been over-romanticizing and essentializing. Thus, it 
may be forgotten that the civil society consists of divergent interests, social inequalities which may 
be struggling against each other and be a source of conflict as well as democratic development. The 
assumption that the civil society is representing public interests, disengaged and opposed to the 
state has also been questioned. An example may be the domain models applied by Friedman (1992) 
or The World Bank (1997), which separates political operators into distinct domains, such as the 
state, the civil society and the private sector. In practice, networks of power and interest may be 
intertwined and stretch across the domains, as described by Lindell (2008). According to Azarya 
(1988, in Sjögren 1998) civic associations could might as well be incorporated in state politics and 
aims. Or, one may talk about a continuum from incorporation to disengagement. Thus relations and 
interactions to the state may differ from oppositional to clientelist. For example, organizations may 
be  used  as  institutions  for  providing  services  and thus,  mainly with  the  aim of  reducing  state 
financial expenses rather than civic participation (Blakeley 2005). Discussing this problem in the 
light of the term empowerment presented above, Dudley (1993) claims that participation could be 
misunderstood in several ways and applied in weaker forms. For example, for many governments 
and development-agencies, participation has become a necessity to reduce the costs of development 
projects. Participation has also been used to consciously make a development project seem less 
paternalistic than what it really is. Hence, if the subjects of a participation-strategy are not actively 
taking part in- and have the opportunity to change a decision-processes, the political capital has not 
been strengthened and the participation strategy is not fully empowering. But, the error may also lie 
in the organization's structure and aims. For example, civic organizations may be embedded in pre-
existing  cultural  hierarchies  that  work  in  the  interests  of  their  members  in  collaboration  with 
governments (Beall 2001). The term cooptation as applied by Shleifer & Treisman (2000), poses an 
explanation for a state strategy for dealing with civil resistance to its reforms. A stakeholder may 
either be “expropriated from the stake that gives him leverage. Or he must be coopted”. By the term 
stakeholder, they do not refer to the entire group affected by a reform, but certain, powerful, social 
actors within that group. Cooptation implies:
...not  dealing  the  stakeholders  out  of  the  game,  but  dealing  them new cards.  The  reform 
entrepreneur does not remove the stakeholder's veto-power, but creates incentives for him not to 
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exercise it (Shleifer & Treisman 2000, p 9).
The state will by various means seek to create such incentives, trough persuasion or making 
benefits or rents that the stakeholder will be offered in return for not opposing. 
 
3.2.3 A central role for civil society through neo-liberal reforms
The neo-liberal view on the role of civil society in politics of localization, has certainly been 
the  predominant  one.  It  has  been  advocated  through  the  influence  of  Western  supranational 
organizations,  particularly the Bretton Woods organizations,  like the World  Bank,  the  IMF,  the 
WTO, but  also the  UN. This  has  mainly happened through the  SAPs in  the  eighties  and later 
institutional reforms, but also through discursive power. Alias, the supranational organizations have 
had power to conduct policy-changes in the third world, but the mere existence of foreign aid has 
also influenced recipient countries even long before the SAPs were implemented. Furthermore, it 
has been in the interests of donor agencies, aid-organizations, NGOs and so on to influence political 
practices in their working-countries. Institutional reforms, democratization and human rights have 
occurred as various conditionalities for aid. These conditionalities became even more demanding 
after  the  end of  the  cold  war,  as  the  West  then  no  longer  saw it  necessary to  cooperate  with 
authoritarian regimes. The West has enjoyed legitimacy for its pro-democracy conditions through, 
first,  the  fact  that  this  often  has  been  a  demand from various  domestic  groups  within  the  aid 
recipient  countries.  Second,  in  the  nineties  the  world  saw a  general  wave  of  democratization, 
predominantly in Latin-America and South East-Asia. Third, the later failure of the SAPs to achieve 
satisfying results, was directed at bad governance and corruption in the recipient countries. This 
created  a  recognition that  the  political  conditions  had  to  be made right  for  development  to  be 
achieved (Smith 2007).      
Western  democratic  policy-conditions  have  been  implemented  through  ideals  of  good 
governance. Good governance has been defined differently at different times and depending on the 
promoting institution or agency. The separation of the terms government and governance must not 
be taken for granted, as the current definitions on good governance at times mainly have pursued 
changes in the state management. During most of the 1990s, the term contained a democratic state, 
special  policies  for  poverty-reduction  and  enhanced  civil  services  and  the  «right»  economic 
policies, which usually mean trade-liberalization and privatization. State institutional reforms were 
also promoted to decentralize the government and make it accountable, with functioning legal and 
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judicial systems. Good governance-agenda has also been associated with liberal, capitalist ideology, 
a package of: liberal democracy, free enterprise, free trade, free markets and a minimalist state. In 
other words, the good governance ideals have mostly been associated with the neo-liberal agenda 
(Smith 2007). 
The importance of civil society's participation has increasingly been taken into account. First 
in a lighter way, to play a role for encouraging political accountability, legitimacy, transparency and 
participation  in  politics.  Later  on,  particularly at  the end of  the  1990s as  the network-oriented 
approach  on  governance  became  stronger,  good  governance  has  come  to  mean  a  deeper 
involvement  of  non-governmental  bodies  like  private  firms,  NGOs,  CBOs  and  so  on,  both  in 
implementation  of  public  policies  and  public  services.  The  state  should  function  merely  as  a 
facilitator  for  democratic  negotiations  and  debates  between  these  organizations.  Thus  political 
authority has to be decentralized (Smith 2007). This last notion of good governance has been crucial 
for the later understanding of citizen participation in development. For example the UNDP Human 
Development  Report  of  1993  «People's  Participation»  completely  circles  around  the  idea  of 
decentralizing the state and promoting citizen participation in governance (HDR 1993). It has also 
affected The World Development Report 1997 (World Bank 1997) in addition to earlier notions: 
Governments are more effective when they listen to businesses and citizens and work with 
partnership  with  them  in  deciding  and  implementing  policy.  Where  governments  lack 
mechanisms to listen, they are not responsive to people's interests, especially those of minorities 
and  the  poor,  who  usually  strain  to  get  their  voices  heard  in  the  corridors  of  power.  (...) 
Partnership involves bringing the voice of the poor and of marginalized groups into the very 
centre of policy making process. In many countries voice is distributed as unequally as income. 
Greater information and transparency are vital for informated public debate and for increasing 
popular thrust and for confidence in the state.... (World Bank 1997 p10)
3.2.4 The frame of urban governance 
The term  governance  is somewhat confusing because it has been used in many different 
ways.  First,  it  has  often  been  used  interchangeably  with  the  term  government.  In  this  thesis, 
government represents the formal, governing institutions. Governance represents the way society is 
being governed and all operators that may be influential, from state institutions to powerful, foreign 
entities like the Bretton Woods-institutions to companies or local CSOs. Hence, governance is a 
broader term than government. 
Second, the term governance has been used both as a tool for explaining how decisions are 
being made and as a definition that explains the Post-Fordist mode of regulation itself. This last 
definition has been useful for, for example describing the new politics of the Post-Fordist  shift 
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«from government to governance» (Rhodes 1997). Here, the first approach becomes more relevant: 
The term governance is used as an explanatory tool rather than something that has to be explained. 
This thesis seeks to analyse a particular process of decision, so the role of relevant actors in the 
description of this process must be considered. The degree of state-power centralization becomes a 
different matter in this instance (Goodwin & Painter 1996). 
Third,  one may use either a state-centric or a more society-centred approach.  The state-
centric model refers to how the state has the capacity to steer and how it opens opportunities for 
other  influential  actors  to operate.  The society-centric  approach has a  focus on self-governance 
manifested  in  different  types  of  partnership-networks.  For  this  thesis,  it  has  been  important  to 
emphasise the role of civic actors in the ideal of creating a democratic governance.  I will  also 
describe the state as an operator itself with certain goals to achieve in negotiation with civic actors. 
Furthermore, the role of the state is central for creating a framework of influential policies in which 
civic actors operates, opening possibilities or making limits on the performance of civic actors. The 
role of the state and its relation to the civil organizations has a main focus in this thesis (Rhodes 
1997, in: Pierre 2000). 
Fourth,  governance  has  been  used  both  for  describing  systems  or  arrangements,  like 
networks of governing operators, and for describing processes, like decision-processes. I find it 
more  useful  to  use  the  governance  term  for  describing  a  process,  because  it  seems  that  the 
participants in a network,  especially in a third world urban governance context,  vary from one 
decision-process to the next. Still, of course, a process of decision will depend on an pre-existing 
network of operators (Goodwin & Painter 1996). I will use the Tostensen et al. (2001) definition: 
«Governance refers to practices rather than formal institutions and can be understood as the general 
manner in which people are governed, but not exclusively by the institutions of government». In 
this  thesis,  for the second part  of my problem, I  will  analyse one certain decision-process,  the 
various  participating  actors  with  influence  on  the  process  and  how the  state  created  a  certain 
framework in which the process was exercised (Pierre and Peters 2000, in Millstein 2007). 
Furthermore,  I  will  use  an  urban  governance-lens  when  analysing  this  process,  which 
usually includes  typical  characteristics  on  actors  involved in  urban decision-making.  This  will, 
according to  Beall  et  al.  (2002)  for  example imply taking a  myriad  of  different  operators  into 
account,  like  civic  associations,  private-sector  organizations,  community-groups,  and  social 
movements in addition to state institutions.  As many operators takes part in the processes, it  is 
important to take the potential  complexity into account,  when analysing urban governance.  For 
example Lindell (2008) writes about an informalization of governance when describing a situation 
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in which decision processes take place outside of the formal political arena, for example through 
networks, contacts, political corruption and lobby. The political power exceeds the legal framework. 
Power may also be situation-dependent, depending on the changing constellations between different 
actors and their aims in the particular political process, which changes from one situation to the 
next. This creates a  scene for urban governance,  where analysing formal  institutions  and static 
networks of representative organizations and their formally stated aims may be insufficient (Lindell 
2008).
3.3 Summary
This chapter has discussed new definitions and ideals of democracy in the wake of a Post 
Fordist dispersion of state power. It is argued that the term governance has become the best way to 
catch the way politics are being played out in this context. For this thesis, the term governance is 
used as a tool for analysis and therefore operationalized in sub-chapter 3.2.4.
As state power has been decentralized, a greater attention has been paid to the role of civic 
organizations,  which  have taken over  many of  the  state's  former tasks.  Civic  organizations  are 
expected to play a crucial role for the quality of the  substantial democracy, which has become a 
new democratic ideal, replacing the ideals of an electoral democracy. The substantial democracy is 
marked by a larger degree of public participation in decision processes as it takes place on a local 
scale instead of on a national scale. The civic organizations are expected to be a tool for civic 
interests when taking part in the decision-making and are supposed to represent the interests of their 
groups and be able to demand responsiveness from the state.  This occurs through processes of 
negotiation or through resistance. Civic organizations may also function at an international scale, as 
multinational corporations and organizations also take part in local decision-making processes. In 
this thesis, the role of two civil organizations, the Xikhelene market committee and the ASSOTSI, 
and their relation to the state will be discussed. 
  Optimists  have  claimed  that  a  stronger  civil  society  will  eventually  lead  to  a  stronger 
substantial democracy. These expectations are embedded in a good governance agenda promoted by 
large,  supra-national organizations such as the Bretton Woods organizations and the UN. These 
have been attempting to facilitate the participation of civic organizations in their democratization 
agendas.  However, for this chapter it has been crucial to discuss the various criticisms addressing 
the way optimists assume that a stronger civil society automatically leads to a improved substantial 
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democracy: First and foremost, the term governance as it is being used here describes a complex 
scene and it is difficult to make any overall claims about what role the civic organization will play. 
For  example,  it  may be working in  the state's  interest  as  well  as  opposing it,  through “weak” 
strategies of participation. This may imply representing the interests of the organizational leaders 
and members rather than its base, being solely used by the state as an institution for providing 
services in a cost-saving manner or being integrated in state agendas through state strategies of 
cooptation. In this thesis, the agenda of the Xikhelene market committee and the ASSOTSI, how 
they are located within a structure of governance and the outcome of their relations with the state 
will be discussed. 
To bring together the two bodies of social science presented in this theory chapter, Hansen & 
Vaa (2004) in the volume Reconsidering Informality, pose a useful contribution for this thesis. They 
combine  these  two discussions  the  following  way:  It  must  be  specified  that  the  discussion  of 
formal/informal has to be be related to governance as well as economy, because income generation 
depends on entitlements such as laws and ownership. Such entitlements are continuously shaped by 
political  negotiations  over  policies.  On  the  basis  of  this  understanding,  it  becomes  hard  to 
distinguish the formal from the informal. First,  the very policies may be informally adjusted or 
shaped to fit certain interests. These are likely to be the interests of powerful citizens. Second, to 
what extent regulations are enforced may also be a question of power. Third, formal, economic 
entitlements may be obtained informally. 
Hence, what is defined as formal and informal will shape governance and power relations, 
but it may also be subjected to it. Thus, as Hansen & Vaa (2004) claim, “the urban space is not so 
much a product of an overall regulatory system as it is a dynamic field of interaction for economic, 
social,  cultural  and  political  processes”  (Hansen  &  Vaa  2004).  This  additional  theoretical 
contribution  is  relevant,  because  formalization  in  this  thesis  will  be  explored  as  a  process  of 
decision making in which various operators and their agendas are relevant. 
Jenkins (2004) in the same volume, holds that it may be even dangerous to maintain the 
strict dualist approach to informality, putting an exaggerated legitimacy into the term or allowing it 
to become self-explanatory, as the very definition of the term may serve to reproduce unbalanced 
power relations and lead to further exclusion and marginalization.  
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4    The political and economic context of the case-study  
The aim for this part is to portray the social situation in which the Xikhelene market has 
developed. Some of the information is used as empirical findings which will confirm or question 
fieldwork results and will thus contribute to the analysis. 
The  chapter  draws  further  the  topics  raised  in  the  theory chapter  and  seeks  to  create  a 
background for informality and the setting for urban governance in Maputo. This will in turn give 
an idea of what challenges policy changes, such as formalization,  have to meet. First,  sub-chapter 
4.1 presents a few discussions on the general development the post liberation African city and will 
serve  as  an  introduction.  Then,  sub-chapter  4.2, will  briefly  give  account  for  the  economic 
development in Mozambique. In in sub-chapter 4.3, the informal nature of urbanization in Maputo 
will  be  explored.  In  sub-chapter  4.4, some  general  reasons  for  informality  in  Maputo  will  be 
discussed.  The  last  sub-chapter,  4.5 will  look  at  governance  in  Maputo,  particularly  the 
development of a civil society and the role of the state. 
4.1 The African city
Regarded from an European point of view, the governance of African cities might definitely 
seem dispersed. It is not only the formal governmental institutions that make decisions, but a wide 
range of administrators of the civil society take part in this process: community based- and grass-
root organizations, NGOs, trade-unions, religious organizations, formal and informal businesses, 
and so on. The growing influence of the civil society  is assumed to have a democratising effect, but 
there are certain implications regarding this supposition. It is a problem that theory and assumptions 
regarding the term governance originally derives from the Post-Fordist experiences of developed 
countries and that this is insufficient to describe the African context (Tostensen et al. 2001). 
First,  the  particular  social  conditions  of  African  cities  have  implications  for  urban 
governance. It is important to note that African cities have gone through an urban crisis during the 
decades after liberation from colonial rule. To illustrate this briefly, the rapid urban growth created 
an immense shortage of jobs, housing, services and deteriorated infrastructure and schools. Local 
authorities have generally not been open to discuss these problems, either because of the lack of 
resources,  or  because  of  their  incompetence  and  corruption.  They  preferred  to  aggravate  the 
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problems  through  obstructive  or  failed  state  legislations.  Furthermore,  the  neo-liberal  SAPs 
imposed on most  African economies  to  liberalize  national  economies,  have marginalized urban 
populations even more through wage freeze and weakening the public sector, diminishing social 
protection and reducing food subsidies (Tostensen et al. 2001). Still, African cities continue to grow. 
And as states fail to provide an institutional and legal framework that may serve urban residents in 
their pursuit of job, shelter and services, citizens obtain what they need collectively using informal 
means. As a result of this, and of the new political rights stemming from democratic transitions, 
there  are  an  increasing  number  of  civil  groups  that  informally  aim  to  meet  people's  needs. 
Therefore, an increasing informalization of politics can be noticed in African cities (Lindell 2008). 
Second,  civil  organizations  themselves  do  not  necessarily  function  democratically.  For 
example, a study made by Beall (2001) on third world cities, shows for example that community 
organizations often were embedded in pre-existing cultural hierarchies and that they made their 
decisions  taking  into  account  personal  interests  of  the  members. The  way  that  many  civil 
organizations  collaborate  with  local  government  to  deliver  services,  may  also  hamper  their 
democratic composition and responsiveness to their bases (Beall 2001). Furthermore, according to 
Lindell (2008), there is a growing literature that shows how the local government uses a «public 
participation» strategy,  where civic  organizations  are  solely used to  facilitate  delivery of  social 
services. Blakeley (2005) shows how the state used public participation in a way that was shaped by 
a top-down, cost saving manner, mainly as a result of economic recession, globalized competition, 
low local government spending and an inadequate welfare system. Even though Barcelona is used 
as an empirical example in this article, the incentives for use of civic participation may be the same 
as for African states: dwindling state financial resources. 
Third, the state within the African context has often been described as weak, with limited 
powers, and often as irrelevant. Although, the African state may have limited possibilities to create 
policies or to control urban development, its presence has not necessarily become less relevant. The 
decision-making processes may still function in a top-down manner. Even though the civil society 
has had a growing strength, democratic processes are often dominated by political elites and are 
often insufficiently accountable for citizens (Devas et. al 2001). 
4.2 The Mozambican economy
Mozambique was liberated from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975. The liberation movement, 
Frelimo, transformed itself into a political party and has been the party in power until today. The 
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transition  to  liberty  was troubled  by an immediate  economic  collapse  caused  by an  exodus  of 
foreign expertise and equipment, inexperienced and insufficient personnel in important positions 
and an unsuccessful industrialization strategy (Hanlon 1996). The Mozambican economy continued 
to be largely dependent, not only on export to Portugal, but first and foremost on its neighbour, 
South  Africa  (Munslow  1983).  Cash  income  from  South  Africa  also  dried  up,  as  far  less 
Mozambican workers were now recruited for the Rand. Mozambique also suffered from heavy 
droughts and flooding in its first years of independence (Newitt 1995). 
At the end of the 1970s, further economic rehabilitation was put to a halt as Mozambique 
was plunged into a civil war between Frelimo and the rebel movement Renamo, which was created 
in  Rhodesia  in  order  to  destabilize  Mozambique,  as  a  response  to  Frelimo  sanctions  to  the 
Rhodesian minority regime and support for the Zimbabwean nationalist guerilla movement (Hanlon 
1996). The sixteen years of civil war from the end of the 1970s to 1992 put a devastating mark on 
Mozambique  and  its  economy.  The  main  Renamo  insurgency  tactics  were  to  sabotage 
infrastructures that  that  Frelimo managed to build up, burn crops and to perform terror actions 
destroying entire villages, killing both Frelimo state officials and innocent people to promote fear at 
the countryside. When the peace agreement was signed in 1992, most of the social and economic 
infrastructures were destroyed, five million people were displaced and the number of anti personnel 
mines planted in different parts of the country was estimated at one million (Newitt 1995). After the 
peace agreement, Renamo was disarmed and turned into a political party. It has represented the only 
realistic, opposition to Frelimo until today (CIP 2009).
During the eighties, as the Reagan and Thatcher governments intensified the cold war, so 
that stronger conditionalities were set for loans. The Bretton Woods Institutions were thus used to 
push neo-liberal reforms, like free-trade, de-regulation, privatization, cutting and state expenditure 
and abolishing price-control and subsidies,  in  order to stabilize the Mozambican economy.  The 
Mozambican Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), the PRE was introduced in 1987.  There are 
various criticisms on how the combination of deflationary measures through squeezing demand and 
reducing  public  spending,  privatization  and  trade  liberalization  have  negatively  affected  low-
income groups in Mozambique and the development of the society in general (Hanlon 1996). State 
institutions were slimmed down and salaries of lower rank civil servants and bureaucrats were cut.. 
The  most  qualified  personnel  left  their  positions  so  that  the  state  lost  parts  of  its  means  to 
effectively steer society. With salaries below poverty-level there was an increasing tendency for 
state employees to take bribes as a coping strategy.  When suddenly facing foreign competition, 
Mozambican companies did either have to close, or sack most of their employees, as earlier labour-
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intensive methods proved to be outdated (Bowen 1992).        
The current economic situation is market by economic growth deriving from aid and FDI, 
but  with  little  spread  effects  and  still  with  a  widespread  poverty.  The  Mozambican  state  has 
conducted two reconstruction programs, the first from 1995 to 1999 and the second, the PARPA 
from 2000 to  2004 aiming to  restore  economic  and  social  infrastructures,  determining  various 
priorities  for  improvements.  The  PARPA had  also  a  socio  economic  agenda  and  a  democratic 
contain,  striving  to  reduce  absolute  poverty  through  involvement  and  initiative  of  citizens.  It 
contained an aim of decentralizing government action (Diogo 2002). 
This has lead to Mozambique becoming the top recipient of FDI among the least developed 
countries. FDI contributes to more than a half of Mozambique’s GDP (Robbins et. al 2008). Since 
the end of the civil war, Mozambique has had a considerable and steady economic growth of an 
average annual 8% of GDP until 2004. However,  75% of the current industry is located in the 
Maputo province (Robbins et. al 2008). Currently, Mozambique finds itself as number 172 among 
the 182 countries at the HDI ranking, placing Mozambique among the world's poorest countries12. 
Mozambique is also among the world's most vulnerable to climate change and other nature disasters 
(Patt et. al 2009). This may be confirmed by the events of severe floods in 2000 in southern and 
central Mozambique in which 500.000 people had to flee their homes and 700 people died (Christie 
& Hanlon 2001). 
4.3 Urbanization in Maputo
After liberation, the civil war, better economic opportunities in Maputo than in the rest of the 
country, floods and droughts at the countryside has led to a continuing expansion of population in 
Maputo. The colonial institutions that the Frelimo inherited, lacked a  clear legal basis for urban 
planning and particularly not for covering the large scale of lower-income groups entering the peri-
urban zones (Jenkins 2000). As a result of civil war and economic crisis, the city administration did 
not have sufficient skills nor financial capacity to manage the urban expansion, with supplement of 
enough plots or infra-structure. Consequently, the administration increasingly lost control over the 
demographic development of Maputo (Jenkins 2001). Frelimo nationalized all land in Mozambique. 
The use of urban land was covered by the Land Law of 1979 and it was mostly motivated by a rural 
development focus as it was developed by the Ministry of Agriculture. Access to land for residential 
12  Human Development Report 2009
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use and family agriculture was free from payment. There were no clear regulations for how this 
framework was supposed to function for land management in urban areas, which severe constraint 
on strategic urban land management (Jenkins 2000). Informal mechanisms for access to land have 
taken over. Land is commonly obtained illegally and traded among people, inherited or swapped 
despite  being  nominally  free.  Free  formal  access  to  land  has  for  the  most  part  probably been 
obtained through bribes or personal connections to get through the bureaucratic processes,  thus 
making the formal system almost inaccessible for common people and effectively reserved to the 
economic and political elite. The benefits of informal trade on land may have been great for certain 
operators. For example, there has been occasions where the political elite used land allocations to 
increase political influence. There are also other examples of granting favourable land plots to the 
private sector (Jenkins 2001). 
However,  for  most  people,  the  informal  nature  of  land  allocation  has  proved 
disadvantageous.  The  fact  that  the  city  has  developed  through  decades  of  poverty,  rapid 
urbanization and a  weak overall  planning has created conditions of large scale  urban,  informal 
settlements with low standards of living (Jenkins 2000). The missing legal framework poses a social 
vulnerability  for  many  people.  However,  for  residents  the  new  land  law  of  1997  allows  for 
occupation in “good faith” after ten years. The CMM has also developed policies for avoiding or 
minimizing  resettlement  of  residents  or  loss  of  infrastructure  (PEUMM  2008).  Nevertheless, 
Maputo is a large city with a population now estimated to be about 1.300.000 inhabitants and it is 
still growing fast. Maputo has the highest standard of living in the country, but extreme poverty in 
the city is increasing as the economic growth do not follow the rapid urbanization. Furthermore, the 
CMM's financial basis for solving these problems is scarce, even in regional terms: The per capita 
budget of the Municipality of Maputo is 5$ compared the average 15$ of capitals in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Paulo et al. 2007). 
 
4.4 Informality in Maputo
My informants among Maputo officials, including the president of the ASSOTSI, used an 
explanation  for  informality  or  the  informal  sector in  Maputo,  as  a  result  of  the  poverty, 
unemployment and urbanization as presented above. They see informality as something that takes 
place mainly within low income groups. Informal sector is commonly referred to as the street trade, 
the marketplaces or the informal import. In Maputo it is a tendency for informal street trade, as 
people  are  more  dependent  on  cash  income  through  commodity  exchange  than  elsewhere  in 
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Mozambique, as there is less physical space to earn a living by growing crops (Paulo et al. 2007). 
People cannot afford to purchase sufficient goods within the formal economy, so informal systems 
become necessary for people to buy food or other important goods and to earn extra cash (CMI 
2008).  It  is  documented  that  informal  wholesale  has  been  necessary  in  order  to  maintain  the 
necessary food-consumption for the households in Maputo (MOA/MSU 1993).
However, Francisco & Paulo (2006) stress upon that informality occurs within all levels of 
the  Mozambican  society:  there  are  people  who cannot  find  other  job  opportunities  than  doing 
informal petty-trade, some entrepreneurs are able to use informal street trade or other informal trade 
for profit and prosperity, the established, private businesses may often be partly based on informal 
economic  activities  and  powerful  people  are  able  to  use  their  position,  through  corruption  or 
missing regulations to accumulate wealth. Informality is present within all markets and factors of 
production  in  Mozambique  and constitutes  about  90% to  95% of  the  national  economy.  They 
explain informality in Mozambique in relation to inefficient legislations. According to them, it is 
Frelimo's unrealistic attempt to control all aspects of economic life, particularly the earlier price 
controls that created a necessity for informal economy and corruption to get around regulations. 
They also claim that the Mozambican economy is, although liberalized, still not very liberal. For 
example, it is very difficult and time-consuming to start a firm. Another example may be that a large 
part of the population in Maputo live in informal settlements with no property-rights. As described, 
the conditions in these settlements may be attributed to the policies of urban planning that are too 
strict on one hand: the state is the owner of all land in Mozambique, and on the other hand: there 
has not been a sufficient framework for an urban plan that could administer the wave of migrants to 
the  city.  Alias,  the  institutional  framework  is  too  weak.  The  weak  legal  framework  may  be 
explained in relation to the introduction of the PRE. Many of Hanlon's (1996) arguments may be 
used to link informality to the PRE and the institutional disintegration that followed. 
The weak legal framework creates conditions in which the informality is reproduced, as it 
becomes a natural way for people to solve their problems. They live in informal settlements, many 
people  do  not  have  official  identification  papers  and  they  earn  their  money  within  informal 
arrangements  and informal  institutions  (Francisco & Paulo  2006).  Informal  institutions may be 
illustrated  by the  way vendors  use  social  networks  and create  informal  institutions  for  mutual 
benefit  and  solidarity,  which  is  generally  important  in  the  African  context  (Lindell  2001). 
Mozambique is no exception. Households often have to use a wide variety of strategies to support 
themselves with food, clothes and shelter. Maintaining family bonds, social relations and networks 
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are crucial for such strategies (CMI 2008). As demonstrated by Cruz e Silva (2003) or Francisco & 
Paulo  (2006),  there  is  a  wide  variety  of  such  strategies  both  in  Maputo  and  generally  in 
Mozambique. The same tendency may serve to explain the way civil organizations run civil life and 
commercial activities.  
The weak legal framework also creates a situation in which the political and economical 
elites in Africa take advantage from the internationalization of their economies engaging in informal 
trade-networks. The political elite may reap great profits from the seemingly unregulated city. The 
institutional disintegration in Mozambique created opportunities for large scale corruption and for 
the political elite to exceed its power beyond the framework of official state tasks. Hence, engaging 
in informal networks is certainly not just a strategy applied by the poor. Representatives of the 
political  elite  in  Mozambique  may also  use  its  economic  and  political  power  within  informal 
networks, pursuing power and wealth (Lindell 2008). 
4.5 Governance in Maputo: A room for civil society participation? 
Frelimo inherited a highly centralized state with a limited contact with the Mozambican 
population.  According  to  the  general,  modern  political  view  deriving  from  African  pre-
independence  movements,  the  African  state  was  to  make  use  of  the  African  traditions  of 
communalism  or  collectivism,  but  at  the  same  time  abandon  traditional  ruling  institutions. 
Resources were to be unified under a strong developmental state, thus justifying the one party rule 
(Virtanen  2003).  Thus,  Frelimo  regarded  itself  as  the  only  legitimate  governing  party  in 
Mozambique  (Grest  1995).  As  a  Marxist-Leninist  party,  Frelimo  dismissed  nationalist  and 
traditionalist ideologies in governing institutions. Hence, the Frelimo state had little acceptance for 
political  pluralism  and  cultural  difference.  In  turn,  this  hampered  the  development  of  local 
democracy and organizational life in Mozambique. Nevertheless, mass mobilization was seen as 
important  and  people  gathered  to  participate  in  “Dynamizing  groups”  or  “Mass-democratic 
movements”. These were created to mobilize the population to support government policies, control 
at the neighbourhood-level and to call up people for voluntary work (Newitt 1995). However, these 
organizations  were  rather  centrally influenced as  the Frelimo state  exercised a  tight  control  on 
governing  institutions  and there  was no clear  distinction between state  and civil  organizations. 
There was also no freedom of association outside the formal  state  institutions  (Francisco et  al. 
2007). 
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Later on, compromises with the traditional authority were made, first as a necessity during 
the civil war and later after the transition to multipartism in 1990 and the 1992 peace treaty, as from 
this point, Frelimo had to compete politically with Renamo, which has profile as more traditionally 
oriented (Virtanen 2003). Gradually, a further distinction between the party and the state has been 
made, the state has become more decentralized and the democracy somewhat stronger. The Law of 
the Municipalities was passed in 1994 and created locally elected institutions and increased the role 
played by traditional authority and civil society (Alexander 1997). The process of decentralisation 
can also be noticed at  a supra-national level,  as certain tasks,  formerly belonging  to the state, 
passed now in the hands of the World Bank, the IMF or foreign NGOs (Grest 1995). Due to the new 
freedom of association,  many of the state controlled organizations, like the dynamizing groups, 
broke their allegiance to the state. Consequently more independent civil organizations started to 
emerge and many of them have now become important for the provision of services in Maputo. 
Apart  from this,  many national and international  NGOs have emerged,  organisations which are 
often well equipped and have strong influence. Moreover, there has been a rapid increase in grass-
root  organizations,  based  on  membership  and  representing  various  interests.  These  became 
particularly  important  as  people  increasingly  became  reliant  on  informal  systems  for  survival 
(Lindell 2008). 
With  the  dispersion  of  power  from  the  state,  the  state  has  become  less  relevant  and 
governance has become informalized. The state has also been using informal means to reach its 
goals. Lindell (2008), gives an example of governance of marketplaces in Maputo and describes 
how the local government uses a variety of informal methods to govern the marketplaces and to 
control opposition of the vendor's association, for example, through clientelist networks or even 
threats or harassment of individuals. Hence, the informalization of governance, poses great power to 
those with access to the state. According to Sumich (2008), it is a clear connection between political 
power and economic power in Mozambique. For example, representatives of the political elite have 
been able to acquire many of the formerly state owned companies (Hanlon 1996). However, the 
informality also creates losers. Jenkins (2000) concludes that it is the poor people who benefit less, 
when formal, political rights are replaced by arbitrary relations of power as determinant for political 
processes.
Francisco (et al. 2007) claims, with a bundle of quantitative variables that Mozambicans 
generally have a weak involvement in civil society action, so participation of the citizens continues 
to be limited. The reasons may be that the state is not capable to respond to the demands of the civil 
society and that it is dependent on powerful external operators which lack communication with the 
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civil  society.  Furthermore,  it  was  just  an  elite  that  benefited  from  market  liberalization  and 
informalization of governance, groups that adopted a behaviour of “small dictators” by pursuing 
their interests through informal networks on the expense of common, public participation (Lindell 
2008).  It  is  also  difficult  to  clearly  highlight  the  role  of  CSOs  as  they  are  often  used  as  an 
instrument for the implementation of state policies (Grest 1995) and that representatives of these 
organizations rather want to ally with the state than to oppose it (Alexander 1997). Some have 
argued that this derives from the Frelimo centralized political tradition. Thus, operators of  the civil 
society do not have any experience of opposing the state and the state remains unresponsive to 
popular  pressure  (Lindell  2008).  The  governing  institutions  also  still  bear  some  marks  of  a 
continuity from the  vertical  organization  of  Frelimo's  socialism.  Below the  central  and district 
municipal  levels,  there  is  a  hierarchy  of  geographical  units,  all  headed  by  a  municipal 
representative: bairros, quarteirões and the lowest is a unit of ten houses. For example, the chefe do 
quarteirão is supposed to be elected locally, but is often appointed by the Secretary of the Bairro.  
Below the  bairro-level,  it  is difficult  to distinguish between the party and the state.  The bairro 
secretary in Maputo seems, according to Paulo et al. (2007), to always be a Frelimo member. These 
officials are often used to mobilize community residents for Frelimo's political manifestations. It is 
also common to have a Frelimo representative working in the same office as the bairro secretary, 
making sure to prevent the latter  from representing an eventual conflict  of interest  from below 
(Paulo et al. 2007). 
In sum, governance in Maputo appears centralized, but at the same time highly informal. As 
embedded  in  the  CMM  official  structure,  the  opportunities  for  substantial  democracy  and 
participatory governance is quite weak. The CMM itself regards institutional change and a more 
democratic governance as a main current challenge. The question of is treated in the ProMaputo 
plan, in which the Component A among other things aims to: 
• Simplify the organization and administration of the CMM. 
• Decentralize and integrate the administration of CMM programs horizontally. 
• Improve the communication between the CMM and the citizens, to increase CMM responsiveness to 
preoccupations and priorities at the local level.
• Increase transparency in the use of resource during CMM administration.
• Improve the coordination between the CMM and the public sector. 
• Strengthen partnerships with NGOs in the city (CMM 2007, p10).13
One has to wait and see whether these changes will improve governance participation for CSOs. In 
13 My translation from Portuguese
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the seminar  “Mozambican Elections – Consolidating Democracy” organized in Oslo, Aslak Orre 
representing the CMI expressed his pessimism regarding Mozambican democratization. His main 
reason was that Frelimo remained, and even strengthened its position as a predominant party. The 
Frelimo party went from almost loosing the presidential election to Renamo in 1999 to gaining 
more than 75% of the votes in 2009 (CIP 2009). Furthermore, political opposition seems unrealistic, 
as Renamo has a weakening approval. Renamo has been criticized for being disorganized and for 
running  a  bad  election  campaign  in  2009.  There  might  be  no  incentives  to  make  changes  to 
decentralize or share power as long as there is no opposition to Frelimo's hold on the parliament. 
Furthermore, this vertical organization of governance may increasingly become a source of conflict 
in  the  future,  as  people  lack  the  opportunity  for  a  voice  in  political  processes.  This  may  be 
exemplified by the riots14 that took place in Maputo February 2008, when the authorities raised the 
prices for  chapa-rides by 2,5mzn, due to increasing oil-prices, which has been said to come as a 
result of a highly centralized governance (Fellesrådet for Afrika 2009). 
4.6 Summary 
Since its liberation in 1975, Mozambique has been through two troubled decades of civil 
war which exacerbated the widespread poverty. In spite of the country's current economic growth, 
the capital, Maputo still bears the marks of this period. The poverty, the diminishing state budget, 
disintegration of state institutions, missing or unrealistic legal framework and corruption along with 
a  rapid  urbanization  has  led  to  an  informalization  of  urban  governance  in  all  social  levels  of 
Maputo. Many people now depend completely on various informal arrangements to earn a living.
Likewise, the urban land use in Maputo is marked by a widespread informality. Potentially, 
the tenure system for urban land could serve poor citizens well. The state owns all land and the 
rights to land use, either for residents or for commercial use, are supposed to be allocated through 
state institutions for free. However, the system itself has proved unsuitable for the complex, urban 
setting, and, due to periods of civil war, institutional disintegration and massive urbanization, the 
system has not functioned. Consequently, the majority of the urban population live and work in 
informal settlements. For many of these citizens, there is an uncertainty on what may happen to 
their house or workplace tomorrow.
14 See for example: http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/02/06/mozambique-a-riot-organized-through-sms-and-reported-
by-bloggers/ 
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In spite  of  a  decentralization of state  tasks and more importance being put  on the civil 
society,  the  state  continues  to  play  a  central  role,  partly  due  to  the  Frelimo  state's  traditional 
hierarchical structure and to the colonial heritage. Civil society organizations often face difficulties 
when attempting to  question municipal policies and they are  often co-opted into the municipal 
structure. It seems unrealistic that changes to this top-down structure will be be brought by the 
current political opposition, but a current urban reform, the ProMaputo calls for a reorganization of 
the municipal structure into a more horizontal one and for an extended collaboration with the civil 
society.
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5    The Xikhelene  
This chapter will use empirical findings to answer the first two research questions for this 
thesis:
How does the Xikhelene operate?
What are the reasons for the growth of the Xikhelene?
Sub-chapter 5.1 describes how the Xikhelene has developed in legal and social context. Then, the 
rest of this chapter will discuss how the vendors, in various ways, make use of the marketplace. In 
sum, this  will  shed light upon some of the dynamics that  shape the way the Xikhelene market 
operates as a social and political unit. 
5.1 Development of the Xikhelene 
During the early 1980s in Mozambique, domestic trade was centralized and articles were 
sold through bonded shops «lojas vinculadas» and through consumer cooperatives as a development 
strategy to  promote local  production.  However,  access  to  goods was scarce and they could  be 
obtained through informal channels and particularly industrial goods could be sold at two or three 
times the official price. Spontaneous centres of market activities became a normal phenomenon in 
Maputo in the mid 1980s, even though the state attempted to confine vending activity to formal 
market places, where prices could still be controlled (Little 1999). During the civil war and massive 
urbanization in Maputo, the black small-scale street trade started to become a necessity as it turned 
out to be the only way families could earn an income or buy necessary goods. It was named «dumba 
nengue», which in Ronga means «thrust your feet» because street vendors literally had to run often 
to avoid prosecution or police harassment. Informal street trade was looked upon as a crime because 
it  undermined the state's development strategy.  The state attempted to fight it  or control it,  but 
usually in vain because after police raids the vendors would eventually go somewhere else to sell or 
in the end, return to the same spot as soon as the police gave up paying attention to it. During the 
destabilizations induced by the civil war, the state had no means to control the tendency, but was 
rather overwhelmed by the scope of it. Commodities disappeared from the regulated market and 
reappeared in the parallel street economy which eventually became the real market for commodity 
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exchange. This parallel market was known in Maputo as “Candonga” (Grest 2006). In the later 
1980s the state started to abolish the system of price control. As it lifted regulations, first on fruits 
and vegetables in 1985 and later, with the introduction of the PRE all types of street trade were 
legalized and started to come out in the open. The state even started to have a more liberal view on 
informal import and informal trade networks and saw it as a necessity for people's survival or that it 
could not be stopped as long as the conditions for it were there (O Tempo 1989). 
The Xikhelene grew up in the mid 1980s, like many other marketplaces in Maputo as a site 
for “candonga” street trade. The place was not planned for hosting a market, it was an occupation of 
the urban space, outside of urban plans or regulations. The site used to be a roundabout surrounded 
by an empty area which was not used for anything in particular, saved for activities like football 
playing. The name, Xikhelene, means «hole» in Ronga and derives from a large hole in the ground 
at the place, left by the need for sand fill for roadworks in the area. The first market activity sprang 
up in the area where the industry buildings and the gas station are located today. It was quite easy to 
get there by chapa and there were a lot of people passing by since it was a bus station at the place 
and as the area became increasingly populated. When the industrial buildings in the area were built, 
the vendors eventually had to move to the other side of the roundabout to where it is located today. 
Its growth has more or less followed the liberalization of private trade in Mozambique. In 1985 the 
Xikhelene  was  a  smaller  marketplace  for  fruit  and  vegetables,  but  by  1990,  the  Praça  dos 
Combatentes was already completely changed and taken over by the Xikhelene market activities. 
Since then, the marketplace has grown both in terms of size and diversity of articles (interviews, 
vendors). 
Even though the Mozambican authorities over time liberalized commodity exchange, the 
commercial activity at the Praça dos Combatentes was by no means accepted. What is particular for 
the Xikhelene market is that the site where it is located has, as a part of the city-plan, the status of a 
“state reserve”. This implies that the area is meant to be left for some future use. However, similarly 
to the situation when the state was unable to control the stream of people migrating to Maputo and 
the way they informally took possession of urban space, to reside or perform different activities, it 
was impossible to control the activity at the Praça dos Combatentes (interview A1).  The police 
would show up and try to stop the activity by confiscating articles or beating up people, but the 
vendors would always return. The conflict between the Xikhelene vendors and the local government 
came in waves, depending on the attitude of the authorities that was changing from attempting to 
clear the place, try to give space for traffic or just to leave the development to its own fate. To 
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defend  their  own  interests  in  this  climate,  the  vendors  organized  a  market  committee.  This 
committee has represented the vendors' interest in keeping the market despite of CMM legislation. 
It  is  also  this  committee  that  has  been  administering  the  marketplace  until  today  (interviews, 
vendors).
As a Frelimo initiative,  through the organizations Organization of Mozambican Workers 
(OTM) and  Committee  of  Female  Workers  (COMUTRA),  a  trade  union  for  informal  workers 
named  ASSOTSI  was  consolidated.  It  was  established  in  1999  during  a  conference  with 
representatives of various Maputo markets. The Xikhelene market committee played a main part in 
the consolidation of this organization, as for example the first spokesman of the Xikhelene market 
committee, Ramos Vasconcelos Marrengula has been its president from the very beginning. The 
objective of the ASSOTSI is, as stated by Marrengula in an interview I made with him: “to organize 
the sector, defend the informal workers and claim their rights as workers, because even though 
being informal, the worker is still a worker”. Within this frame, it appears to be a common interest, 
both for the CMM and the ASSOTSI to improve the conditions of street trade in Maputo. For the 
CMM, one of the aims is to set in order the way street traders and marketplaces are taking hold of 
urban space. Together with the ASSOTSI and market committees, they have been working to assign 
the vendors' activity to places in the city that are approved by the CMM and the urban plan, in a 
process of formalization.  The vendors will  benefit  in turn from this  strategy,  as they will  have 
formally expressed rights to the places and infrastructure. There will also be a common interest in 
improving working  conditions  at  the marketplaces  as  the CMM provides  infrastructure,  toilets, 
drainage and imposes rules for securing sanitary and health conditions (Grest 2006).  Ever since 
1999, tax policies have been imposed to the vendors at the markets in Maputo. Now, they have to 
pay taxes both to the CMM and to the ASSOTSI, collected by the market committees. Marketplaces 
are  categorised  in  classes  A,  B and C markets,  depending on  the  quality  of  the  infrastructure 
provided by the CMM. Whereas the class A markets have reasonable infrastructure, class C have 
little  or  no  infrastructure  at  all.  The  better  the  infrastructure,  the  higher  the  taxes  paid  by the 
vendors.  However,  there  is  a  last  category  of  markets  that  remain  outside  the  advantages  of 
formalization, namely the class D, or “informal markets”. Vendors at the class D markets pay the 
same amount of taxes as those of class C, but the class D markets are still not acknowledged as 
markets, the CMM does not provide any infrastructure  to them and the vendors conducting their 
activity here have not  formally demanded right  to  infrastructure.  10% of  the taxes  goes  to  the 
market committees themselves, meant for the implementation of their own initiatives. The final aim 
of these policies is to find solutions to formalize all the markets in Maputo, but due to the sheer 
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scope of it, this is a costly and toilsome process. At the current stage, most of the marketplaces and 
the largest marketplaces still remain within the classes C and D. In 2008 there were 6 marketplaces 
within  the  class  A,  7  within  the  class  B  and  in  the  classes  C  and  D,  respectively  27  and  23 
marketplaces. This comes without mentioning the innumerable ambulant street vendors who operate 
outside the marketplaces (FAO/CMM 2008b). In addition to the ASSOTSI, the CMM generally 
collaborates  with  organizations  representing  various  aspects  of  informal  trade,  for  example  an 
organization for informal importers, an organization for female informal workers, one for ambulant 
street traders and so on.
In a correct language, [ambulant] vendors are no longer considered as dumba nengue, but as 
street-vendors since they are to be found in the streets. By the way, we had a meeting with them 
yesterday on the distribution of [vendor's] identification-cards and we explained how they have 
to be organized to guarantee the circulation of people and cars (interview A1).    
Alias, the CMM has changed its strategy from having an antagonistic stance towards informal street 
trade,  to  trying  to  control  it  by institutionalizing  the  activities  through collaboration  with  civil 
operators. 
During the nineties the vendors at the Xikhelene went from using temporary bancas made 
out of straw or wood to investing in  barracas made out of bricks and concrete. At this point the 
CMM intervened and the market committee had to sign a contract making it clear that the vendors 
were only allowed to develop their activities at the place, under the condition that they would have 
to move out as soon as the CMM had a specific need for it. The CMM would then not be obliged to 
provide any compensation for the lost values. 
Life  here  is  difficult.  Because  we're  not  in  a  formal  marketplace.  We're  in  an  informal 
marketplace and that's not good. (…) We work with fear here. Some day sooner or later they'll 
say: “Get out of here!” Do you see? (interview C2)
Hence, this is both a contemporary solution both for the CMM and the Xikhelene vendors. After 
this agreement, the CMM has generally not tried to hamper the increasing activity at the market, as 
long as it  did not cause particular problems for example for the traffic in the area (interviews, 
vendors). 
The Xikhelene market is classified as a class D market and the vendors pay their taxes like 
in any other Maputo market, but the CMM does not provide any infrastructure to it. The 10% of the 
tax  fee  that  goes  to  the  committee  is,  according  to  the  contemporary  committee  spokesman 
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Bernardo Samussone Matsinhe, not enough to cover the essential needs of the market (interview 
A2).  For  example,  the  market  committee  has  lacked  financial  means  to  solve  the  hygienic 
conditions at the place. Several thousand people use the place every day, they share only a few 
toilets  and refuse disposal  facilities  have been limited,  so garbage and dirt  tend to  pile  up.  In 
addition,  the  marketplace  is  located  on  a  lower  level  than  the  surroundings,  so  the  hygienic 
conditions have particularly been a problem every rainy season when the place is filled up with 
dirty water and mud that mixes up with the trash. In Maputo, places like these become centres of 
infection during cholera outbreaks, that are frequent during the rainy season. Together with vendors, 
the Xikhelene market-committee has led several  demonstrations addressing the municipality,  to 
improve these conditions, but nothing happened (Savana 2009). According to Matsinhe, the CMM 
blamed the vendors for the cholera problem, because they were gathering at an unsuitable place. 
Still, the committee has managed to improve the market in certain ways. For example, the 
committee has defended the vendor's interests by getting rid of unwanted competition, like vendors 
taking advantage of the place without paying tax fee. Vendors claimed equally that the committee 
managed to impose some discipline, for example concerning the way the vendors used the space, 
the conflicts among vendors, the way customers were treated, closing times and so on. Matsinhe 
expressed that the committee played an important part, being an authority which contributed to both 
creating opportunities for people and contributing to the development of society. For example: 
People were afraid. Earlier, people got killed there. But the market grew and grew... they called 
it Xikhelene because of the big hole there. It was normal, if you walked through there by day, to 
find somebody dead there, in that hole. (…) People got their money in their pockets, that's why 
they would get killed. Or, they would walk around drunk and alone at the wrong hour. (...)They 
even took people's clothes to go and sell. (…) Now, people walk around as they please. It's a lot 
of police and security. The banditry has calmed down, there's no robbing any more (interview 
D2).
In collaboration with the police and by mobilizing people, they have managed to solve some of the 
earlier problems of crime at the place. The committee, in collaboration with the vendors have also 
managed to provide some infrastructure and services, like pavement, electricity, a few toilets and 
security measures, like guards and gates.
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5.2 Activities at the Xikhelene
The Xikhelene is a marketplace bustling with activity. The marketplace has a “nucleus” or 
an “officially stated” limit, but it is normal in Maputo that the commercial activities develop outside 
of the marketplaces in the streets and side walks nearby, which is by far the case of the Xikhelene. 
However, since the place, during the fieldwork period was under reconstruction, the situation was 
far more chaotic than it used to be. All areas that would normally be reserved for traffic were now 
taken over by activities, and the part of the market that was cleared of barracas, was almost empty. 
The crossing between Av. Vladimir Lenin and Av. Julius Nyerere and the  Av. Julius Nyerere all the 
way from the railway bridge and far down southwards after passing the Praça dos Combatentes was 
bustling with activities. It was impossible to distinguish the Xikhelene market from the marketplace 
1. de Junho, a marketplace mostly consisting of barracas, but also bancas reserved for meat. The 
roundabout was also used. As usually, there were activities taking place all the way along the road 
that  leads the 300-400 metres  from the Xikhelene to  a  marketplace in  the Polana Caniço “B”, 
vulgarly known as the Mucoriane. Almost all the vendors at the Mucoriane tend to go out of the 
marketplace, to the nearby streets or to the Xikhelene to sell, leaving the Mucoriane empty. Hence, 
it  is  impossible  to  distinguish between the Mucoriane and the Xikhelene,  unless one knows to 
which market committee the individual vendors pay their  taxes.  In the streets  just  close to the 
Xikhelene, the activities also extended to the nearby bairros. For example, in the Ferroviário, there 
are several barracas, bars, inns and stores on the nearby streets, but within the streets of the bairro it 
is usually quite calm. The continuation of the Av. dos FPLM after passing the market nucleus, was 
also crowded with vendors, some 200 metres of where the street is destroyed by erosion. Moreover, 
the official number of vendors at the Xikhelene market varies a lot,  from 1500 counted by the 
CMM, to 7075 according to the ASSOTSIs last counting (FAO/CMM 2008). However, it seems to 
be difficult to establish an exact number, because it is very likely that ambulant vendors at the place 
who do not pay taxes are not included in the statistics. The number varies equally because many 
vendors do not use the marketplace regularly (observations).      
 
It  is  a  large  variety  of  activities  at  the  market,  a  variety  that  reflects  the  different 
opportunities and strategies for earning cash. Some vendors have built or bought barracas made of 
bricks. The  barracas have the advantage that they assure protection both for sun and rain, and it 
may be shut so that one can leave the articles there over night. This makes it possible to have a 
larger assortment of different articles, which is important for vendors running groceries, or for those 
who sell heavy equipment along Av. Julius Nyerere.  Barracas are also important for running bars 
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and eateries because they give space for heavy cocking equipment,  like grills,  refrigerators and 
radios that demand electricity and have to be left there over night. The brick walls will also shelter 
the  food  from collecting  sand  and  dirt. Barracas made  of  bricks  are  also  crucial  for  running 
hairdresser shops or pharmacies. Several  barraca owners rent out storeroom space, so that other 
vendors may store their goods there over night. However, most vendors use  bancas, made out of 
wood. The  bancas have the advantage that they may be moved and relocated. Usually they are 
supplemented with a parasol or a tarpaulin for protection against the sun. Bancas are typically used 
by those who sell smaller articles, like fruit, vegetables, fish, meat, live poultry, telephone service, 
capulanas, clothes, second hand clothes or shoes, groceries, mobile phone recharge cards, candy, 
spices, yeast, water, soft drinks, alcoholic drinks, traditional medicine, equipment, hair extensions, 
make-up and so on. Others do not use a banca, but sit on the ground spreading their articles on a 
straw mat. Some vendors also sell heavier goods, like furniture or reinforcing steel out in the open. 
There  were  also  ambulant  vendors  walking  around  at  the  marketplace,  selling  mobile  phone 
recharge cards, capulanas or other goods that the vendor was able to carry around all the time. Most 
of the mobile vendors, either those who use bancas or the ambulant vendors generally offer goods 
that  either  require  less  space,  or  are  sold  on  a  smaller  scale  because  the  vendor  has  to  bring 
everything back home every day, or make use of one of the storerooms at the place. One user of the 
marketplace had built a lavatory, taking a fee for every visit. Furthermore, there were trucks coming 
in to the marketplace every day, with goods in large quanta, for example frozen fish from Angola, 
bread from local bakeries or coconuts from the countryside. It has also happened that trucks of 
goods  came from South  Africa,  to  sell  articles  to  Xikhelene  vendors  (Observations/Interviews, 
vendors). 
5.2.1 Vendors' strategies
The vendors purchase their goods at different places. Some people obtain various articles, 
like food and clothes in Nelspruit or other places across the South African border, through regular 
travels  by  chapa.  Some  of  them have  contacts  on  the  countryside  and  could  purchase cheap 
agricultural  products,  like  bananas,  tomatoes  or  sweet  potatoes.  Others  sell  farm products,  like 
cabbage, salad, cassava or cassava leaves, that they grow themselves in the peripheral, peri-urban 
areas of Maputo reserved for agriculture, or sometimes in their own backyards. Articles may also be 
bought  at  other  marketplaces,  like  in  the  Xipamanine  market  and  resold  with  profit  at  the 
Xikhelene. New clothes,  capulanas or kitchen utensils are usually acquired in Baixa, in normal 
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shops and sold at the Xikhelene. The aim is to buy cheap goods and sell them in order to make a 
profit.  A normal strategy is to buy articles cheaply in large quanta and resell them for profit in 
smaller  quanta.  The  vendors  operate  with  “unwritten”  prizes  for  the  most  common goods  and 
people know that smaller quanta of goods would eventually be more expensive. There are always 
customers who either cannot afford to buy their articles in large quanta, or simply do not have the 
time to do it. One of the neighbours of the market stated that they would always prefer to buy goods 
in large quanta, like large boxes of rice, tomatoes, potatoes, carrots, frozen fish, a big bottle of oil 
and so on, that would last for a month. They would have saved money that way. However, they 
seldom had that large amount of money at the same time, but rather gained a little money every day, 
so that they would have to buy their everyday needs in smaller quanta day by day. Hence, there is 
an  opportunity  for  different  vendors  to  reach  different  segments  of  customers.  For  example,  a 
vendor that has a small amount of money, would only purchase a small amount of articles and target 
customers that would buy smaller quanta. A piece of soap can be cut in four pieces and sold with a 
small profit for each piece. Others, that managed to build up a larger assortment of articles, prefer to 
sell  in larger quanta for a cheaper prize,  sell  more and thus earn more.  Hence,  the sources for 
buying  goods  in  large  quanta  are  important,  for  example  the  storerooms  at  the  market  or  the 
wholesalers' market in Zimpeto, where articles are brought in by trucks, mostly from South Africa 
and sold in large quanta. However, the vendors usually did not use a stable supplier, but rather 
change  their  suppliers  as  prizes  changed.  Or,  if  they  heard  rumours  about  some  one-time 
opportunity to obtain cheap, good quality goods somewhere, they would  try to exert it (Interviews, 
vendors). 
People work as vendors for various reasons. Many of the respondents had been trying out 
different strategies selling different sorts of articles. Others had several other occupations before 
they decided to settle down at the Xikhelene, or they planned to save money in order to invest it in a 
barraca at the Xikhelene. A woman running a restaurant, had for example invested in buying the 
barraca with the money her husband had earned, working in South Africa. A barber told me that he 
had moved his shop from the Baixa to the Xikhelene because business was better there. However, 
not all the vendors use the market with an ambition to improve their incomes. A woman confessed 
that she went to the Xikhelene only in periods when she did not get any income from her other 
sources. She had friends selling at the market, and she knew that she could work in collaboration 
with them and earn some money whenever she needed. The subject of “earning surplus” and to 
improve the activities was most of the times a conversation among vendors in their thirties and 
above. Most of the younger informants had other plans and other wishes. They said that they saw 
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their activity merely as a temporary solution, as they were studying in the evenings and hoped to get 
another job as soon as they would be finished. A young woman had been selling at the market to 
save up money for the admission test  at  the UEM. After failing,  she got admitted to a banker 
education and now she was saving money while waiting for the semester to start. However, the 
younger informants appeared to be disillusioned. They used to complain that it was difficult to get a 
“formal” employment in Mozambique and particularly for young people without contacts. To finish 
school, one often has to bribe the teachers to pass tests, which is hard for people without money. A 
young man confessed that he had not been able to finish school, that it was impossible to get a job 
and now he was selling at the Xikhelene. He complained also about the lack of opportunities in 
Mozambique and claimed that if one wanted to achieve something, then fleeing the country was the 
only solution. Making jokes about stealing was also frequent among the younger men, who often 
regarded the activity of selling at the market as an alternative to stealing: “I am here because I do 
not  want  to  steal”.  One man revealed having been a  thief  before,  but  stopped doing  that  now 
(interviews, vendors). 
Most of the informants, regardless of how much they managed to earn at the marketplace, 
did not see their activities as a “job”. They rather stated that: “we came here during the eighties as 
we were looking for a life and something to do”. Or: “I'm working here because there are no jobs”. 
Most Mozambicans meet a lot of difficulties when trying to get employment within the “formal 
sector”, so the vendors generally saw the vending activities as an alternative solution for survival. 
Most of the informants claimed that they used the market to support their families and children, and 
many of them confessed that their families had no other sources of income (interviews, vendors). 
On the other hand, there are vendors who consciously use the opportunities of the Xikhelene 
in an attempt to make their business grow. Informants among vendors who managed to prosper, 
took a lot of pride in this and discussed what it takes to “ganhar lucro”, earn a surplus and what to 
do with it. According to a  woman who owned a barraca: 
To gain surplus? Well, that's a struggle. Because everything is expensive. Nothing is cheap,  
everything is expensive. To gain surplus, people really have to use their head. Combine a lot of  
things (Interview C2).
 
A woman who sold chickens proudly showed me pictures of a house she had been able to build with 
the she got from her activity. Another poultry vendor wore a handmade ring she had ordered, with 
an embellishment shaped as a chicken cage, stating that it was vending chicken that gave her a life. 
Another woman explained that she had started working at the Xikhelene during the 1980s, and 
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prospered a lot since then: 
It demanded a lot of patience. I started out with 60.000mzm15 and today I have a house and a 
barraca with refrigerators and tables. To begin with, I started by buying a box of soft-drink in  
cans, and a box of beer, also in cans -and beans. The business has been growing little by little  
until  today and I've  always been trying to  sell  food because it  is  always a demand for  it  
(interview C12). 
Obviously, to establish a stable business and gain surplus demands a lot of time. Furthermore, it 
also demands a lot from the vendor's abilities: 
It's just that the business helps a lot. It helps, but it has got something to do with the person's  
head. It demands a lot of responsibility not to go bankrupt in short time. You have to work, but  
you also have to use a lot of intelligence. (…) It's many big “empresários” that grew up there at  
the Xikhelene. The cars that they drive around in... If anybody told that they started up with a  
banca at the Xikhelene, nobody would believe it (interview D2).
To gain surplus demands a lot in terms of social capital, intelligence, patience, consciousness and 
planning. Hence, the surplus that vendors were able to gain varies a lot. Some vendors said that they 
did not manage to save anything. Some told me that they saved about 20mzn every day,  while 
others  claimed  that  they  managed  to  save  about  200mzn  a  day.  In  other  words,  some  of  the 
Xikhelene vendors are deeply impoverished, while others make their economies grow.
    
5.2.2 Collaboration and competition
Some vendors work as employees for others. For example, some of the restaurant owners 
worked  with  assistants  they  had  employed,  who  were  often   friends  or  family  members.  I 
interviewed vendors working in stores along the Av. Julius Nyerere, selling parts and accessories for 
cars. They all had employers, who did not work there themselves, but owned the shop and paid 
regular salaries to their employees. One informant was running several shops with employees, both 
at  the  market  and  other  places,  so  that  he  had  the  time  to  focus  on  other  income  generating 
activities. Another respondent worked in a small DVD-shop owned by his uncle, who also owned 
barracas at  several  places,  both  in  Maputo  and  in  Inhambane.  The  employees  were  mostly 
youngsters employed by older people. According to a former vendor at the Xikhelene, working as 
an employee at the beginning is an advantage, because experience is needed when starting running 
your own activity. One has to know what goods to buy, where to get it and how to sell. Besides, 
15 MZM (Mozambican Meticais) was replaced by MZN (New Mozambican Meticais) 1.july 2006, by dividing the old 
metical by 1000.
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young people often can not afford to pay the market fee, the goods or a  banca. This vendor had 
started himself as an employee, but after saving up some money and gaining some experience, he 
eventually bought a banca himself and started reselling a small selection of groceries at the market. 
More money is to be earned if one works alone.
Establishing contacts with other vendors and customers as well was an important aspect. It 
creates predictability when one is acquainted with vendors at the market and has a more or less 
regular circle of customers. For example, I was in contact with a group of women selling poultry, 
who were all friends or members of the same family. They had also family members and friends in 
the surrounding neighbourhoods. One of the regular customers at the market explained that they 
were not morally “obliged” to buy their necessities from vendors they knew, but were still more 
likely to do so if  they did not find some obviously better alternative. Collaboration was also an 
option: if a group of vendors heard for example about a cheap supplier with good poultry, say in 
Matola, they could go there together by a borrowed car, or split the expenses when renting one to 
get there. 
Generally, having contacts proved to be relevant to participate in various social networks. In 
Mozambique, there are various examples of social networks becoming important institutions, for 
example: xitique,  which is an informal system of credits and savings, or: yakulahlana: in which a 
group of people associate and save money for funerals, marriages or similar events (Francisco & 
Paulo  2006).  Many  vendors  at  the  Xikhelene  are  members  of  xitique-groups.  I  ran  into  one 
example: it was a man who had created a xitique-organization and worked as its administrator. All 
participants  paid  100mzn every day and were  repaid  3000mzn  once  a  month.  One respondent 
explained that she did not have enough discipline to save money by storing it in her house, so it was 
a good way to save money. One could also borrow money first and repay later if one needed to 
invest in something or needed to buy more articles to resell at the market. Thus, the system could 
function as a micro finance bank for people who for various reasons could not use a normal bank. 
Apparently, marketplaces like the Xikhelene, that have a lot of activity, pose good opportunities to 
participate in such networks, or generally to get necessary contacts.  
However,  the  Xikhelene  is  also  marked  by  the  competition  among  vendors.  One  informant 
explained that distrust would always be present where there was money: 
For example, if I am selling there next to you and a customer shows up with a 500mzn bill and 
wants something for 100mzn; if I ask you to help me out with change, you're not going to help 
me. (…) There's no union. Everybody for themselves (interview D3).  
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Some vendors stated that there was usually so much movement of people at the Xikhelene that one 
did not have to establish any connections with customers to be able to earn money. There is always 
someone who buys  things  spontaneously.  However,  one  needs  to  place  oneself  close to  where 
people normally walk by, so there is a lot of competition for the best spots and for the ambulant 
vendors there is often a tendency for “chasing the customers” instead of waiting for the customers 
to come. As one contributor to debates in the journal Notícias wrote:
(...) it is a weak absorption of vendors at the formal bancas, which has something to do with the 
reduced number of formal markets and, in some cases, the weak presence of customers at the 
inside the markets. Some citizens prefer to buy their goods at the side walks instead of inside 
the markets. As a consequence, it is a emptying of the nucleus of some markets, a movement 
from the interior towards the periphery. They are occupying improper places, meant for the 
circulation of people and cars. In the case of Xikhelene, people have left the Mucoriane to fill 
the  Avenida  Julius  Nyerere,  claiming  that  the  customers  do  not  come  inside  the  market 
(Notícias 04.03.2010).16    
Alias, the competition among vendors and the fact that many customers are reluctant to enter the 
market,  creates  situations  which  makes  it  difficult  to  control  the  use  of  vending  spaces. 
Furthermore, this uncontrollable nature of the informal vendors has  caused traffic congestion, as 
vendors have been often conducting their activities in the middle of the road and side-walks. During 
the flood disasters  in 2000, the Av. Julius Nyerere was destroyed by erosions cutting the most 
important access way between the city centre and the Praça dos Combatentes.  After this  point, 
traffic towards the north, out of the city centre has been canalized through the Av. Vladimir Lenin, 
which is far too narrow during rush hour. Then, the vendor activities in the crossing has exacerbated 
the discontent among citizens in Maputo (A Verdade 2009a).  
5.2.3 Why operate at the Xikhelene?
What makes people cling to a place, go into conflict with the local state, pay tax, invest in 
vending stalls and work under unhygienic conditions at a place that, sooner or later, will be taken 
over by the municipalities? Apart from the situation of poverty and informal, spontaneous urban 
development, some qualities and the dynamics of the place could serve as an explanation for this. 
16 My translation from Portuguese
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There  are  certain  advantages  when  conducting  a  commercial  activity  at  the  Xikhelene 
market. For the first,  Praça dos Combatentes is a place with a lot of activity.  For example, the 
roundabout at the Praça dos Combatentes marks a crossing with Av. dos FPLM which are both main 
roads. The Av. Julius Nyerere leads, as a highway directly out of the city and runs through the 
northern suburbs: Hulene “A” and “B”, Laulane, 3 de Fevereiro, Mahotas and Albazine, which are 
all  densely  populated  municipal  districts.  The  Av.  dos  FPLM  runs  to  Praça  dos  Heróis 
Moçambicanos close to the airport and meets Av. Acordos de Lusaka that leads to the western parts 
of the city centre. The Av. Vladimir Lenin that also leads to the Praça dos Combatentes goes directly 
to the Baixa through the Coop, the Malhangalene and the Polana Cimento “A”, and thus provides a 
quick access to the more prosperous parts of the city.  What is even more important, is that the 
chapa-routes  have  developed  along  these  main  roads,  leading  directly  to  the  Praça  dos 
Combatentes. According to my personal observations, it was possible to catch chapas directly to the 
city  centre:  Baixa,  and  to  another  important  part  of  the  centre:  the  Museu through the  Polana 
Cimento “A” and “B”. There was also the route that went directly to Xipamanine, another large 
Maputo market, the approximate size of Xikhelene's. The same route crossed the western outskirts 
of the city centre and passed Alto Maé, which is another area with a lot of activity. All these routes 
went up Av. Vladimir Lenin and passed the Compone market, which is a popular marketplace in 
Maputo for second-hand or “made in China” clothes and shoes. One could also catch chapas that 
drove along the Av. das FPLM to Xipamanine and  to the western parts of the city centre. There 
were chapas that went up Av. Julius Nyerere, directly to the wholesalers' market in Zimpeto. Apart 
from these, several other routes existed at that time. Briefly, at the Praça dos Combatentes, one 
could catch  chapas directly to almost all parts of town and out of town to Inhambane or Matola. 
Hence, except for the Baixa, this is apparently the place in Maputo which is the most central when it 
comes to collective transport. This is important because the  chapas are a main tool for the way 
many of the vendors organize their activities. First of all, the chapas provide access to the Praça dos 
Combatentes and thus, a general movement of people which is necessary for having enough clients 
at the place. Second, since most of the vendors cannot afford to buy a car, they often use the chapas 
themselves to transport the article from the place where it is purchased to the place where it is sold. 
Buying goods in one part of the town to sell it for profit in another part of town, is the general 
strategy. If prices are changing at one place, or if new opportunities to get cheap goods arise at 
another, it is an advantage to have easy access to different places (observations).
Another important  point is  that  the market  is  located in  a densely populated area.  Even 
though people come from all over Maputo and even from outside of town to sell at the Xikhelene, 
living nearby was the main reason for which people chose to sell at the Xikhelene instead at some 
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other  marketplace.  All  the  surrounding  bairros,  the  Polana  caniço,  the  Bairro  das  FPLM,  the 
Rodoviário  and the nearby  bairros: the Mavalane,  the Maxaquene and the Hulene are  all  well 
established  bairros  of  high  or  relatively  high  population  density  (PEUMM  2008a).  The  high 
population density also serves to feed the marketplace with customers that use it on a daily basis. 
The size of the marketplace as well attracts activity. One vendor that had an education in 
economics described the place as a centre for economic activity. According to him, the easy access 
to the place is important, but also that the bigger it gets, the more people want to conduct their 
activities there. There are so many different activities at the place that it  becomes easier to get 
access, for example, to storeroom space, articles to resell, cheap food, good suppliers and contacts. 
There are also some micro finance banks in the area. The neighbours talked about the Xikhelene as 
a marketplace where one could find “everything”, that it was a practical place, easily reachable. Its 
size makes it a well-known marketplace in Maputo: customers are more attracted to go there when 
they know what they get.  It is a typical conversation in Maputo to talk about where to get the 
cheapest and best  articles, and as the Xikhelene is  one of the biggest  marketplaces in Maputo, 
people know the articles and the prices. The Xikhelene has developed a certain “role” which is 
important, as people tend to buy what they recognize. According to some of the informants, the 
prices at the Xikhelene are relatively cheap and people all over Maputo have an idea  about the 
products that can be bought there and about their prices. The marketplace is divided in specialized 
areas:  one for  second-hand clothes,  one for  meat,  one for  fish,  one for  groceries,  etc.  and the 
customers are able to localize these areas. If they are looking for something special, the Xikhelene 
may be the place to visit to check out and compare prices (interviews, vendors).     
5.3 Development in the horizon
It took a long time for the eventual CMM plans to make use of the place as a state reserve to 
be put into practice. It seems to have been further postponed due to events of the last decade; by the 
destruction of Av. Julius Nyerere, so the Xikhelene market was allowed to develop freely.  This 
situation is changing. Missing opportunities to develop the urban expansion in this direction have 
caused problems for the development of the city, because according to the first urban plans Maputo 
was supposed to  develop  towards  the north.  Westwards,  the expansion  seems to  be  effectively 
blocked by the airport area. This has put a lot of pressure on the city centre, particularly during the 
recent years as Mozambique has seen a higher economic growth than ever before. Now, the CMM 
has got World Bank financial support for the ProMaputo, to develop infrastructure and make place 
79
for continuing growth. A rehabilitation of the Av. Julius Nyerere is a part of this, and is planned to 
be  finished  during  the  second phase  of  the  ProMaputo  from 2010 to  2016.  So  after  Maputo's 
historical  centre, the Baixa,  has reached its  potential,  private sector growth is likely to develop 
along the Av. Julius Nyerere and towards the Praça dos Combatentes. The Praça dos Combatentes is 
also planned to be connected to the newly rehabilitated Rua Dona Alice, which is the only road in 
northern Maputo that leads to the beach. Moreover, according to the PEUMM the place is seen as a 
future urban centre and will probably be attractive for the investors in the  private sector (PEUMM 
2008b). 
5.4 Conclusion: Formality and informality at the Xikhelene 
This sub chapter will pose some concluding remarks on the two first research questions for 
this thesis, which are:
 
How does the Xikhelene operate? 
What are the reasons for the growth of the Xikhelene?
The growth of the Xikhelene market may be understood as a manifestation of some broader 
tendencies in Maputo. The widespread informality has here been referred to as one such tendency. 
The way the term informality was explained and understood by the CMM, the ASSOTSI, and the 
market committee applied well to the dualist approach. They were for example talking about the 
massive  urbanization,  the  unemployment,  the  poverty  and  the  lack  of  jobs  as  reasons  for  the 
emergence of an informal sector. The growth of the Xikhelene is commonly understood as a result 
of the general emergence of an informal sector. 
However, Francisco & Paulo (2006) use the legalist approach and warn about the tendency 
to only discuss the “informality that can be seen”. By this they mean the various manifestations that 
are often associated with poverty. Defining informality as legal or illegal, unregistered economic 
activity, they underline that informality occurs within all levels of the Mozambican society: there 
are people who cannot find job opportunities by other means than conducting informal petty trade, 
some entrepreneurs  are  able  to  use informal  street  trade or  other  informal  trade  for  profit  and 
prosperity,  the established,  private  businesses may often be partly based on informal economic 
activities and powerful people are able to use their positions through corruption or by breaking 
regulations to accumulate wealth. Likewise, it is important to note that not only poor people resort 
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to the Xikhelene. Salaries in Mozambique are generally low, so vendors at the Xikhelene may earn 
more than people who have occupations that demand education, or which normally are associated 
with the middle class, such as municipal officials, policemen, teachers and so on. The marketplace 
has  been  used  by  people  who  were  able  to  work  themselves  out  of  poverty  and  it  has  been 
strategically targeted by entrepreneurs who could have had a formal employment if they had wanted 
to and who cannot be described as poor. This shows that the marketplace provides opportunities for 
entrepreneurship. Hence, the Maputo street trade and spontaneous markets may also be understood 
by referring to the high barriers to enter the formal economy. The growth of the Xikhelene may 
likewise be understood as a manifestation of informal entrepreneurship, due to a formal economy 
which is both inaccessible in terms of legal barriers  and unfavourable because it  may be more 
money to be earned conducting informal activities. Moreover, the Praça dos Combatentes, as an 
urban centre is, geographically well suited for conducting informal trade. 
Furthermore, the Xikhelene is a manifestation of the informal urbanization of Maputo. As 
shown  by  Francisco  &  Paulo  (2006),  the  legalist  approach  poses  understanding  for  the 
informalization  of  urban  space.  Jenkins  (2000)  characterizes  the  Mozambican  land-law  as  not 
adapted to the urban context and he adds that the administration of it was badly organized and too 
slow and bureaucratic, causing informal land allocation. The informalization approach may pose an 
understanding of this situation as the informalization may be understood in the context of building 
down the institutions that were necessary to administer and develop the land-law, and thus secure 
the citizen's legal rights to the access to urban space. As Jenkins claims, the political and economic 
elite gained profit from the informal allocation of land, so there was no motivation to develop a 
sufficient legal framework. In sum, this may serve to explain the growth of the Xikhlene. The Praça 
dos Combatentes was occupied as any place in Maputo was occupied by people migrating the city. 
and the authorities did not have the means to control the occupation. 
This may serve as a starting point to understand the legal status of the Xikhelene: When 
attempting to formalize urban land use in Maputo, the CMM has to deal with a situation in which 
the actual use of land do not correspond to the actual legal framework or the urban plan. A new 
framework has to be developed and adapted to the actual situation. This formalization strategy has  
affected the way the Xikhelene operates.  
With a partly formalization of the Xikhelene's use of space and a partly formalization of 
such commercial activities that the vendors do, one may say that the Xikhelene is moving towards 
the formal  on Chen's (2007) continuum from informal to formal. Policymakers, like the IMF and 
the  CLEP  underline  the  importance  of  local  participation  in  such  processes.  The  CMM  is 
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collaborating actively with civil organizations, such as the Xikhelene market committee and the 
ASSOTSI  in  these  processes  of  formalization.  Hence,  being  formally  included  into  the  CMM 
structure, one may say that these organizations also have become more formalized than they used to 
be. For example, the market committee started up as a completely informal organization, initiated 
by the vendors. Now, it collaborates with the CMM by carrying out formally stated administrative 
tasks at the Xikhelene. 
De Soto (1989) encourages informal entrepreneurship and claim that too high legal barriers 
conduct entrepreneurs to go informal. Likewise, the authorities of Maputo have acknowledged that 
most people are reliant on informal vending activities to survive and that the activities cannot be 
stopped. The commercial activity is accepted and hence one may say that they are formalized in 
comparison to the former non-acceptance line.  The vendors are no longer considered as illegal 
“dumba nengue” operating within an illegal black market system of “candonga”. As a part of the 
CMM's new strategies of formalization, this way of speaking has gone out of fashion. With this 
acceptance, the CMM became able to collaborate with the informal operators and impose more 
control  on  their  activities.  For  example,  earlier  problems  of  crimes  have  been  solved.  Some 
discipline among the vendors has also been imposed.
For  the  Xikhelene,  one  step  of  this  formalization  process  was  to  define  the  market  as 
informal, alias to recognize and formalize its informality. The market committee signed a contract 
guaranteeing that the vendors would have to leave the place as soon as the CMM should need it. As 
a  result,  the  CMM  withdrew  from  taking  responsibility  for  the  actual  use  of  the  Praça  dos 
Combatentes.  Since then, informal systems, as exemplified below, have been developing almost 
freely at the place. 
Another step was to include it into the policy on marketplaces in Maputo, defining it as a 
class “D” market, meaning that the vendors would pay tax to the CMM and the ASSOTSI, whereas 
10% would go to the development of the market itself. This demanded that the vendors started 
paying taxes and it allowed a certain improvement of the infrastructure at the market. 
As one may see, the formalization measures did not have a very profound effect on the way 
the Xikhelene operated, so still there are factors at the Xikhelene that remain informal. As explained 
in  the  ILO  paper  of  2002,  informal  dynamics  are  “governed”  by  something  else  than  formal 
institutions  and procedures.  The  Xikhelene  is  marked by a  plethora  of  informal  dynamics  and 
arrangements which influence the way the market operates.  As the CMM does not provide any 
services, the vendors have to rely on themselves, or on that the committee will act independently of 
the CMM to solve problems that occur,  such as crime, flooding or to provide services such as 
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electricity, garbage disposal or toilets. They do not have any security for their assets at the place: 
their market stalls, the infrastructure or the advantages of the location, so they have to procure 
eventual back-up solutions themselves. Hence, they do not enjoy the advantages of formalization, 
such as ownership rights, which de Soto (2003) or the CLEP (2008) deem as important. 
There are also dynamics that result of the competition among vendors and the need to chase 
the customers in order to earn money. As many customers find it uncomfortable to go inside the 
marketplace and therefore choose to do their shopping at the periphery of the marketplace, there is a 
tendency for the vendors to move towards the periphery and even to fill the streets and side walks. 
If one vendor does it, others will have to follow to be able to vend. Hence, vendors often break the 
law, but the governing institutions such as the CMM or the market committee are unable to stop it, 
due to the scope of it. 
Dynamics  at  the market  may be ascribed to the various informal  strategies  the vendors 
pursue in order to earn money and the vendors may also change strategies when new opportunities 
occur.  The  vendors  are  often  dependent  on each  other  or  on  a  network  of  contacts  they have 
established with friends, family, xitique, neighbours, regular customers and suppliers, all of which 
Lindell (2001) describes as general important survival strategies among third world poor. After a 
while, many of the vendors have become dependent on the marketplace as a predictable system of 
relations and opportunities that developed around them. These are all advantages embedded at the 
very  location,  which  Lyons  &  Snoxell  (2004)  stress  as  crucial  for  vendors  conducting  their 
activities in third world, informal, urban retail-markets like this. This poses another explanation for 
the  growth of  the market:  As an established and functioning  system of  informal  activities,  the 
Xikhelene attracts even more vendors to establish their activities there.
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6.    The Rehabilitation of the Pra  ç  a dos Combatentes  
When I came to the Xikhelene the 15th of July 2009, the municipality had demolished about 
two-thirds of the nucleus of the Xikhelene-market.  Most of the part  that  consisted of barracas, 
bancas and pavement had been removed. Actually, the demolishing had started in May, but wooden 
poles dug into ground to serve as groundwork for bancas were still burning and what was left from 
the concrete pavements and the barraca brick walls  were broken into pieces by pickaxes.  The 
debris and remains were spread all over the place. Vendors were still sitting in the middle of the 
dust and rubble at the building site, refusing to move while bulldozers and diggers were moving 
back and forth, creating dangerous situations. 
It was an obvious situation of conflict. I decided to study the political processes related to it, 
which a primary focus on what efforts that were made to relocate the vendors. This part will answer 
the second part of the problem: 
What characterizes the decision making process of resettling the Xikhelene vendors?
What explains the way in which the vendors responded to the resettlement?
The first sub-chapter 6.1, will briefly explain the CMM plans for the reconstruction of the Praça dos 
Combatentes. The next, sub-chapter 6.2 will discuss the PDMM Resettlement Policy Framework, 
which is used as a reference point for policy intended to minimize losses for displaced individuals 
during an urbanization project. Then, sub-chapter 6.3 will look into the CMM strategy for avoiding 
conflict when demolishing the Xikhelene market and how the different actors were involved in the 
decision  making.  Sub-chapter  6.4  will  explore  the  resettlement,  the  vendors'  opportunities  for 
response,  discuss  what  they  did  to  influence  the  process  and  their  contact  with  the  civil 
organizations organizations.  
6.1 Plans for demolition and reconstruction
After talking with the president of the ASSOTSI and officials of the CMM, I found out that 
the demolition of the market was to give space for a new terminal for collective transport in the 
area. In addition, there would be built a new roundabout and a rehabilitation of the existing one. 
Originally, an additional 40 houses were also planned to be demolished (CMM, Acta No.19, 2009). 
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However this plan was changed as it later turned out to be possible to rearrange the shape of the 
terminal in order to avoid it. 
The reconstruction was a part of a larger plan to rehabilitate the Av. Julius Nyerere, in which 
the Praça dos Combatentes would become an important node for traffic. Eventually, the area was 
going to  become an attractive place for private  sector  investment.  According to  an action-plan 
obtained at the office of the head of the bairro, the proper market would be rebuilt during the Phase 
II of the ProMaputo. First, this implied a formalization of the marketplace, an upgrading from the 
current  class D, informal  status.  Second,  it  implied that  new infrastructures like pavement  and 
drainage was going to be built. The president of the ASSOTSI, Ramos V. Marrengula claimed that 
the rehabilitation of the marketplace had been a condition laid down by the World Bank for taking 
part in financing the reconstruction of the Av. Julius Nyerere, but this was not confirmed by any of 
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Plan  for  reconstruction  of  the  Praça  dos 
Combatentes shows new roundabout (the smallest  
one)  and  collective  transport  terminal  (at  the 
center  left).  The  planned  collective  transport  
terminal  covers  about  2/3  of  the  nucleus  of  the  
Xikhelene market and demands demolition of about  
40 houses (text manipulated). (CMM activity-plan)
New  plan  for  reconstruction:  The  shape  of  the  
collective transport terminal has been modified to  
avoid demolition of houses (DMEP).
the other informants (Interview A1). According to the engineer responsible for drawing schemes for 
these projects, there was no concrete plan or financial sources yet for this work, so at this point it 
remains to see how the Xikhelene will  be and what the consequence will  be for the remaining 
vendors owning  barracas  there. Anyway, it is unlikely that the project will cover more than the 
remaining one-thirds of the former nucleus of the market, as the collective transport-terminal covers 
the two-thirds that were removed.
Xikhelene market before and after demolition of barracas. The red line on the left image marks the nucleus  
of the market (FAO/CMM 2008a). At image on the right (from GoogleMaps 30.09.2009), the southern part  
of the marketplace has been demolished. The new roundabout is not yet constructed.
6.2 The PDMM Resettlement Policy Framework 
The World Bank recognises, based on its own experience, that involuntary resettlement of 
people during development projects is likely to cause severe economic, social, environmental and 
cultural  problems.  The  Resettlement  Policy Framework  (RPF)  is  a  framework  for  the  Maputo 
Municipal  Development  Program (PDMM) and it  is  a  compilation  of  the  general  World  Bank 
safeguard policies adapted to the PDMM (World Bank 2001). The PDMM is partly financed by the 
World Bank and thus has to follow the RPF as a directive. The reconstruction of the Xikhelene-
market is a part of the ProMaputo programme and not of the PDMM, the PDMM is not a part of the 
ProMaputo.  However,  in  World  Bank's  and  CMM's  documents  it  is  impossible  to  distinguish 
between these two programmes, as they were presented as if they were one and the same17 (World 
Bank 2006). According to representatives of both the World Bank and the GDEI, the CMM, through 
17 See for example a World Bank programme-presentation: http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?
pagePK=64312881&piPK=64302848&theSitePK=40941&Projectid=P096332
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the  cooperation  with  the  World  Bank,  adopted  almost  the  same framework for  the  ProMaputo 
programme.  Still,  it  is  important  to  note  that,  since the reconstruction of  the Xikhelene-market 
remains outside of the PDMM, no other exterior institution could hold the CMM responsible for the 
the way the RPF was implemented. 
A good governance ideal plays a central role for the outlines of the RPF. First of all, the RAP 
is supposed to be developed in consultation and negotiations with stakeholders. Furthermore, it is 
supposed to be open for public information and discussion. During the resettlement process, the 
GDEI is obliged to make sure that a participation strategy is being applied: 
At community level a resettlement committee should be established to represent the interests of 
those who will be displaced. The local Resettlement Committee (RC) will be identified by the 
local Neighbourhood (bairro) Collective and include a sub-group of its members as well  as 
other trusted local influence leaders and representatives of the displaced people (PDMM 2006, 
pV).
(...) For the implementation of a RAP, an ad hoc Working Group of the Municipal District (DM) 
Consultative Committee (CC) should be set up with community and local leader membership 
(drawn from the local resettlement committee) from an affected area in the DM territory. RCs 
and CC Resettlement Working Groups should be trained in social and management issues and 
supported by social facilitators where possible. At DM level,  the DM Administrator will  be 
responsible for leading the district CC Resettlement Working Group, a group of stakeholders 
concerned with PDMM activities in the DM. The district CC Resettlement Working Group will 
coordinate,  monitor  and  supervise  community  consultation  and  participation  in  RAP 
implementation at district level. The Working Group should coordinate its activities with the 
CMM’s Environmental Management Department, and must ensure a copy of all information 
collected  locally is  deposited  at  the  referred  to  department  and  the  Communication  Office 
(PDMM 2006, pVI).
In this participation strategy, the municipality, here represented by the GDEI is first and foremost 
responsible to make sure if there is a civil organization representing the interests of those who are 
going to be displaced, the RC. The RAP is supposed to be negotiated with this organization in a 
working group with the municipality. This organization is aimed at representing the grass-root, and 
should thus have the opportunity to oppose the local state's decisions or suggest alternatives. The 
working group consisting of the RC and the CC is also supposed to be properly trained for the task. 
Furthermore, the information is supposed to be available for all stakeholders. All this seems to 
correspond well with  good-governance  ideals of civil participation in partnership with the local 
government, transparency in decision processes and accountability. It is not solely up to the state to 
follow  the  RPF  aims  of  reducing  risks  during  resettlement.  The  civil  society  is  also  made 
responsible for an accountability of the local state in a reciprocal process of negotiation (PDMM 
2006).  
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6.3 A CMM strategy: Avoiding conflict through an awareness campaign
During the municipal election campaign, in November 2008, the Frelimo's candidate for the 
mayor position, David Simango, announced a reconstruction of the roundabout and the Av. Julius 
Nyerere. According to Matsinhe, the committee took part during the election campaign in a reunion 
with  the  CMM in which the reconstruction of  the  street  was  debated.  However,  the collective 
transport terminal and the destruction of the majority of the barracas had not been mentioned at 
this point. Meetings about giving space for the public transport terminal did not take place until the 
next  year.  I  was  not  able  to  find  out  exactly  when,  but  the  resettlement  of  vendors  and  the 
construction of the collective transport  terminal,  was originally supposed to start  as  early as in 
March  2009,  however  postponed  until  May (CMM activity  plan).  Various  meetings  about  the 
project  were  organized  during  this  period.  These  meetings  included  among  other  operators: 
representatives of the ASSOTSI, the Xikhelene market committee, the secretaries of the municipal 
districts  3 and 4,  the secretaries of  surrounding  bairros and  quarteirões along with the CMM, 
including the mayor himself at least in the last meeting, and both the councillor of the municipal 
department  of  infrastructures:  Mário  Macaringue,  the  councillor  of  the  department  of  urban 
planning and environment: Luís Nhaca in addition to the head of the DMMF: Carlos Nelson Quibe. 
Some of my informants among vendors had also participated in these meetings. Apart from this, I 
was not able to find out exactly who participated, when the meetings took place or the specific 
agenda for each of the meetings. But all of my informants who had participated in this process 
confirmed that there were “many meetings” that had taken place in advance of the reconstruction. 
The communication between CMM and the vendors, through this process of meetings was 
crucial for initiating the resettlement process and it shows the municipality's awareness that this was 
a potential source of conflict. As for example Marrengula stated, even though I did not even ask 
specifically about the reconstruction:
Now, there's another impact that in my analysis isn't negative, because the Xikhelene market 
has a rehabilitation project going on, advanced by the Municipal Council. This is related to the 
reconstruction of the Avenida Julius Nyerere. The rehabilitation created panic and continues to 
create panic among the vendors, who question the reasons for the destruction of the market 
(Interview A1). 
Hence,  the problem of vendors loosing assets like  barracas  and infrastructure was certainly an 
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issue. It was a conflict in the air. This issue of conflict was also confirmed by my informants at the 
market who started talking about the reconstruction, about their anger and frustrations concerning 
it, without even being asked (Interviews). 
The Secretary of the Bairro Polana Caniço “B” confirmed that they had known about the 
reconstruction plan for some time. He stated that they had been informed by the municipality about 
this, so that they could work together with the authorities in the bairro to mobilize the vendors, in 
order to avoid problems. The head of the DMMF, Quibe referred to this strategy as an awareness 
campaign18, making people aware of what was going to happen in order to avoid problems: 
It  was an awareness  campaign  that  took place before the  realization [of  the  reconstruction 
project] and people were informed: that from day X we will start doing this and from the day X 
will will do this and so on (Interview A3). 
So, the awareness campaign signifies a transmission of concrete information about exactly what  is 
going to happen in order to erase all doubts or rumours about it. But, it also contains something 
deeper, which may be understood from Sr. Quibes argumentation, when asked about how the CMM 
managed to avoid conflict: 
It  was no  conflict  here.  Because  the  municipality,  through a  process  of  raising awareness, 
avoided conflict. People became aware19. It [the project] was presented to the people in order to 
avoid  conflict.  And I  have  to  inform you that  whatever  barraca  built  whether  in  a  formal 
marketplace or like this, in an informal, people go into terms of compromise with the municipal 
council, that this space is provided by the municipal council to build infrastructure for the social 
benefit, so people have to remove their infrastructures without any compensation. (...) So, there 
was no resistance among people. Because the Municipal Council urges people to build bancas 
that can be dismantled (Interview A3).     
He also made it clear that when people built barracas made out of bricks in such a place and in the 
middle of the street, they knew that they might suffer losses afterwards. Hence, the term project of 
rising awareness also implies an element of taking initiative to define the premises or “the rules of 
the game”, in this  case:  the contract  that  the Xikhelene market committee had signed with the 
CMM. 
The participants at the meetings were informed about the benefits of the reconstruction. For 
example, the CMM was now finally supposed to create the long time demanded drainage at the 
place and to build a new marketplace.  For example,  Matsinhe stated that his  obligation in this 
18 My translation from Portuguese: trabalho de sensibilização
19 My translation from Portuguese: «Sensibilisou-se as pessoas»
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process was to “mobilize people to understand that, as a matter of fact this project,  all of us  will 
benefit from this project”. This quote may serve to exemplify that the process of awareness-raising 
implied that the CMM used various means to persuade the subjects, trying to make people take a 
positive stance even though two thirds of the vendors would have to move, being thus unlikely to 
benefit at all. The presence of the mayor at the last meeting could be a proof of the same thing: that 
the CMM attempts to create a positive atmosphere by showing the importance of the project and 
that they regard the contact with the local community as important, by bringing to the meeting a 
person of authority and importance. For the same reason, the CMM also conducted ceremonial 
marches, with the mayor and councillors walking through the Praça dos Combatentes, accompanied 
by a group of singing women dressed in colourful capulanas among other supporters.         
According to the councillor of the municipal department of urbanization and planning, Luís 
Nhaca the strategy was fundamental for avoiding conflict in this case: 
One of the things we did was to involve the local authorities in the process, and they had a 
paramount role in the mobilization. When I say local structures, I refer to the secretaries and 
administrators of the bairros who are local administrators, along with involving the vendors' 
committee. As I told you, there were various reunions. Still, when we initiated this, it was a 
signal there indicating that we could have had problems, but the municipal police was always 
there along with the police of the republic. So, luckily, we didn't get any problems. The reason 
is that the municipality exercised a method of participation. This is fundamental. If they hadn't 
participated, it would have been a lot of speculation and a lot of rumour that could have posed 
problems. (…) It was explained to them what advantages there were. The project was presented 
to them in order to remove all doubt about it (Interview A6).
Hence, it is obvious that the CMM followed a strategy directed towards the implication of the local 
authorities, which in turn mobilized people from the local community. This was fundamental for 
avoiding conflict. The decision itself was already made at the municipal department level. The local 
involvement in this case, signified a method of making local authorities and vendors collaborate in 
the process, to facilitate and to avoid conflict, even though a lot of people actually suffered losses. 
6.4 Attempts at resettlement of vendors
The  vendors  were  sitting  along  the  Av.  Julius  Nyerere  to  the  railway  bridge,  in  the 
roundabout or in the middle of the building site, claiming they were waiting for the municipality to 
show them another place to go.  However, according to both the GDEI and the DMMF, there was 
enough space in various Maputo marketplaces for vendors to go, so there was never necessary to 
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find another specific place to relocate the vendors or to find some other solution. According to the 
officials, there were enough free spaces in Maputo's marketplaces. Nevertheless, the problem has 
been  taken  into  consideration  to  a  certain  extent.  According  to  the  local  councillor  of  the 
Department of Urbanization and Environment,  Luís  Nhaca,  the CMM was negotiating with the 
Mozambican telephone connection company TDM that owned a suitable area located in Laulane, 
by the continuation of Rua da Beira after crossing the Av. Julius Nyerere. The TDM was offered an 
area close to the Praça dos Combatentes in exchange. When I asked Marrengula of the ASSOTSI 
about the negotiations for a space to relocate the marketplace, he categorically denied it and asked 
me where I had got such information. So at this point, the associations had no knowledge about this 
aspect and it is difficult to know the likelihood of its achievement or the real degree of seriousness 
of the made efforts. It remains to see. 
In this case, the CMM initiated a relocation in which a resettlement committee was formed. 
According to the spokesman of the 1. de Junho market committee, the market committees of the 
Xikhelene, 1 de Junho and the Mucoriane got assigned by the CMM, to lead the relocation, along 
with the heads of the relevant bairros and quarteirões. Spaces were prepared in the Mucoriane and 
in the 1 de Junho markets and in the industrial area, in a street that runs parallel with the Av. das 
FPLM in the Bairro das FPLM. Some vendors were also moved further into the north-east of the 
marketplace, into the prolongation of the Av. dos FPLM. However, it did not take many days before 
the  vendors  moved away from the  places  they had  been  transferred  to,  and  started  to  fill  the 
building site and the Av. Julius Nyerere with their activities (conversation A8).
 
6.4.1 Responses at the resettlement
As most of the vendors left the places they were assigned to, one may safely state that the 
CMM initiated resettlement process did not work. After talking to the vendors and the officials, the 
reasons for this failure became quite clear. First and foremost, the spokesman of the 1 de Junho 
admitted that there was never really enough space at the new places, were the vendors had been 
transferred.  The  spokesman  of  the  Mucoriane  claimed  that  all  bancas at  the  Mucoriane  were 
occupied. They just seemed vacant because the vendors who owned them did not use them, but 
preferred to conduct their selling activity outside the marketplace. The free space at the 1. de Junho 
was quickly bought and filled up. This is a small marketplace and it consists primarily of barracas. 
The new buyers started to construct new barracas, but left them unfinished due to temporarily high 
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prices of concrete. It was more money to be earned selling in the street, in the roundabout or in the 
Av. Julius Nyerere as long as the road remained closed for traffic, so they continued to do so for as 
long as possible. Furthermore, the resettlement committee did not make any agreement with the 
companies or the neighbours residing in the Bairro das FPLM. So, when the vendors established 
themselves  in  the  street  there,  this  was  tolerated  neither  by  the  industrial  companies  nor  the 
residents. They claimed that the vendor activity caused crime and insecurity in the area. Hence, it is 
obvious that it was not put too much effort into this resettlement. It was rather short termed and the 
conditions were not properly screened. In other words, the main objective was rather to clear the 
area and assure space for the rebuilding (Interviews, vendors).
The large area that was demolished, consisted mainly of barracas made of bricks, but also 
some bancas. Those who owned barracas suffered the greatest losses, because these are expensive 
to build and  there was no compensation for the lost values. Many of them had invested largely in 
building  one  or  more  barracas,  sometimes  taking  bank  or  micro-credit  loans.  During  the 
demolition, many of the vendors did not have enough time to take with them the sheet metal roofs, 
window frames and doors. A lot of articles were equally destroyed in the process. The activities at 
the  Xikhelene  were  often  the  only  income  people  had  to  support  their  families,  so  after  the 
demolition the source of their income disappeared and they were left without the financial means to 
buy food for their husband or wife and children. Some had also borrowed money in banks or on 
micro-credit,  to  build  infrastructure  and  buy  articles.  Now,  the  material  obtained  through 
investments was gone and at the same time, they found themselves unable to pay down the monthly 
payments. Some also had debts at the wholesaler who often sold products on credit. The majority of 
the  vendors  remained  at  the  place,  even  though  claiming  they  were  not  selling  anything, 
complaining about the bad conditions. There were few customers coming to the area. The roads 
leading to the place had been blocked, thus keeping the chapas and cars out. The Xikhelene market, 
as the regular customers knew it, with specialized areas for the various categories of products, had 
changed completely in a way that people lost their will to go there. The quality of the products also 
deteriorated in the sun and drifting dust and sand. The vendors claimed that municipality had not 
shown them a place to sell, or that they were waiting for this to happen. The atmosphere  at the 
marketplace was marked by frustration and anger. However, some vendors had taken precautions 
and had a backup plan: some already had secured access to other marketplaces, some were not so 
much in need for the marketplace and simply retired while others had used the surplus from their 
activities to build up a new activity somewhere else (Interviews, vendors).
The vendors kept saying that there were no customers coming to the new places, where they 
had been resettled. The street that runs parallel with the Av. das FPLM has industrial buildings on 
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both sides, so few people ever pass by. Those who were transferred to the north-eastern side of the 
marketplace did not benefit from customers passing through Av. Julius Nyerere. The vendors who 
had not been transferred and remained at the marketplace, immediately got an upper hand on those 
who had been transferred. Consequently, the transferred vendors went back. All the vendors that 
had been transferred to the Bairro das FPLM, quickly left the bancas they had built there. Or, for 
example the women selling poultry, were transferred further to the north-eastern side of the market. 
Most  of  them quickly left  these  bancas and  moved  their  activities  to  the  side-walk  instead.  I 
interviewed one of those who remained. She was proud of following the rules, but admitted that 
those who were selling on the side-walk earned a lot more. The vendors selling on the side-walk 
argued that there were no customers coming to that new place, but they admitted that if everybody 
had stayed, customers might have started showing up (Observations/Interviews, vendors). 
According to the vendors, one would have to pay an entrance fee just to start over again at a 
new marketplace. Those who were used to work in a  barraca would also have to raise money to 
build a new barraca. Being able to enter another marketplace “depended on the person's pocket”, 
according to some of the informants at the Xikhelene. However, according to my observations, the 
most important reason for not moving was due to the fact that the vendors were used to play out 
their activities at the Xikhelene and exploit the various advantages of being there:
The fact that people are used to exercise their activities here at the Xikhelene is the reason for 
that, even though there's a reconstruction, they don't accept to go to other places, even though  
there  is  space  in  other  marketplaces,  for  example  the  Expresso,  Laulane,  Mucoriane...  
(Interview A2).
 
 
When talking to the vendors about this, some sustained that it had demanded time and effort to 
establish contacts and a regular circle of customers at the Xikhelene. Hence, it was easier to remain 
at the place and make use of the advantages there for as long as possible. One vendor stated that he 
had spent two years establishing a stable income for himself at the marketplace. In fact it was not as 
easy to move from the Xikhelene as the authorities had perceived. According to one vendor, an 
alternative marketplace should have the same qualities as the Praça dos Combatentes: a lot of traffic 
and easy access. This one also explained that as the Xikhelene is well known in Maputo and has a 
certain image, that could have made the relocation easier if it had been planned thoroughly. If all 
the customers had known that the entire Xikhelene was now moved to another place, the vendors 
might have kept most of their regular customers. However, the way that the market was removed, 
merely caused confusion. So, the Xikhelene vendors claimed that the authorities had not considered 
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that it was severely difficult to re-adapt to a new situation, as it was both hard and expensive to 
obtain entrance to  another  marketplace.  They pointed up that  they had been dependent  on the 
marketplace as a particularly good place to perform their activities20 and that it was difficult to find 
similar conditions somewhere else. Furthermore, some emphasized that they had developed their 
activities over time and that they were now reliant on a network of colleagues and an established 
circle of more or less regular customers. In sum, moving from the Xikhelene to establish activity at 
another market was often difficult and for the individual vendor it could take time (Interviews, 
vendors). 
One woman owned a barraca where she was making food and selling soft-drinks and beer. 
She was eager to tell how much she had struggled to build it and to make the business work. This 
barraca was something that she had been able to build with help from her ex-husband, who had 
been able to save up profits from selling clothes. After a long period of saving, she had been able to 
build the barraca in 1997/1998. She told that people came to the Xikhelene: “looking for a life, a 
way to survive. People did not have any food, but then they created an organization and built this 
market”. Hence, she saw the market as a necessity for many people's lives. But her message was 
primarily that  life at the Xikhelene was hard. It was hard to earn money and hard because the 
barracas might be demolished any time because it was an “informal market”. Then it would be “no 
way” that one could start all over again. To get to another market and open a similar barraca, one 
would have to pay about 10 millions MTM, just to get access. This would be difficult. First and 
foremost she was concerned on how the reconstruction affected the lives of the vendors, but this 
quote also exemplifies the lack of knowledge about what was really going on, and the point of view 
that something wrong and surprising has happened as the municipality did not come up with a 
solution for vendors who had to move:
Me: How does this reconstruction affect the activity at the market?
She: They say that they want to rehabilitate. It's not a new project, they decided this a long time 
ago. It's because of the street. They have to make a parking-place, they have to make a street, I 
don't know what it is. The municipality knows, we're just watching. 
Me: What were the consequences for the vendors?
She: Ai! There was a panic! There was a panic! 
Me: What happened?
She: Because here, it was people who had borrowed money from the bank. To build their things, 
I don't know, to pay each month, and where? Where were they going to arrange money to pay 
20 As explained in chapter: XXXXX -forrige del
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the bank now? (…)
Me: What did they do?
She: For the population it was a horrible thing. It was a horrible thing. É-pa! It hurts. It hurts 
because people don't know where to go and arrange money. They don't sell here now, there's no 
space.  They didn't  remove them from there  to show them another  place.  They didn't  show 
another place. It's just: “get out of there”. These people, they're mothers of families, they're 
fathers of families. The absolute poverty is increasing. It's not getting better! (Interview C2)
Another  woman  claimed  that  the  municipality  had  not  considered  the  importance  of  the 
marketplace for the people who worked there:
The major problem resides in the fact that, before, the authorities did not perform an analysis on 
what was the importance of the marketplace for the lives of the vendors. There are people  who 
depended exclusively on the activities that they exercised at the marketplace (Interview C7).
There was an expectation among the vendors that the authorities should take into consideration 
Xikhelene's significance for the vendors and take an initiative to deal with the consequences when 
removing the vendors. 
The CMM on the other hand did not see it as necessary, nor as within their responsibility to 
procure a viable solution for resettling the vendors. This derives from the fact that there are free 
spaces  at  various  marketplaces  in  Maputo,  and  that  the  officials  are  aware  of  the  dynamics 
mentioned in sub-chapter 5.4. For example as the head of the DMMF, Carlos N. Quibe stated:
There are 6000 empty bancas where people can go and occupy. It's not that there's no place for  
people to sell in marketplaces. There are places. There are infrastructures. At the market in 
Polana Caniço (…) it's  called Mucoriane.  There are empty barracas there.  But  people are  
going to the streets. We provide infrastructure so that people can sell in different marketplaces,  
but people say: “no, I don't want to sell here”. But we're working. We're doing an awareness  
campaign so that people one day will understand that they cannot sell in the streets (Interview 
A3).
Marrengula, president of the ASSOTSI partly shared the same concept. However, he related the 
problem to the articles not being interesting enough to attract customers, so that vendors have to 
chase the customers to sell their products: 
There are 96 marketplaces in Maputo where one can find free space. The problem doesn't reside 
in the fact that you cannot develop your business at the [street-] corner, but that you cannot offer 
a product appreciated by the customer. This mean that I could have developed my business in 
Catembe21, if the product had a different brand, it's certain that people would have crossed the 
bay to get it (Interview A1).
21 Catembe: a bairro located at the other side of the mouth of the Tembe river 
95
The spokesman of the Xikhelene market committee, Bernardo S. Matsinhe also stated something 
similar:
I've always defended the idea that there exist spaces inside marketplaces and a lot of it (…). If 
everybody had decided to sell inside the marketplaces, things would have become easy, because 
people would then have asked: “where are the people who sell what here?” Or: “where can I 
find this product?” and they would have gone inside the marketplace (Interview A2). 
In sum, the common opinion among the people in high positions was that first, it was not necessary 
to take initiative to resettle the vendors, because there were already free spaces in various Maputo 
marketplaces. Second, the argument was that when these spaces were not being used, it was the 
vendor's responsibility,  not the CMM's. In this  case, the vendors are addressed as one mass of 
people and seen as one operator which may be held responsible for its  actions.  However,  “the 
vendors” as a group consists of a range of individual operators. The way they act can be ascribed to 
a set of dynamics as discussed in sub-chapter 5.2.2, the vendors are chasing the customers and it 
becomes  difficult  to  assign  them  to  a  fixed  space.  This  was  also  admitted  by  the  vendors 
themselves. Third, and even more important was the Xikhelene market's legal status as “class D” or 
“informal”, deriving from the fact that it is an occupied marketplace at a place that the CMM never 
recognized  as  suitable  for  being  used  for  market  activities.  Both  for  the  CMM  and  for  the 
ASSOTSI, it was absolutely crystal clear that the Xikhelene vendors would have to give up the 
space as long as the market was “informal”. The CMM was by no means obliged to compensate the 
vendors for their lost values. The CMM was neither obliged to find a solution for resettling the 
vendors. This was a part of the contract, the vendors were aware of it from the beginning and thus 
they were responsible for their own situation.  Consequently, the CMM did not see itself as the 
responsible  operator  to  figure  out  a  way  for  a  successful  resettlement  process.  In  sum,  the 
resettlement  that  took  place  was  either  half-hearted  or  solely  aimed  to  make  space  for  the 
construction  works.  Other  aspects  of  the  unsuccessful  resettlement  derives  from  the  vendors 
understanding of their own rights and expectations on how they would be treated in this situation, 
which in turn shaped their willingness to cooperate. These aspects will be discussed in the next two 
sub-chapters. 
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6.4.2 The lack of vendor perspectives in the decision processes
There are certain findings that may serve to shed light upon the involvement of the various 
institutions. According to its president Marrengula's words, the ASSOTSI is supposed to function as 
a union for the workers in the “informal sector”. It is supposed to defend the workers' rights which 
are regarded as identical to the rights of any worker. These aims are built-in into its own statute 
which affirms that it is created to represent the workers, defend the workers' interests and property 
through representation of the vendors in negotiations with the CMM (Cruz e Silva 2005). It should 
therefore normally function as any trade union. However, in practice, the ASSOTSI bears the marks 
of its close relation to the government fabric. It is situated at the third floor in the building as the 
Frelimo-related OTM at Av. Olof Palme n.° 245, a location for which they are not paying rent 
(Grest 2006). The office looks like the office of any municipal department: the president has his 
own office and outside there is a secretary desk in a waiting room whose walls are decorated with 
Frelimo posters and Frelimo calendars. There is also the usual large portrait photo of the President 
of  Mozambique,  Armando  Emílio  Guebuza  (observations).  The  ASSOTSI's  policies  regarding 
marketplaces are officially stated in a set of clauses put down in a memorandum of agreement 
between the CMM and the ASSOTSI. The main objective is to collaborate with the CMM in order 
to create formal rules for Maputo's marketplaces. Secondly, it works continuously in collaboration 
with  the  market  committees  to  cover  taxes  and  register  vendors  (CMM  2008).  Moreover,  as 
described  in  sub-chapter  5.1,  it  does  also play a  role  in  the  aim of  “formalizing”  the  Maputo 
marketplaces. In other words, the aim of representing the interests of the informal workers is shared 
with  an  administrative  role  in  collaboration  with  the  CMM.  According  to  an  evaluation,  the 
association's  aim  of  representing  the  vendors'  interests  and  property  in  negotiations  with  the 
municipality, has seemingly lost some of its ground. Certainly, the association's achievements in 
promoting  better  working  conditions  and  “formalization”  of  the  informal  vendors'  utilities, 
represent  a  benefit  for  many Maputo  small  scale  vendors.  On the  other  hand,  it  appears  as  a 
problem that the association's partnership with the CMM has come more to the front, and that it has 
lost a great deal of the contact with its base (Cruz e Silva 2005). None of my informants among the 
vendors at the Xikhelene, even though being members and taxpayers, had any knowledge of the 
ASSOTSI.  Furthermore,  Marrengula's  statements  reveal  the ASSOTSI's  stake in  the process  of 
decision in advance of the reconstruction. As explained above, the ASSOTSI did not consider it 
necessary to resettle the Xikhelene market, which was the main demand of the Xikhelene vendors. 
Concerning this aspect, Marrengula adopted the same point of view as the CMM, namely that there 
was enough free space around in various Maputo marketplaces. Furthermore, no will or aim to 
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oppose the CMM's decisions was expressed, not in this case and not in other similar situations, 
something about which Marrengula was quite open: 
We've had to explain the vendors that when a country is in the middle of a development process, 
the rehabilitation is  a result  of  that  development.  As a country in the category of the poor 
countries,  whenever  there  are  finances  so  that  the  government  or  the  municipality  can  do 
something, we have to support these projects. It's certainly unfavourable, but still, it's for the 
best for the well-being of the inhabitants and the Mozambican people. (…) But, we understand 
that  we  cannot  impede  it  (the  removal  of  vendors),  because sometimes  people  confuse the 
constitution of the association with the creation of an opposition, which is not the case. The 
association is there to offer some ideas or to help (Interview A1).    
Hence,  the  ASSOTSI is  too closely connected to  the CMM to  oppose it.  Marrengula  did also 
express  the  same opinions  as  the CMM officials.  These  findings  to  a  certain  extent  contradict 
Lindell's (2008) research conducted in 2002 and 2004, three and five years after the ASSOTSI's 
creation in 1999. It was then a relation between the ASSOTSI and the Frelimo too, but the CMM 
had  a  far  more  antagonistic  policy  towards  informal  markets  in  Maputo,  attempting  to  limit 
tendency and entered into conflicts with the market committees and the ASSOTSI. The ASSOTSI 
was  defending  the  vendors  access  to  vending  space  even  on  occupied  places  and  were  hence 
representing the vendors' interests. The ASSOTSI did also have contacts, within the Frelimo and the 
ruling elite,  which it  used informally to  pursue the vendors'  interests  (Lindell  2008).  Now, the 
ASSOTSI  collaborates  with  the  CMM  to  formalize  Maputo  marketplaces  and  it  does  so  in 
accordance to a formally stated memorandum .  
The  only official  among my informants  who complained  about  the  way the  process  of 
decision had taken place was the  chefe do quarteirão  who was responsible for the houses which 
were planned to be demolished as a part of the reconstruction. She is a woman who has been living 
at the same place since before the liberation. She had been told by the engineer that houses in the 
neighbourhood would be demolished and that the families eventually would have to move. Her job 
was to  prepare the residents for this. As opposed to the owners of market stalls, residents who have 
been living at a place for a certain period of time will, according to the law, have to be compensated 
for losses if they have to move. However, at the time of the interview, it had not been specified how 
the compensation would be and the chefe do quarteirão was furious because the residents were not 
guaranteed new houses and because of the arrogant way she had been assigned to carry through the 
municipality's decision: 
Without any proper explanation about the reasons for the demolishing, the engineer from the 
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municipal council asked for my assistance to register the names of the affected families. (…) 
The houses were indicated by the municipality. I don't have words! My responsibility is limited 
to receive orders from the secretariado do bairro and carry them through!22 (Conversation A4) 
She added that the demolition was put to a halt because of hers and other residents' refusal to move 
out. According to the engineer, the CMM did not have any proper place to resettle these people, so 
the solution was to rearrange the shape of the collective transport terminal. It is difficult to say 
whether this new decision came as a result of the residents' opposition to the process, whether the 
CMM  in  this  case,  according  to  the  law,  was  more  obliged  to  finds  solutions,  whether  the 
recommendations of the RPF were followed more strictly or simply because the solution was easier 
and less costly. However, in a later conversation with the chefe do quarteirão, she still did not have 
any knowledge about this change of plans, so it is unlikely to have been the result of a negotiation 
process (Conversation A4).       
Matsinhe's statements reveal some ambiguities in the committees stance in this case. In the 
first  interview, Matsinhe expressed a concern for the vendors suffering about the demolition of 
barracas.  He  insinuated  as  well  that  there  were  not  many  opportunities  for  people  to  find  a 
predictable  way to  earn  money,  in  the  context  of  unemployment  and poverty.  Furthermore,  as 
mentioned above, he stated that the vendors were expecting and demanding that the CMM would 
show them another place to play out their activities. However, even though about two thirds of the 
vendors were supposed to move away, he claimed that “everyone” at the marketplace would benefit 
from the drainage works and the creation of infrastructures, actions financed by the CMM. During 
the  second interview, he obviously changed his mind, from claiming that the vendors needed one 
other place to conduct their activities to declaring that it was no problem for the vendors to move to 
various other marketplaces. By adopting this notion, Matsinhe put forward simultaneously the point 
of view of the vendors and the attitude of the authorities, creating an ambiguity that might reflect 
somehow the committee's position on the political structure (Interview A2/A7).
It  must  be  mentioned that  Matsinhe himself  is  an active  person who,  apart  form being 
spokesman  for  the  Xikhelene  market  committee,  owns  several  barracas  and  employs  several 
vendors.  He is  a church reverend and also a Frelimo member with a position  in the municipal 
district. Thus, according to his declarations, he was involved in the party structure (Interview A7). 
During the municipal election campaign in 2008, he supported Frelimo and the party's candidate for 
the mayor position, David Simango, in an attempt to use his influence at the Xikhelene to gain 
22 Based on summary made by assistant and translated from Shangaan to Portuguese 
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votes. He was accused of having threatened those who did not want to support Simango's campaign 
with expulsion from the market. He denied these accuses, but confirmed his attempts to use his 
influence in order to persuade people to take part in the campaign. However, this situation can be 
perceived as one of the many intrigues that occur in every election campaign, but still it shows his 
involvement  in  the  established  politics,  an  involvement  that  for  certain  persons  may imply an 
economic benefit (Moçambique para todos 2008). Hence, one may think that Matsinhe and other 
members of the market committee, within the networks of power, have personally a lot at stake 
regarding their contacts and careers, a condition that in turn can make them less responsive to the 
vendors. Some informants among the vendors complained that the committee did not discuss their 
concerns more aggressively with the authorities. According to them, the relation with the committee 
did not use to be like this, but changed their ways at a certain point. Some remembered that the 
committee formerly cooperated a lot more with vendor, defending their rights, for example during 
the period when the Praça dos Combatentes was occupied and the marketplace established. Now, 
their only concern was to collect taxes. Or, as one vendors stated: “the committee doesn't exist any 
more” (Interviews, vendors).
The  committee  is  so  closely  connected  to  the  municipality  that  Matsinhe  thought  the 
members deserved the same free medical heath care system from which the municipal officials 
were  already  benefiting.  According  to  Matsinhe,  the  committee  had  the  power  to  oppose  the 
government, to gather the vendors, organize demonstrations and strikes, but as they were working 
in collaboration with the municipality they did not take this kind of actions. As such, he expressed 
frustration about the committee not being acknowledged as a part of the municipality nor receiving 
favours and privileges connected to it.  At the same time, the committee is forced into a certain 
responsiveness towards the vendors because its office is located in the middle of the Xikhelene so 
that they have to socialize with the vendors everyday. The vendors were complaining a lot about the 
demolition of their barracas and he had to be there, talk to them and answer their questions . The 
committee members are also vendors themselves and find themselves in the same situation as other 
vendors at the Xikhelene (Interview A7). Furthermore, it has happened that a market committee 
spokesman in Maputo was killed, probably for using the position to feather his own nest and not 
working in the vendors' best interests (Lindell 2008). Consequently, the relation to the vendors may 
still be crucial. Hence, for the Xikhelene market committee, the structure creates a squeeze between 
the CMM and the vendors. In this case, this condition became obvious and the situation appeared to 
be very stressful for the members of the committee.
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6.4.3 The vendors' understanding of their rights
Without exception, the atmosphere among the vendors was rather bad. People were angry 
with the politicians for the demolition of the market.  Even people that  did not  personally lose 
barracas reacted as well on the way the vendors had been treated. Some complained that they had 
been removed like one removes an ant-hill from one's property,  and that people were scattered 
around in the area “de qualquer maneira”: not knowing where to go or what to do. A woman said 
that they had been thrown away like one gets rid of rotten tomatoes. Where did the anger come 
from? Even though people knew that this was a state reserve which the state could claim back at 
any moment, there was a widespread discontent about the way the authorities had dealt with the 
matter.  It  had  to  be  some logics  behind  it.  Further  on  I  shall  discuss  what  were  the  vendors' 
expectations.
The common perspective among my informants who were selling at the marketplace was 
that  they accepted that  the government  needed the place.  They were also appreciating that  the 
problems of flooding finally would be solved and that the municipality would build infrastructures. 
Most of them, particularly older vendors, or vendors that had been there from the beginning, were 
familiar with the legal status of the market as it was expressed in the document that the committee 
had signed in accordance with the CMM: that the Praça dos Combatentes was a state reserve and 
that the state could claim it back at any time. But, there were also other informants at the market, 
particularly the younger people, or vendors who had started their activities at a later time, who were 
not completely aware of the agreement. One vendor claimed that the market had been there for such 
a long time now, that many people had stopped believing that the CMM would reclaim the place. 
The vendors who were ignorant of the legal status of the market were also less likely to justify the 
incident. These people made themselves more vulnerable to it, by not having found an alternative 
strategy. 
Some vendors were talking about the president or the state metaphorically as a  father and 
about themselves as the children who were being expelled from the house. They admitted they 
knew it was wrong to occupy state property. At the same time they saw the removal of the barracas 
as a punishment and argued that it was disproportionate to  expel the children from the house just 
because they did one wrong thing. 
The behaviour of the current government is not wanted. Because, we're all the children of the 
president, the republic, the municipality and the Frelimo party. But still, they don't consider us 
as the children of this house. It should not happen this way. (…) the government acted in a way 
that is totally contrary to how it is supposed to act. It treated us like dogs (Interview C4). 
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According to this man's opinion, the authorities were responsible for looking out for the population 
and  taking  care  of  their  well-being.  It  did  not  matter  if  the  market  was  unauthorized  to  be  a 
marketplace, the authorities had to take a responsibility for the lives of the people. 
As concluded in chapter 5, the Xikhelene market may, as a favourable place for petty trade, 
be  seen  as  contributor  to  society  and  as  a  manifestation  of  how the  Mozambican  society has 
developed since liberation, which in the opinion of many of the vendors, the politicians cannot, or 
should not turn their backs on. Such factors shaped the argumentations of some of the vendors. For 
example, it could not be favourable to the society to separate 7000 people from their income. One 
hair-dresser at the marketplace argued that there were many families that relied on the marketplace 
as their only income. So removing one barraca would  not only affect the life of one person, but 
also the lives of several people, wives and children. Sending children to school demands family 
finances and it is for the best of the society that the children remain in school. He himself had four 
kids and argued that his entire family was dependent on what he earned at the Xikhelene. Hence, 
the argument was that it was not only the future of individuals that depended on the marketplace, 
but  also  society.  Another  frequent  argument  was  that  the  removal  of  vendors  would  lead  to 
increased crime. Matsinhe told that there were many vendors he knew who used to do “bad things, 
crime, because hunger is hunger”. As people got other opportunities at the Xikhelene, they were 
able to change their ways, develop themselves and become better people. One vendor joked about 
that  the  municipality now certainly would  have to  build  a  large prison at  the place where  the 
marketplace had been, because all the vendors would now have to become criminals. Hence, it was 
an argument among vendors that it would be in the interest of the authorities to find solutions for 
the vendors who had to be removed (Interviews).
Matsinhe from the Xikhelene market committee, also stressed that the Xikhelene plays a 
role in society:   
The government insisted that  this  place is  not  fit  for  constructing an informal marketplace, 
because it was supposed to be used as a roundabout and a street. However, the fact that people 
don't have jobs, the only possibility they have to sustain their families is to sell at the Xikhelene. 
During the first phase, the trade was exercised by women, widows and some unemployed men 
due to the unemployment-crisis.  Other factors that contributed was the return of the former 
workers in the DDR and with the end of the civil war many of the demobilized that didn't have 
access to employment joined us at the marketplace and the reduction of the miners in South 
Africa. So, vending at the market means an activity to guarantee the support of their families. 
Because of  this,  we want  that  the  government  will  provide us  with a  place where  we  can 
exercise  our  activity.  (…)  Destroying  Xikhelene  is  like  destroying  Mozambique.  This  is 
Mozambique and all kinds of people are gathered here (Interview A2).
102
This  conveys  the idea that the Xikhelene market is  a  result  of  the general  development of the 
country and that people use it because they have no other choice, even though the authorities do not 
accept the occupation of the Praça dos Combatentes. 
Several  of  the  vendors  pointed  out  that,  during  the  period  when  the  marketplace  was 
demolished, they had been promised another place to conduct their selling activity. However, it is 
difficult to say whether this derived from a misunderstanding or an actual promise made at that 
point. One vendor mentioned a space originally planned for being a cemetery, that was suitable for 
building a marketplace (Interviews, vendors). As mentioned above, there were also, according to 
city-councillor Luís Nhaca, ongoing negotiations for a suitable place. A rumour circulated among 
the vendors about the existence of such plans. It was also an expectancy that the municipality would 
treat the Xikhelene the same way it dealt with the wholesalers' market, that was previously situated 
in Baixa, but moved to Zimpeto. In this case the CMM had, with World Bank financial assistance, 
provided  infrastructure  like  new  barracas  and  pavement.  According  to  Matsinhe,  the  market 
committee was demanding that the CMM would show them a place to start building a new market. 
In the case of almost all my informants at the marketplace, the general opinion was that the 
authorities should have been responsible for solving the problem by relocating the Xikhelene to 
another place.  It  was a widespread point of view and there were strong opinions about it.  The 
disappointment as this did not occur, came thereafter. Consequently, there was neither any will to 
cooperate with the authorities, during the reconstruction process. The resettlement that took place 
was not respected (Interviews, vendors). 
According to  my findings,  the logic  among the vendors concerning this  question boiled 
down to the following statements: First, among the vendors, the most important argument was that 
a lot of people were dependent on the Xikhelene, and that the CMM should not turn its back to this 
aspect. Second, the vendors have been emphasizing the importance of this specific marketplace in a 
context where it is difficult to get other jobs. The ASSOTSI, the Xikhelene market committee and 
also some vendors have expressed a notion of street trade as a consequence of the development of 
society in wider terms. Hence, the Xikhelene is a result of the society and a part of it and, for many 
of the vendors, it felt natural that the authorities should deal with this fact. This logic was also 
present among municipal representatives. However,  for the ASSOTSI and the municipality,  this 
view did not seem to “out-compete” the notion of the Xikhelene's legal status as “informal” and 
occupied, which puts a larger part  of the responsibility on the shoulders of the vendors. Third, 
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deriving from the arguments above, but also from earlier CMM plans to relocate the Xikhelene, the 
event  of  the  relocation  of  the  Malanga  market,  promises,  but  possibly  just  rumours  and 
misunderstandings, there was a strong expectation among the vendors that the CMM would treat 
the matter differently and that they had the right to be treated differently. This has contributed to the 
vendors' anger, frustration, opposing reaction to CMM decisions and lack of will to cooperate. 
6.4.4 The vendor's room for manoeuvre
When informants at the Xikhelene were asked about what they did, or how they reacted 
when their market stalls were removed, they claimed that there was nothing to do about it because 
the municipality was there with armed police and dogs. A typical statement was that “one simply 
does not oppose the government's decisions”. The notion of  resistance implied more a physical 
resistance,  like  making  barricades  or  striking  rather  than  trying  to  organize  and  to  exercise 
influence. People manifested a certain fear of attracting too much attention to themselves through 
oppositional  actions.  For  example,  one  informant  who  had  participated  in  organizing  a 
demonstration for demanding the provision of state services and drainage at the marketplace, was 
identified and sent a warning letter, according to which she would be prosecuted if she participated 
in similar actions in the future (Interviews). 
Still, one vendor confessed that he and some others had tried to appeal to the mass-media to 
cover their stories and how the lost of the barracas influenced people, but without any result.  
We tried to invite the people of the TVM, but they did not show up. And definitely not the STV, 
which shows that they're all institutions of the government, which maybe told them they should 
not go to the Xikhelene. With the newspapers it's the same, they did not come to see what was 
going on (Interview C4).  
Except from this  attempt,  no vendors told about any attempts to influence the decision-making 
process. 
Why  were  the  vendors  so  unprepared?  All  the  vendors  whom  I  interviewed  lacked 
information about what was going on. They did not know very well what was being built. Most of 
them claimed that  before the demolition, they believed that only the activity conducted on the 
streets  was  going  to  be  removed,  as  in  accordance  to  what  had  been  said  during  the  election 
campaign.  Most  of  them claimed that  they had not  got  an  absolutely clear  message  about  the 
demolition until two days before the process started. Some claimed that they had not been informed 
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at all. One vendor said that the committee had spread the news by informing one person and relied 
on that the message would be transmitted from one person to the next. However, in this way people 
could not distinguish real facts from gossips or rumours. A lot of rumours and stories circulated at 
the marketplace, usually spread by word of mouth, so people did not necessarily trust what they 
heard. No meeting about the reconstruction of the market was held in which the vendors took part. 
Or at least not a meeting that included the majority of the vendors. The vendors did not have any 
accurate knowledge about what was being built, but rather a vague idea. Some thought that there 
was going to be built a cars sales outlet. Others thought that the municipality was going to build a 
parking space. One man thought that they were going to build a hotel. One boy came out with the 
idea that they were probably going to make the Praça dos Combatentes look prettier in advance of 
the FIFA World Cup, organized in South Africa in 2010 and aiming probably to attract tourists and 
other foreigners to Maputo. Some knew that they were building a terminal for collective transport, 
but  there  was  no  knowledge about  exactly where  and whether  the  CMM would  remove more 
barracas. Again, the vendors' knowledge was in general based on rumours rather than access to 
official statements or documents. 
If possible, the committee could, for example, have used the aims of the ProMaputo political 
reform, in the vendors' favour in this case23.  The vendors and the market committee did not have 
any knowledge about the ProMaputo or the aims of decentralization as part of a municipal political 
reform. Moreover, the vendor-committee knew nothing about the RPF. I have not even been able to 
obtain any Portuguese version of the RPF. If the provisions of the RPF are to be followed, local 
organizations should be familiar with its content as a reference point when evaluating the process of 
decision. They should also have known that the RPF was strictly connected to World Bank policies 
and that the World Bank is a main financial operator for various ongoing projects. However, the 
World Bank is not financially involved in the reconstruction of the Praça dos Combatentes, but it 
could still be possible to appeal to the World Bank as it may be regarded as an important provider 
for the urban development as a whole and therefore partly responsible. For example, one may argue 
that it would not have been so urgent or attractive to rehabilitate the Praça dos Combatentes, if the 
municipality had not thought about reopening the highway of Av. Julius Nyerere, a project which is 
directly financed by World Bank funds. Hence, it may be pointed out, whether its representatives 
like it or not, that the World Bank is an operator that is involved and should have been responsible 
for monitoring the RAP24. 
23 See sub-chapter 4.5
24 See sub-chapter 6.2
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6.5 Conclusion: governance in the process of rehabilitation
In  this  chapter,  the  decision  making  process  for  resettlement  of  the  Xikhelene  vendors 
before the reconstruction of the Praça dos Combatentes has been discussed. It was not a viable 
resettlement, but rather a removal of vendors in order to make space for the reconstruction works. 
The vendors were removed without being compensated for their losses and the CMM did not assure 
an alternative place to sell. The CMM was not obliged to provide any such things as the Xikhelene 
is  a class “D” marketplace,  built  on an occupied space in the city.  The decision was canalized 
through the municipal bairro secretary and the market committees of the Xikhelene and the nearby 
marketplaces,  the Mucoriane and the 1.  de Junho.  For  many of the vendors,  the consequences 
became dramatic. This conclusion will answer the second two research questions for this thesis:  
What characterizes the decision making process of resettling the Xikhelene vendors?
What explains the way in which the vendors responded to the resettlement?
The decision making process did not bear in this case the marks of a strong substantial 
democracy. According to Törnquist (2004) the substantial democracy should imply a  voice from 
below,  through  representative  organizations  and  a  local  participation  in  the  decision-making 
process. Good governance ideals  as  recommended by the  World  Bank (1997)  and the  Human 
Development Report of 1993 also reflect such aims. Through the adoption of the RPF and aims of 
policy changes in the ProMaputo plan, the CMM is also striving to deepen its democracy according 
to such aims. According to the RPF, it should not matter that the Xikhelene was situated on an 
occupied space. To avoid conflict with the vendors, the CMM conducted an awareness campaign 
where several meetings were held. Some vendors took part in the meetings along with the market 
committee,  the  ASSOTSI,  the  bairro secretary and  councillors.  At  the  last  meeting  the  mayor 
participated. This awareness campaign was used to give out information about what was going to 
happen,  to  persuade the market  committee and the vendors,  to  present  a  certain  picture  of  the 
situation and to define the “rules of the game”. The task of the civil organizations: the ASSOTSI 
and  the  market  committee  was  delegated  from  the  CMM.  They  played  an  important  part  in 
transferring the contents of the awareness campaign to the vendors and the committee was used to 
design the resettlement. The vendors were left unable to influence the decision making. 
To understand what characterizes the decision-making process, it  is necessary to analyse 
how the structure of governance has developed and how it serves as a background decision making. 
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The Xikhelene market committee started as an organization opposing the state efforts to get rid of 
vendor  activity  at  the  Praça  dos  Combatentes.  It  did  also  function  independently  as  an 
administrator. This may be well understood as Friedman (1992) explains, as a civil organization 
working  in  the  interest  of  the  marginalized,  opposing  the  centralized  state  and  attempting  to 
improve service provision. The market committee still has many of these functions: it is responsible 
for administering the market and it has conducted demonstrations to claim municipal support for 
solving the problems of missing waste disposal and floods. As a representative organization, the 
market  committee  has  been  important  for  the  vendors'  ability  to  secure  their  assets  at  the 
marketplace  in  the  past.  Hence,  the  committee  contributes  in  strengthening  what  according  to 
Friedman (1992),  would  be  the  vendors'  political  power,  or  according  to  Rakodi  (2002),  their 
political capital: it improves the vendors' ability to influence political processes that affect their 
own lives. Friedman (1992) suggests that such organizations should enjoy more legitimacy and that 
they  should  be  strengthened  by  being  able  to  participate  with  the  established  structure  of 
governance. Regarding the policies on street trade, this acceptance and inclusion has certainly taken 
place, as the civil organizations have become crucial in the way the municipality administers the 
street vendors and marketplaces. The ASSOTSI is working continuously in collaboration with the 
CMM for administering retail markets and street trade. The Xikhelene market committee has been 
included into the same structure in order to govern the Xikhelene.  
However, in the case of resettlement of the Xikhelene, the organizations lacked the ability to 
oppose the authorities as a direct result of their involvement with the authorities. As Azarya (1988, 
in Sjögren 1998) claims, the civil organizations' relation to the state may solely be motivated by the 
state's interest  in procuring a cost effective service provision.  According to Dudley (1993), this 
would be a weak form of participation, which does not serve to empower the subjects as they will 
not have any de facto influence in political decision making. Due to scarce financial means, the 
municipal departments have proved inefficient to control the informal development of urban space 
in Maputo, as explained by Jenkins (2001, 2000). Both the ASSOTSI's and the Xikhelene market 
committee have been used as administrative departments. For the CMM, this is a way of regaining 
control over the informal use of urban space, of which the Xikhelene is an example. The CMM's 
acceptance and inclusion of these civil organizations were not motivated by a need to strengthen the 
vendors' political influence, but rather to regain its lost control over the urban space. Hence, this 
participation strategy did not empower the vendors in this case. On the contrary, it resembles more 
the theory of Shleifer & Treisman (2000) who talk about a strategy of  cooptation, which implies 
that it is in the representative organization's interest in situations of conflict to collaborate with the 
state rather than to the organization's base. 
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According  to  Cruz  e  Silva  (2003),  the  ASSOTSI  original  statutes  about  defending  the 
informal  workers'  interests  lost  their  initial  importance  as  the  organisation  got  more  oriented 
towards  the  CMM through  its  memorandum,  losing  contact  with  its  base  in  the  process.  The 
Xikhelene market committee, on the other hand, is generally forced to be more responsive to the 
vendors, as the members are vendors themselves and as their office is located within the market. 
However, in the case of the relocation of Xikhelene vendors during the reconstruction, the market 
committee  was  used  to  carry  through  the  relocation  of  vendors.  It  became  difficult  for  the 
committee to “oppose its own task” by representing the vendors' interest and demand a more viable 
solution  for  the  vendors.  Furthermore,  as  Matsinhe  himself  takes  part  in  the  municipal  district 
administration and has used his influence at  the market to conduct electoral  campaigns for the 
Frelimo party, there are signs indicating that it would not be within his personal interest to oppose 
his employer, the CMM. Still, the empirical findings also show a certain ambiguity in the market 
committee  spokesman's  statements,  which  may  underline  the  way  the  committee  found  itself 
squeezed between the vendors and the CMM in this question. 
In sum, these findings claim that the CMM is governing the society in a top-down manner 
and that it is hard for civil organizations to oppose the authorities. This may be confirmed by earlier 
works discussed in sub-chapter 4.5, for example by Alexander (1997) who claims that the Frelimo 
has a centralized political tradition deriving from its earlier Marxist-Leninist stance and the colonial 
heritage, Paulo et al. (2007) explaining how the municipal institutions are still very hierarchically 
organized,  leaving  little  room for  opposition  from below,  Grest  (1995)  who  claims  that  civil 
organizations  in  Maputo  have  a  tendency to  ally  with  the  state,  rather  than  to  oppose  it  and 
Francisco (2007) sustaining that Mozambican citizens are generally weakly represented by civil 
organizations. However, as Lindell (2008) shows the agendas of the civil organizations and their 
ties to other entities are changing, so that their representativeness may be equally dependent on the 
situation. She describes a situation in which both the ASSOTSI and the market committees display 
a far stronger representativeness than what is portrayed here. This may derive from the fact that the 
organizations did not oppose the CMM's aim of conducting a concrete reconstruction project. In 
other words, both the ASSOTSI and the market committee, may certainly be more representative in 
other  situations.  The  ASSOSTI's  lack  of  responsiveness  may also  derive  from changes  in  the 
organization's general relation with the CMM, which will be discussed in the next sub-chapter. 
At  first  glance,  the  vendors'  response  to  the  demolition  of  the  marketplace  and  the 
resettlement was marked by resignation. What might earlier had functioned as an organized counter  
movement,  as  described  by Polyani  (1957,  in:  Mittelman & Chin  2000)  was  pacified  by their 
108
inclusion into the CMM structure. The vendors did not have access to any medium through which 
they could conduct their resistance, no mass-media and no representative organization. Eventual 
signs  of  physical  violence  were  suppressed  by  the  police.  Drawing  on  Gramsci  (1971,  in: 
Mittelman  & Chin  2000),  the  legal  framework  could  represent  a  discursive  hegemony  as  the 
formalization policy, the categorization of markets into A, B, C and D became the only ground for 
argument or negotiation. As the Xikhelene was a class D and informal market, the discussion was 
already closed. Due to the CMM's awareness campaign, the general lack of information and the 
short time for reaction, the vendors did not gather up under any counter narrative to oppose the 
“rules of the game”. The most common argument was that the authorities should have considered 
the consequences for them, but they did not question the very rules. 
However,  the  anger  and  frustration  among  the  vendors  indicates  that  the  conflict  was 
certainly present even though suppressed. The vendors strongly disagreed with the resettlement that 
took place, they refused to cooperate and to stay at the place they were assigned to. This may derive 
from the fact that it is difficult to move away from the marketplace because people are reliant on the 
way it  functions,  as  highlighted  in  sub-chapter  5.2.  It  may also  be  read  as  an  act  of  passive 
aggression, a sort of war of movement as advanced by Gramsci (1971, in: Mittelman & Chin 2000): 
The vendors immediately left the place which they were assigned to and the construction works 
were  put  to  a  halt  due  to  the  vending  activities  in  the  building  site.  This  aggression  may be 
understood the same way as Orre explained the backgrounds for the 2008 riots in the streets of 
Maputo: there is no representation or opposition which may pose an opportunity to contest a quite 
centralized decision-making process (Fellesrådet for Afrika 2009). 
Still, a better explanation may be the informal nature of the functions of the marketplace, as 
explained in sub-chapter 5.2. The market's functions are largely governed by informal arrangements 
and as Lyons & Snoxell (2004) claim, the functions of such informal markets and the advantages of 
conducting commercial activities there are often embedded in the very place and the proximity to 
the various, necessary contacts. Such functions were not considered during the transfer of vendors. 
As the vendors  were saying,  it  would take a  lot  of time to  re-establish an activity and it  was 
therefore difficult  to  move.  Another  function at  the Xikhelene  that  has  been  mentioned,  is  the 
competition, which makes it difficult to assign vendors to specific places: As one vendor left the 
place they were assigned to and moved the activity to the Av. Julius Nyerere, the others had to 
follow. At the same time, the refusal to cooperate and uncontrollable behaviour of the vendors could 
also  bee  seen  as  infrapolitics as  described  by  Scott  (1990,  in  Mittelman  &  Chin  2000).  The 
tendency to sell in the streets in spite of CMM regulations may also be an example, which the 
authorities  frequently  explained  as  a  negative  behaviour  which  had  to  be  abolished  through 
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awareness campaigns. However, my impression is that nobody can control these dynamics, not the 
authorities and not the vendors. It appears to be rather a trait of the lack of formal procedures at the 
market than a “negative behaviour” among the vendors.
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7.    Conclusion: The Outcome of formalization  
The aim of this conclusion is to give some additional answers to the second two research 
questions  by looking  at  how  formalization affected  the  process  of  decision  making before  the 
resettlement of the Xikhelene vendors and the vendors' room for action. Finally, this may serve to 
make some comments on the strategy of formalization and consider some recommendations.
As summarized in sub-chapter 5.4 there have been some phases of strategies conducted and 
laws implemented that have affected the way the Xikhelene market operates. Consequently, the way 
that the Xikhelene operates has been formalized, becoming thus more formal than it used to be. In 
chapter  6  some  final  steps  of  formalization  were  presented:  The  Praça  dos  Combatentes  was 
reconstructed. This implied that the agreement between the market committee and the CMM was 
realized: the vendors had to move from the place without any compensations for the lost values. 
However, about one third of the nucleus of the Xikhelene will remain, which was actually not a part 
of the original contract. This part of the market will be upgraded from the current class D status, the 
CMM will  provide infrastructures,  but  it  was uncertain  during fieldwork whether  the  barracas 
would remain in place, if the change would be beneficial for the vendors who were already there or 
if the new market would be open for new vendors to enter. 
The RPF was implemented as a part of the ProMaputo, and serves as a formalization of 
rights for subjects who are to be resettled and as a certain procedure of securing such rights through 
ideals of participatory governance. The CMM generally adopted the RPF as guidelines, but not 
formally  as  a  directive.  The  CMM  was  thus  not  obliged  to  follow  it  and  the  way  of  its 
implementation was left  to the officials'  own judgement.  Consequently,  two crucial  points were 
ignored.  First  the  aim to  “improve  or  restore  their  livelihoods  in  a  manner  that  maintains  the 
sustainability of their interaction with the economic resources available to them”, which according 
to this analysis were embedded at the very place. Second, according to the findings in this thesis, 
the aim of establishing a truly representative organization was also ignored (PDMM 2006) 
For the vendors at the Xikhelene, formalization did not serve to empower the subjects, as it 
is the aim of the CLEP (2008). On the contrary, they were made more vulnerable by the processes 
of  formalization  conducted  by  the  CMM.  First  and  foremost,  the  Xikhelene  vendors  became 
vulnerable because they did not enjoy the benefits of formalization, such as ownership rights. Thus, 
they  were  left  without  any  formal  rights  they  could  have  appealed  at  during  the  resettlement 
process.
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Second, after the ASSOTSI started working more closely with the CMM, the ASSOTSI has 
had a formalized status into the CMM structure. It is a paradox that the ASSOTSI, as a trade union 
for the “informal sector” with an aim to defend the vendors' informal assets, works only according 
to the legislations and acknowledges the vendors' interests only when they are formally expressed. 
Through  formalization  of  the  organization's  role,  the  ASSOTSI  became  unable  to  defend  the 
interests of the informal vendors on the informal vendors' premises. These findings contradict some 
of the Lindell's (2008) findings from 2002 and 2004 which portray the ASSOTSI in a different way, 
as an organization that was opposing the CMM on behalf of the vendors. This may derive from the 
formalization of the relation between the CMM and the ASSOTSI and the formalization of the 
ASSOTSI's  tasks.  The  market  committee's  ability  to  represent  the  vendors'  interests  was  also 
weakened by their formal task of implementing the resettlement. Hence, the civil organizations lost 
some of their ability to be representative, thus undermining the vendors' room for response.  
Finally,  the  formalization  creates  a  sharper  and  officially  claimed definition  on  what  is 
informal  and  unrecognised  and  what  is  formal  and  recognised,  which  is  unfavourable  for  the 
opportunities for political action of the informal vendors. As shown by the empirical findings, the 
legal framework became the main determinant for decision making. The vendors' argumentation 
became weak compared to the legal definition of the market as a class D market. The vendors were 
aware of, and and even agreed on the logics of this legal status. Hence, referring to Gramsci (1971, 
in: Mittelman & Chin 2000) it even appears that the formalization produced a discursive hegemony, 
which the vendors did not question. Consequently, the Xikhelene vendors enjoyed less security for 
their assets and had less room for political response now, than during the 1980s and 1990s when the 
market committee had a more representative function for the vendors and as the Xikhelene did not 
have a legal definition, except for an indistinct definition on the Praça dos Combatentes as a “state 
reserve”. 
Hansen & Vaa (2004) sustain that the very definition of informality is negotiated through 
processes of governance. The definitions of formality/informality are thus often shaped or modified 
by networks  of  power.  Furthermore,  one of the main aims of the CLEP is  to  secure the stake 
holders' participation in the process of formalization, in order to secure people's assets. According 
to  Lindell  (2008),  Maputo vendors  were able  to  participate  in negotiating the legal  framework 
through the ASSOTSI, which she describes as a quite powerful organization. As the ASSOSTI now 
appear more co-opted into the CMM's aims, the vendors are effectively excluded from the ability to 
shape the  legal  framework.  In  turn,  formalization had a  marginalizing  effect  on the  Xikhelene 
vendors.
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7.1  Policy recommendations
According to the empirical findings of this thesis, formalization in this case appeared not to 
be motivated by empowering the poor or by imposing a pro-poor policy as stressed by the CLEP 
(2008). The vendors at Maputo markets often benefit a lot from formalization, but this is motivated 
by the CMM's needs to regain control over the urban space. When formalizing informal markets, it 
is important to legally empower the vendors. This is not just in order to fight the problem of urban 
poverty, but also to conduct a successful formalization: As two thirds of the Xikhelene vendors had 
to leave as a consequence of formalization, they are likely to procure new, informal strategies to 
generate new income and so the informality is reproduced. 
As suggested by both ILO (2006) and the CLEP (2008), participation of the subjects is a 
major solution for being able to impose a legal framework that works and that would be beneficial 
for the poor. One of the reasons why the resettlement of the Xikhelene vendors was unsuccessful, 
was  that  the  RAP did  not  consider  the  systems  on  which  the  vendors  depended,  which  are 
embedded at the very place of the market. Local participation might have been a valuable tool for 
maintaining such systems by providing information and through a process of negotiation. The RPF, 
which is discussed in sub chapter 6.2,  is  based on ideals  of good governance and it  is  a good 
suggestion for a procedure that can be followed in order to conduct a strong participation strategy. 
Hence, the RPF or some similar framework adapted for conditions in Maputo should be made an 
official part of the CMM policy on marketplaces.     
However,  according  to  the  RPF,  true  local  participation  demands  a  representative 
organization.  In  this  case,  the  process  of  formalization  deprived  both  the  ASSOTSI  and  the 
Xikhelene market  committee of their  abilities  to operate as representative organizations for the 
vendors. Consequently, one should be careful when co-opting or including the civil organizations as 
a formal part of the CMM structure. As they are representing the interests of informal actors, the 
organizations should thus be given the opportunity to operate informally, or they should be given 
some other  incentives  to  be  effectively representative.  Changes  of  the  way civil  organizations 
function, their tasks, the aims of their leaders or their ability to represent their bases as a result of 
formalization, could be a topic for further research.
In the case of the reconstruction of the Praça dos Combatentes, the vendors did not know 
exactly what was happening and they had no information which could have proved favourable to 
their ability to influence the process. For a successful participation strategy, both vendors and the 
representative organizations need access to information which may prove favourable to their cause. 
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Appendix 
List of interviews and conversations
Key informants
A1 27.07.2009 Interview with Ramos Vasconcelos Marrengula, President of the ASSOTSI. 
Transcribed
A2 06.08.2009 Interview with Bernardo Samussone Matsinhe, Spokesman of the Xikhelene 
market-committee. Transcribed
A3 21.08.2009 Interview with Carlos Nelson Quibe, Head of the Municipal Directorate for 
Markets and Fairs. Transcribed
A4 20.08.2009 Conversation with a Chefe de Quarteirão in the Bairro Polana Caniço “B”. 
Summarized
A5 20.08.2009 Conversation with Secretário do Bairro, Polana Caniço “B”. Summarized
A6 01.09.2009 Interview with Luís Nhaca, Councillor of the Municipal Department for 
Urbanization and Planning. Transcribed
A7 04.09.2009 Follow-up interview with Bernardo Samussone Matsinhe, Spokesman of the 
Xikhelene market-committee. Transcribed
A8 25.09.2009 Conversation with Spokesman for the 1. de Junho market-committee. Summarized
A9 17.09.2009 Follow-up interview with Ramos Vasconcelos Marrengula, President of the 
ASSOTSI. Summarized
Other
B1 05.08.2009 Conversation with António Francisco, professor at the IESE, Maputo. Transcribed
Xikhelene Vendors
C1 06.08.2009 Woman 40, vending poultry. Transcribed
C2 10.08.2009 Woman 44, barraca-owner. Transcribed
C3 11.08.2009 Woman 40, vending clothes. Transcribed
C4 19.08.2009 Man 64, owner of storerooms. Summarized
C5 19.08.2009 Man, vending groceries. Summarized
C6 11.09.2009 Man, young, vending clothes. Summarized
C7 07.08.2009 Woman 46, vending rice, beans and sugar. Summarized
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C8 07.08.2009 Woman, vending clothes. Summarized
C9 19.08.2009 Woman 38, vending capulanas. Transcribed
C10 21.08.2009 Man, young, tailor. Transcribed
C11 25.08.2009 Man 21, vending groceries. Transcribed
C12 25.08.2009 Woman 48, barraca-owner. Transcribed
C13 19.08.2009 Three young men, tailors. Summarized
C14 26.08.2009 Man 27, vending clothes. Summarized
C15 31.08.2009 Woman, barraca-owner. Transcribed
C16 01.09.2009 Woman, young, vending second hand clothes. Transcribed
C17 09.09.2009 Woman, vending meat. Transcribed
C18 03.09.2009 Man, young, vending electrical equipment. Transcribed
C19 03.09.2009 Man, young, vending equipment. Transcribed
C20 21.08.2009 Man, vending candy. Summarized
C21 02.09.2009 Man 21, vending fish. Transcribed
C22 02.09.2009 Man, vending soft-drinks. Summarized
C23 01.09.2009 Two men, hairdressers. Summarized
C24 02.09.2009 Man, vending groceries. Summarized
C25 08.09.2009 Man 27, vending DVDs. Summarized
C26 24.09.2009 Young woman, vending poultry. Summarized
C27 08.09.2009 Man 34, hairdresser. Summarized
C28 09.09.2009 Man 32, owner of barraca with hardware and equipment. Summarized
C29 11.09.2009 Man, employee in barraca, vending motor-parts. Summarized
C30 15.09.2009 Two young men, employees in barraca, vending motor-parts. Summarized
Neighbours
D1 23.09.2009 Woman, owner of a barraca. Transcribed
D2 20.09.2009 Woman and man, building and selling furniture. Summarized
D3 25.09.2009 Man, owner of a grocery store, former Xikhelene vendor. Transcribed
122
D4 05.10.2009 Woman, former vendor at the Xikhelene. Transcribed
Interview guides
Interview guide for vendors
1) How is life, working here at the Xikhelene market?
2) Why did you choose the Xikhelene?
1. When did you start vending here?
2. How do you earn money here in comparison to other markets?
3. Why do you not work at another market or as an ambulant vendor?
3) What are you vending?
1. How do you acquire the articles?
2. How much surplus do you earn? 
4) How did the current reconstruction affect your work?
1. How is it different now, compared to  before the reconstruction?
2. Why did you not move to another place?
3. Why did the authorities initiate this reconstruction?
5) Have  you  or  some  other  vendor  lamented  to  the  committee  or  someone  else  about  the 
reconstruction?
1.  Generally, what was the vendors' reaction?
6) How  is  your  contact  with  the  market  committee,  the  ASSOTSI,  The  COMUTRA  or  other 
organizations? 
7) What do the committee do to defend your interests?
1.  What is the committee's role?
2.  What did they do to defend your interests during the resettlement?
8) Name, age? Are you married? How many kids do you have? Where do you live? Do you have some 
other occupation? 
Interview with the ASSOTSI
1) What is you name?
2) What is the ASSOTSI?
3) How does the ASSOTSI work? 
1.  How  is  your  collaboration  with  other  entities,  such  as  other  organizations  and  municipal 
departments?
2. How does the ASSOTSI treat the question of informal vending?
4) How does the law treat informal vending?
1. How do you communicate with informal vendors?
2. How do you defend the vendors' interests?
5) What is the problem of infra-structure at the Xikhelene?
6) What was the vendors' reaction to the reconstruction at the Xikhelene?
1. How did you defend their interests? 
2. What will be built at the Praça dos Combatentes now?
7) How will you define the term “informal”?
Interview with the Xikhelene market committee
1) What is your name. 
1. For how long have you worked with the market organization? 
2. What did you do before?
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2) What is the role of this organization? 
3) How is the Xikhelene organized in accordance to laws and rules?
1. Do you pay fees or taxes to the municipality?
4) Why is it so much informal street trade in Maputo? 
1. Why do people not work in stores? What does the street trade offer, which stores cannot?
2. Why did this market grow up right here?
5) How is the situation at the market right now?
1. How the vendors react to this reconstruction?
2. What did the organization do?
3. What will the municipality do for the vendors who lost market stalls?
4. Did you discuss this with the ASSOTSI?
6) Generally, how is your relation to the municipality?
7) How is you relation to the ASSOTSI?
Follow-up interview with the ASSOTSI and the Xikhelene market committee
1) I am studying the process of decision making in advance of the reconstruction of the Praça dos 
Combatentes and the transference of vendors. I  have the impression that you participated in the 
meetings that took place and that the committee/ASSOTSI played a crucial role in the process?
1. How many meetings took place?
2. Why was it necessary to conduct so many meetings?
3. What happened at the meetings?
4. What operators participated in the meetings?
2) What was the municipality's agenda in these meetings?
3) What was the role and agenda of this organization?
1.  It looks like the committee/ASSOTSI was responsible for the reconstruction taking place without 
conflict with the vendors. How did the municipality communicate this to you?
4) How did you negotiate/resolve the situation with the vendors who ended up without a place to vend?
1. How did the municipality consider this?
5) Do you know why they need a collective transport terminal right there?
6) It seems that the municipality's attitude towards the informal vending has changed a lot since the 
1980s and 90s. They have become less antagonistic towards it. How did this organization play a role 
in negotiation concerning this development?
7) Do you have any written sources that documents the organizations connection to the municipality? 
Interview guide for CMM officials
- I am writing a master thesis about political processes concerning the current reconstruction of the Praça dos 
Combatentes and the market that is situated there.
1) Generally, what is the role of this department?
2) Generally, how do you communicate with the other departments and operators? 
3) Now, it  is  a  reconstruction of the Av.  Julius Nyerere going on,  which will  affect  the Xikhelene 
market. Why are they doing that reconstruction?
1. More broadly speaking, what is the role of this reconstruction in the urban plan?
2. What will be build at the Praça dos Combatentes in that site were the market used to be?
3. What has the role of this department been in this process?
4) How is the legal status of the informal markets in Maputo?
1. What is the legal status of the Xikhelene?
2. It looks like that the municipality has conducted various strategies to govern the markets. How is 
the municipality's current attitude towards these markets?
3. What is the difference between the current mayor and the on before the 2008 election in this 
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matter?
5) What was the vendors' reaction to the demolition of the Xikhelene?
1. What did you do avoid conflict with the vendors?
6) (For the DMMF) How is your cooperation with the ASSOTSI?
1. What  was  the  role  of  the  ASSOTSI  in  the  decision  making  concerning  the  Xikhelene 
reconstruction and transfer of vendors?
2. How did the vendors participate in this process?
7) How do you define the term “informal sector”?
 
Interview guide for neighbours
1) How is it to live here, close to the Xikhelene market?
2) How do you use the market?
1. What products do you buy there?
2. Do you know any people there?  - How do you collaborate with them?
3) Tell me about your own commercial activities! (if you have one)
1. Do you somehow use the Xikhelene in your activity? How?
2. How is it important?
4) Does the market create any problems for you?
5) What do you think about the reconstruction that take place there right now?
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